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Introduction:
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
Derryl N. MacLean
Chapter 1
This volume of essays is based on a conference held in Vancouver, British 
Columbia, and sponsored by the Centre for the Comparative Study of Muslim 
Societies and Cultures (Simon Fraser University, Canada) and the Institute for 
the Study of Muslim Civilisations (Aga Khan University, United Kingdom).1 
The orientation of the essays is on the typologies and contexts of Muslim or 
Islamicate cosmopolitanisms in the past and the possible tensions or conjunctions 
of these cosmopolitanisms with regional cultures, isolated enclaves, empires or 
modern nation-states.2 The perspectives of the past chosen for comparison are 
sought not in the classical cosmopolitan venues (‘Abbasids or Fatimids), but in 
the modern period, primarily in different sub-disciplines of history, and clustered 
around diverse geographic areas: the Swahili coast, Ottoman, Arab, Persianate, 
and Indo-Pakistan. The expectation of the editors is that the data will permit 
the comparison of specific cosmopolitan instances within Muslim contexts 
in the past and hence larger reflections on commonalities and  differences. In 
particular, this book seeks to ask the question, is the concept of cosmopolitanism 
useful for the study of Muslim societies and cultures of the past?  
“Cosmopolitanism”, while a term of considerable antiquity referring to a 
“citizen of the world”, has more recently become a key concept for the recon-
sideration of an array of philosophical, political, cultural, and social issues. As 
Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen suggest, the new cosmopolitan theory has 
focused on six different but related perspectives: a global condition of socio-
cultural interpenetrations, a Kantian philosophy of the universal citizen, a 
political project founded on transnational institutions such as civil society, a 
political project founded on the notion of citizens with multiple identities, an 
internalised orientation towards global engagement and a kind of multicultural 
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competence or practice.3 Indeed, other cosmopolitanism perspectives could be 
located, and it is fair to suggest a plurality of cosmopolitan moments in the past 
and theoretical orientations in the present.4
Much of the discussion of the new critical cosmopolitanism has been situated 
within a contemporary European or North American context of multicultur-
alism or neo-liberalism, with little consideration of Muslim contexts of past 
or present, although this is beginning to change.5 Where Muslim contexts are 
considered, the focus has been either on the cosmopolitanism of Muslim empires, 
usually in an urban framework of humanism or Hellenism, or else contemporary 
Muslim neo-liberal examples projected against fixed identities, parochial intol-
erances or Islamic fundamentalism. 
This location of the discussion of Muslim data has had two quite different 
but interrelated consequences. First, while there is a recognition that Muslims 
inhabited certain forms of cosmopolitanism in the classical past, these are often 
integrated with orientalist notions of an axial Islam founded on Hellenism and 
humanism and challenged by the rise of a less tolerant juristic Islam.6 This tends 
to incorporate a sense that these instances of cosmopolitanism in the  classical past 
are overwhelmed by religionist rigidity and not easily transferable to modernity in 
a historical process. That is, there is a necessary rupture between Muslim cosmo-
politanisms of the past and the present, and yet the possibility of redemption 
through transformation via secularism. Second, much of the public discussion, 
especially among Muslims, consciously frames Muslim cosmopolitanism as the 
other of fundamentalism or political Islam, and thus works  apologetically to 
construct the “good” neo-liberal Muslim by providing a history and a genealogy 
in the past. This type of reading of cosmopolitanism, more Islamic than Muslim, 
has its roots in Islamic modernism, although in the public domain, discussion 
often verges on apologeticism and triumphalism, in a comparison of civilisational 
achievements of Islam and the West, often to the discomfort of the West.7 More 
interestingly, cosmopolitanism does feature in the “Islamisation” of knowledge 
project, wherein science and rationalism are reclaimed for Islamic principles.8
Our contributors were asked to think of cosmopolitanism within their region 
and discipline, with a specific eye on five different issues. First, what theories 
and philosophies of cosmopolitanism resonate in the analysis of your Muslim 
context? Second, what types of cosmopolitanism have been produced within 
your Muslim context? Third, if there is a plurality of cosmopolitanisms, what are 
the differences and similarities in issues of power, status, culture, economy and 
class? Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, what is the relationship between 
the high pan-Islamic and the grassroots vernacular form of cosmopolitanism 
within Muslim contexts?9 To what extent should we read cosmopolitanism as 
an instance of hegemony? Fifth, is it possible to locate a theoretically sound and 
non-essentialist form of Muslim cosmopolitanism? 
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No attempt has been made to determine our contributors’ analyses of cosmo-
politanisms within their Muslim contexts, to operate under a single definition of 
cosmopolitanism, or even to accept that it is a useful framework within which 
to view Muslim societies and cultures. Indeed, one of the values of these essays 
is the diversity of approaches and conclusions, with the authors problematising 
the implications of the notion of cosmopolitanism within their own region, 
discipline and sources. The focus of the essays then is less on theory than on 
actually existing Muslim contexts of cosmopolitanism in the past.10 
The Swahili context is that of a large maritime cosmopolitanism constructing 
cultures around coastal urban areas within an enclave spreading outward from 
the coast. Both of our papers on this area focus on the problematic relationship 
between the high pan-Islamic and the vernacular or local. In Chapter 2, 
Felicitas Becker addresses the relationship between the Swahili cosmopolitan 
coastal culture (itself a sub-type) and the inland village cultures of Tanzania. 
Rather than perceive a one-way spread of cosmopolitan ideas from the urban 
areas to the villages, a process which incorporates and transforms (“converts”), 
Becker envisions a more complex process, in which the villagers have their own 
contexts and rationales for reaching out to the coastal towns and opening up to 
forms of coastal cosmopolitanism.11 They take from this relationship a partici-
pation in a larger economy, worldview, religious notions and ritual practices, 
but at the same time these alone do not define their cosmopolitanism. On the 
contrary, the local consumption of networks (such as those of madrasas and Sufi 
shrines) permits a type of vernacular cosmopolitanism concerned equally with 
local social negotiation and larger cosmopolitan patterns of the Indian Ocean. 
This latter quality does seem to carry with it certain larger frames of “Islamic” 
reference over time.
In Chapter 3, Kai Kresse examines the primary port town of Mombasa and 
the way in which its urban environment historically has produced a certain 
configuration of cosmopolitanism, which focuses on openness to others and 
to the world projected from the social structures of the city.12 His concern is 
the way in which integration processes of certain urban social groups work to 
incorporate others (such as South Asians) in systems of dependency or part-
nership. This marks Swahili cosmopolitanism strikingly as both an “openness 
to the world” and “a pool of experience of the world”, constructed from the 
specific urban environment. Some of this, especially the integration of town 
within a larger Muslim maritime world, is enabled by Islamic structures such as 
pilgrimage and belonging to an ummah, although it is not entirely clear how 
this works locally. Is there an Islamic cosmopolitanism founded on a notion 
of pan-Islamic unity and sustained on the basis of universal rituals? If so, how 
does this relate to the pre-existing vernacular cosmopolitanism that moves away 
from urban areas?
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The Middle East selections are represented within three different historical 
traditions; the Arab, the Turk and the Persian. They also, quite understandably, 
address issues of imperialism and colonialism. Thomas Kuehn in Chapter 4 
descends on the Ottoman experience of constructing empire on the Yemen 
frontier, and asks how Ottoman bureaucrats practiced what he calls “colonial 
cosmopolitanism”. This required a conscious application of other non-Ottoman 
imperial practices, especially British indirect rule through local bridging elites, 
primarily for cost-accounting reasons. The British model, though, filters through 
existing Ottoman models of communal interaction (especially the millet system), 
and these have an impact on the unevenness of the relationship with the Zaydi 
imam and other provincial elites of Yemen. Kuehn suggests a certain incoherence 
to colonial cosmopolitanism on the frontier, with its mixed messages resulting 
in a frontier cosmopolitanism in highland Yemen under the Zaydi imam.13 The 
Ottoman colonial discourse is manifested within specific cultures but also within 
the material foundations of the frontier.
In Chapter 5, Ariel Salzmann focuses both on empire and on the disputation 
of the memory of that empire. Ottoman cosmopolitanism is read primarily as 
inter-communal urbanity, but practiced in complex and multiform ways moving 
between the poles of dhimmitude and convivencia. Thus, as a form of cosmo-
politanism, the Ottoman instance altered in certain ways over time, especially 
under print capitalism, thereby providing polyvalent evidence for modern 
contestations. Salzmann focuses on the socio-political basis for the contestation 
of modern Turkish memory of the Ottoman cosmopolis, with the Hrant Dink 
funeral as an event revealing the contemporary cleavages in memory between 
Istanbul reified politically as a binary Islampolis or cosmopolis. This national 
conversation is ongoing and raises a number of issues about the selective erasure 
of memory within specific junctures of power. And a larger question remains: 
can there be an Islamic cosmopolis where the religion of Islam produces the 
irenic and multi-ethnic passages expected of cosmopolitanism?
In Chapter 6, Will Hanley moves the discussion to the cosmopolis of Alex-
andria under the Ottoman–European capitulations agreement. Focusing on 
communication as the key to understanding the cosmopolitan phenomenon,14 
Hanley details an instance in which communication breaks down in a multi-
lingual and multicultural context: a merchant curses a tax collector and a dispu-
tation breaks out at the cosmopolitan court (primarily run on French principles) 
over the meaning and implications of the Muslim Arab curse. While the legal 
comprehension of the curse seems very cosmopolitan in the sense that the 
cosmopolitan court patterns the definition according to elite perceptions, it 
also suggests a non-cosmopolitan other in Alexandria, who exist to provide 
a dangerous frisson to the elite cosmopolitanism. In a sense, as in orientalist 
binary patterning, the non-cosmopolitan is required for a cosmopolitan project, 
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and Hanley asks whether or not it is possible to conceptualise a cosmopolitanism 
without this quality. The essay reminds us of the classed nature of cosmopoli-
tanisms as well as the perhaps inevitable breakdown of power-based communi-
cation across cultures, and the incomprehension that results.15  
Nile Green, in Chapter 7, approaches an instance of cosmopolitanism within 
a Persianate context. Similar to many of our contributors, Green is reluctant 
to impose a grand cosmopolitan narrative, but instead utilises the notion of 
“culinary cosmopolitanism” to examine the way actual interactions around food 
by Christian Britons and Muslim Iranians serve to facilitate communication 
across borders. To the extent that cosmopolitanism coalesces around openness 
to other cultures, and food codes are notoriously culturally confined and even 
form the basis of exclusive moral codes (one must eat right), it is useful to 
examine the confluence of peoples from two different cosmopolitan practices. 
Green argues that the material historical patterns of the nineteenth century, 
marked in the consumption of commodities such as tea and spices along with 
international rituals, have two unforeseen consequences: it brings British and 
Iranians together in a kind of “culinary sociability” while at the same time 
permitting the “understanding” of difference through displays of consumption. 
Indeed, there is a suggestion that the ability to share food and conversation 
across cultures – what Green calls “face-to-face cosmopolitanism” – was an 
important demonstration of belonging to an elite cosmopolitan class which 
began at last to share “pleasure”.16
The South Asian instances are particularly complicated by the continuing 
disputation of the nature of Muslim history both within India and within Islam, 
with a particular concern for issues of Islamic (rather than Muslim) authen-
ticity. Iftikhar Dadi is concerned with the high culture context of Indo-Islamic 
art in the working out of an imaging for Pakistan, while Muhammad Khalid 
Masud is concerned with the high religious context of fiqh (“jurisprudence”) 
in the context of Islamic movement. Iftikhar Dadi, in Chapter 8, examines 
the polyvalent contexts of Abdur Rahman Chughtai (d. 1975), perhaps the 
most prominent and influential Indo-Pakistani artist. Dadi argues that Chughtai 
revisits and modernises a pre-existing Mughal cosmopolitanism, particularly of 
the era of Akbar, and utilises this as a basis to provide a modern cosmopolitan 
aesthetic for South Asian Muslims, especially in the context of Pakistan.17 The 
procedure entails an orientalism, where Mughal cosmopolitanism is remembered 
within the decolonisation process, and a co-option and essentialism of a deeply 
imagined and embedded Persianate tradition, especially the genre of muraqqaæ 
(album painting) seen as continuous within a Lahore school of art that enables 
Indo-Muslim subjectivity. Mughal modernism has formed one important strand 
of Pakistani cosmopolitanism, which evokes optimism in global terms in the 
process of longing for the larger reified identity of the Persianate miniature.18
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It is fitting that our volume concludes with the wide-ranging essay of 
Muhammad Khalid Masud, who is the only one of our contributors to engage 
explicitly with Islamic data over the long term. Masud is interested in whether 
the modern rise of concern for cultural authenticity in identity has compromised 
openness across cultures and thus obviated the material conditions of cosmo-
politanism within Muslim societies and national cultures.19 Masud tests this 
argument by examining legal opinions in modern South Asia concerning the 
important legal doctrine of tashabbuh bi’l-kuffar (“imitating the non-Muslim”), 
which concerns a range of relationships with non-Muslims, but especially the 
appropriation of cultural symbols. The well-entrenched Indo-Muslim cosmo-
politanism, Masud argues, was compromised by the British imperial project and 
the subsequent forms of nationalism and communalism in the subcontinent. 
As a result, a variety of political and cultural contexts emerged, and these were 
reflected by growing distinctions between religion and culture and the imag-
inings of various forms of openness. The readings of tashabbuh follow this change 
in context, although at the same time the embedment of the concept within 
the larger fiqh syllabus, no matter how much the accommodation, does seem to 
constrain the method and range of interpretation of the legal opinions.
Let me conclude by pointing out several commonalities in our contributors’ 
readings of these cosmopolitanisms of the past. First, with some exceptions, there 
is an apparent reluctance to attribute prominence to the specifically Islamic (i.e. 
religious) elements in their Muslim contexts or cosmopolitan typologies. Here 
the discussion departs from earlier Islamic cosmopolitan studies that mined the 
Qur’an and hadith for normative directives for Muslim mobility or tolerance, 
based especially on the elevation of commerce or knowledge as an Islamic duty; 
that examined scientific or philosophical institutions as evidencing an Islami-
cally oriented global science consuming other cultures; or that saw pan-Islamic 
rituals such as the pilgrimage or spaced prayer as constituting the necessary basis 
for trans-regional mobility or ummicity.20 Islamic religious data then, for our 
contributors, simply becomes one part, perhaps not even the most definitive, of 
the larger puzzle of cosmopolitanisms in Muslim contexts. 
It is not surprising then that there seems to be a related uneasiness about 
locating a “Muslim” cosmopolitanism that is coherent and permeable across 
time and space, due in part to a distrust of grand narratives such as “civilisation” 
and “orientalism”. The cosmopolitanisms that emerge within complex Muslim 
societies and cultures are not all that different from those that arise within 
complex non-Muslim societies and cultures, and this renders the question of 
a “clash of civilisations” nonsensical. The difference in the contexts of cosmo-
politanism seems one of class, stratification, empire and the like, which in 
itself raises questions of subject and analysis. Thus an assumption of a clash of 
civilisations or even a clash of cosmopolitanisms between Islam and the West 
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draws little support from these essays. The actually existing cosmopolitanisms 
constructed in Muslim contexts of the past are part of a human pattern, and we 
need no special theory to account for them.
Our contributors have tended to focus on cosmopolitanisms associated with 
modern imperial formations (Ottoman, Mughal, British, French) and the memory 
of these formations within specific national narratives. Cosmopolitanisms seem 
to be a legacy of empires and their enabling classes more than civilisations. Thus 
the focus of much of the analysis is on the bridging qualities of communication 
and solidarity of those classes who manage the empires as they cross cultures 
within a political economy. This also has implications when the unevenness 
of the decolonisation process and the formation of national agendas produce a 
contemporary contestation of the identity and sustained power of prior imperial 
cosmopolitanisms within entirely different classes.
At the same time, in a final cosmopolitan anxiety, most of our contributors 
want to conceptualise an actually existing cosmopolitanism that permits the 
inclusion of subaltern classes, such as those on the Swahili frontier. These firmly 
rooted classes may be part of a cosmopolitan system, although not themselves 
being cosmopolites, and it is not entirely clear how historians should concep-
tualise this vernacular cosmopolitanism in their understandings of the larger 
phenomenon of cosmopolitanism.21 Indeed, in the final analysis, perhaps the 
most important directive to emerge from the discussions of Muslim contexts of 
the past is this problematic relationship between pan-Muslim, texted forms of 
cosmopolitanism and locally rooted communities with all their complexities.
Notes
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For centuries, the Swahili towns on the East African coast were part of far-
reaching networks: traders and scholars, refined goods and cultural practices 
passed between the ports of Mombasa, Tanga or Zanzibar and other shores of 
the Indian Ocean, from Yemen to South Asia and beyond.2 Their inhabitants 
appreciated and displayed their cultural and commercial connectedness in a 
way that corresponds to a basic understanding of a “cosmopolitan” mindset as 
“outward-looking; appreciative of cultural exchange, of the new and exotic”. 
Until recently, Western observers tended to treat them as anomalies on the edge 
of a barbarian continent full of rural, decidedly inward-looking and parochial 
peasant societies; sometimes even as an Arab “transplant” onto African shores.3 
In the 1980s, a new generation of Swahili scholars began to explore the African 
roots of Swahili culture and, to some extent, the exchange between Swahili 
towns and their African “hinterland”.4 
It has become clear that the African continent, its languages, political prac-
tices and rituals, contributed crucially to the development of Swahili culture 
and society. Nevertheless, the role of non-Swahili African neighbours in more 
recent interactions with the Swahili towns continues to be described as reactive. 
These interactions have certainly been recognised as significant. Jonathon 
Glassman, in his foundational study of nineteenth-century towns, has used 
the phrase “urbanization of the countryside” in order to describe their effects 
during the heyday of the East African slave and ivory trades.5 The rural societies 
close to the towns and trade routes began to converge around sites of exchange, 
while their leaders integrated goods and rituals from the towns into their 
political practice. The ability to practice quasi-urban patterns of conspicuous 
consumption and display became a measure of political success. 
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In this context, during the second half of the nineteenth century, the first 
conversions to Islam occurred in the countryside, initially among the retinues of 
“big men” with privileged access to the trade routes.6 When these conversions 
continued apace and even intensified in the following decades, exasperated 
missionaries and colonial officials tended to explain them with reference to 
the villagers’ deference to the perceived material and cultural sophistication 
of the Muslim towns. Uncouth peasants, they implied, were easily dazzled by 
the displays of an urban culture which European observers by then considered 
decadent and itself parochial.
This chapter examines the conversion of villagers to Islam in the context of 
rural–urban relations and the changes wrought by colonial rule during the 1920s 
and 30s. This was the period when conversions to Islam were most frequent in 
this region, and the evidence indicates that converts conceived of their new 
religion as a means to connect culturally with the coast and its wider networks. 
This chapter aims to show that despite villagers’ determination to be part of such 
networks, their appreciation of the towns was pragmatic and often critical rather 
than retrograde; it was premised on their knowledge of the extreme deprivation 
in the countryside. Moreover, and crucially, I argue that while villagers saw 
conversion to Islam partly as a means to establish allegiance with the cosmo-
politan networks of the coast, they were interested in this allegiance for very 
specific ends set firmly in the context of village politics. 
The adoption of Muslim allegiance formed part of an engagement with the 
fluid political environment created by colonialism. After 1918, the pre-colonial 
“big men” were gone altogether, and their violent and demonstrative political 
practice was gone with them. The presence of the colonial state was fairly 
low key. Indirect rule intermediaries operated on a small scale and changed 
often, making them more obscure figures than the “chiefs” of other indirect 
rule regimes in British Africa.7 Colonial administrators, frustrated by nagging 
economic problems, portrayed local society as inward-looking and passive. The 
increasing visibility of Muslims fit with this stereotype, for in the same measure 
as the East African coast lost its leading economic role, administrators identified 
the region with “coastal sloth” and apathy rather than cosmopolitanism and 
wealth. 
The aim of this chapter is not only to make clear that villagers were far from 
naïve in their efforts to establish religious linkages. Their example also shows, 
I think, that the concept of cosmopolitanism in the Indian Ocean needs to be 
used with caution.8 It is a value-laden term; where people conceive of them-
selves as cosmopolitan they typically imply a contrast with others, often quite 
close by, who are dismissed as provincial. Inasmuch as Swahili townspeople 
extolled the overseas connections of their specific location while, in the same 
breath, sniffing at villagers’ supposed ignorance, their cosmopolitanism was itself 
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parochial and exclusivist. In a sense, the villagers discussed here extended the 
cultural sphere of which the Swahili towns were part – characterised by the 
presence of Islam, an attachment to its holy sites overseas, and a more general 
appreciation of cultural connectedness that can be glossed as cosmopolitan – to 
the countryside. They could be said to have undercut the exclusivist tendencies 
of coastal urban dwellers. But this was not an easy flow of goods and ideas; it 
involved a good deal of hardship and did not actually erase the physical, cultural 
and social barriers between town and countryside. Moreover, the significance 
of Islamic allegiance turns out to be highly place-specific despite the pride both 
recent converts and educated urban Muslims took in the vastness of the Islamic 
cultural sphere in the Indian Ocean. Networks, however vast, can be construed 
quite differently from every one of their nodes, and the outside observer has to 
be careful not to homogenise these differences and to acknowledge the tensions 
between the different constructions. 
Ways of Conversion Among Villagers: The Coastal Connection
[The Muslim] religion did not really come here until the time of the English. In 
the time of the Germans, many people were ignorant. They had no religion.9 
[During my childhood] there were pagans round here, too … Muslims and 
pagans lived together quietly; religion established itself slowly, not forcefully 
… A man and his child might be pagan first and then become Muslim, and 
then they might convert the mother, too.10 
These statements by men from villages situated about 150 kilometres west of the 
Indian Ocean coast clearly mark the difference between the old Muslim towns 
on the coast and the recently converted rural villages.11 They chime with the 
chronology of the growth of rural Muslim communities suggested by August 
Nimtz12 and also with the only written information available specifically for this 
region, provided by Benedictine missionaries. Yet these quotations also hint at 
the difficulties of tracing expansion, which was a quiet, cumulative process that 
produced next to no official record.13 To see how and when villagers became 
Muslim, what induced them to do so and what conversion actually implied for 
them, we have to turn to oral information. 
Oral sources suggest that conversion occurred as part of an active search for 
new ritual and social possibilities, and that villagers interpreted their Muslim 
allegiance to suit the pursuit of divergent aspirations. Local politics were still 
about acquiring dependants but, with the end of slavery and big man-ship, the 
options for doing so and the forms of dependency had changed greatly. For 
aspiring elders within lineage networks, the establishment of mosques presented 
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a chance to claim authority over a ritual site. Villagers without such connections 
or aspirations developed a notion of the Muslim person, and of social relations 
among Muslims, that they could call upon to limit the ambitions of notables. 
For them, self-control, charity and shared humility before God were what made 
a Muslim. The emerging Muslim communities, then, were not based on the 
unanimous acceptance of a new religious vision, but on the convergence of 
different visions and aspirations around shared expressions of social allegiance 
and shared ritual forms. The practical circumstances under which conversion 
occurred signal some of the ways conversion was understood. According to Issa 
Makolela, imamu (long-standing prayer-leader) in Rwangwa, a former village, 
now country town west of the coastal belt:
People who went there [to the coastal towns] from here observed the towns-
people pursuing religious activities. Now they, these pagans,14 said what is 
this thing? … He [Khalifa bin Abdulkarim, leader of the Qadiriyya tarika in 
Lindi] says “This is religion.” “‘Religion’, so what do you do?” He says, “This 
is the religion of the Prophet.” “So how do you obtain it?” – So they convert 
and join this religion.15 
The “religious activities” led by Khalifa were Sufi rituals. In the coastal 
towns, the Sufi orders were growing quickly between the wars, as they absorbed 
many new immigrants to the towns, especially former slaves.16 As Makolela 
makes clear, their performances attracted the interest of visiting villagers. His 
description is typical in that it places the performance of the act of conversion 
on the coast. A first-generation Muslim woman explained further:
I had two maternal uncles [who converted] and my sisters converted too; 
[they said] let’s go to take her [the respondent] to Lindi so that she may 
convert. I went to Lindi, we walked and walked and bought clothing, [they 
asked] so now do you accept Kiswahili as is required for conversion? [I said] I 
want Kiswahili and reject [the ways of] the interior, I want those of Lindi, I 
am going to Lindi to convert.17 
And: 
I went to Lindi and I went straight into the water – aaaaaah! – down into it 
three times, while the teacher was reciting, and in this way I became fit to 
wear the kikoi.18 
Missionaries at Ndanda on the Lindi–Nyasa road in the mid-1930s confirm 
this procedure: while conversion to Islam could be performed in rivers, the sea 
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was preferred.19 To venture into the ocean was a memorable feat for visitors from 
the interior, who mistrusted its opaque waters even more than the townspeople 
themselves.20 Bath and prayer ritually marked the acceptance of Islam. The reli-
gious instruction given prior to performance of the ritual was normally minimal: 
it comprised the basics of prayer and of halal eating. Nevertheless, this action, 
even if it was over in an hour, was apt to mark a new start. 
Yet the practice of conversion in the ocean was increasingly replaced with 
a ritual that could be performed in the villages. Saidi Hamisi Mponda remem-
bered of his father, the first resident shehe (sheikh) of Mnero village, that:
He would also baptise some people who had not yet been baptised before the 
holiday … he would wash them with water, douse them and recite for them 
and they would say shahaduhu la illahi ila allah … that is how you convert.21 
The villages, then, became increasingly ritually independent from the 
coast. But there is a telling detail to the process: it was customary to add salt 
to the water used for the ablution, “to make it resemble sea water”. Within 
the coastal environment, the sea makes a fairly obvious place to perform an 
act of cleansing, of washing off past habits. The adding of salt to the water 
in locations in the interior, however, signals that the role of the sea was not 
merely pragmatic. The use of salt water in the villages was a way to recreate the 
allegiance of Muslims with the coast, hence the sea. Asumini Litanda, quoted 
above, explicitly conceived of her conversion as an affirmation of allegiance 
with Swahili ways over those of the interior. The same point is confirmed 
by the fact that the term used to denote “Muslim” in the Mwera language is 
mulungwana, derived from muungwana, the Swahili term to denote the free-
born citizens of a coastal town. 
The Continuing Attractions of the Towns
Evidently, villagers did not share the colonialists’ increasingly dismissive attitude 
towards the Swahili towns. Ordinary villagers at this time went to town most 
often after harvest, in order to sell bags of sesame and grain:
The shops were in Lindi, so we would take the trouble to sleep on the [barely 
inhabited and lion-infested] Rondo plateau, then to sleep in Ng’apa [on the 
western edge of the coastal belt]; a round trip to Lindi and back would take 
six days. We took all this trouble in order to deliver our sesame seed. We 
would prepare bark cloth sacks to put the sesame in because there were no 
gunny sacks, there were no bags except our bark cloth sacks, and so we went 
to Lindi … When we got back here we would have sore feet … One had to 
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go to Lindi, if you had wanted to sell your crops here, who would have been 
there to buy?22 
Villagers had to travel to town to sell their goods so as to acquire cash with 
which to pay their tax as well as all household necessities, and as there were 
no shops or trading posts in the countryside, they were impressed by what they 
found in town. Informants reminisced about first encounters with salt and sugar, 
about types of cloth and pots and pans.23 Mangoes “for the children back home”, 
coconuts (whose use in cooking had to be learned) and sugar were among the 
novelties carried back from the coast by the pedestrian village traders. Coastal 
towns were a consumer’s heaven. 
It is nevertheless clear that the acceptance of Islam was not just another 
acquisition. Although becoming Muslim was clearly in fashion, the connota-
tions of coastal Islam were too complex to think of it as merely an accessory. 
This becomes clearer if we consider some further nuances in the recollections 
of villagers’ journeys to the coast. Antagonism between coastal towns and rural 
villages had not disappeared entirely. Villagers could expect little comfort on 
visits to town:
They used to sleep in an open yard that had been built for them, like it might 
have been for slaves … There was no thought of sleeping in a guesthouse or 
a large hotel. They would just arrive at this yard and lay themselves down 
to sleep, every one holding on to his load, so that he might sell it in the 
morning. Others slept in a go-down.24 
The reference to the way slaves used to be treated is particularly telling. The 
open yard marked a lack not only of comfort, but also of status. Villagers in town 
were still bumpkins, strangers and potentially dupes. Informants recalled with 
amusement their enthusiasm at simple goods such as sugar, but they also felt that 
they were being short-changed because of their ignorance and were vulnerable 
to exploitation.25 
Still, if their need for “tax money” forced them into exchanges they could not 
control, they also appreciated that the real threat of slavery was over. Informants 
from the villages tend to place the end of slavery at the beginning of the British, 
rather than in the German, period.26 The end of slavery, then, coincided with 
the beginning of the practice of travelling to town to convert. A sense that 
the acceptance of Islam was a way of overcoming a historical social division is 
palpable in some observations by village informants. According to Mohamed 
Athuman Mwindi, elder of an isolated outlying village near Mnero:
Black people started to take an interest in [the Muslim] religion because of 
the Arabs. After they [the Arabs] had stopped ruling, they began to take 
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pity on the black people and to bring them religion … the local people, the 
Africans, began to realise the sweetness of religion. One by one, they agreed 
to come to the Arabs to study. When they returned from there, they had 
progressed because of their learning, thanks to religion.27 
With its reference to the passing of Arab rule, this account pays the “Arabs” 
a somewhat back-handed compliment. They became educators only after they 
had stopped being slavers. 
On the coast, the acceptance of Islam still occurred within a hierarchical 
environment. It is noticeable that conversion “in the sea” is not mentioned 
in connection with the names of the most prominent coastal shehe. Rather, 
these rituals were conducted by less urbane religious experts, not from the stone 
towns, but from the mud huts that surrounded them. There is some irony in 
the fact that, viewed from Mnero, the diverse and – according to self-conscious 
“Arabs” – often rather un-Arab members of coastal society that helped dissem-
inate coastal Muslim practice to villagers coalesced into an apparently homoge-
neous category of “Arab”. Further layers of the significance of villagers becoming 
balungwana emerge if we consider the need and scope for the realignment of 
villagers’ social relationships created by the colonial order. 
Indirect Rule, Economic Marginality and Colonial Local Politics
It is widely accepted that the imposition of colonial rule catalysed religious 
change in African societies. There are many different accounts, though, of 
the causes; they differ especially in regard to the relative importance of the 
rupture and destruction caused by colonialism on one hand, and of more long-
term, constructive social processes within African societies on the other.28 
Concerning the acceptance of Islam, these explanations tend to take one of two 
forms. Some accounts of the spread of Islam under colonial rule revolve around 
the role of pre-existing Muslim groups in colonial states, whether as paragons of 
resistance or as intermediaries of the colonial order, or simply on their increased 
mobility and visibility under colonialism.29 Others focus on the role of Islam as 
a means of forging new communities among ex-slaves and others displaced by 
the colonial order.30 
Neither of these explanations sits entirely comfortably with what we know of 
the problematic, even divisive, role of Muslim allegiance in the late pre-colonial 
past. Nevertheless, elements of both, and especially the second, are relevant to 
the present case. To understand how, we must trace how rural Muslims in the 
interwar period were able to depart from and reinterpret the problematic associ-
ations of Muslim allegiance. For this purpose, we again depend on oral evidence, 
as the European authors of written sources tended to look upon the acceptance 
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of Islam in the villages as a clumsy attempt to appropriate an obsolete social 
ideal. The assertion of continuity with the past inherent in becoming Muslim 
was part of what exasperated missionaries, who thought villagers should want a 
clean break with the bad old days.
Instead, we need to trace the way villagers reinterpreted the significance 
of being Muslim. For this purpose, we have to understand the local, rural 
perspective on colonial rule. While becoming Muslim was not a reaction against 
the colonial order, it was a way of addressing concerns about the dilemmas it 
caused. Despite the brutality of colonial conquest, especially the suppression 
of the Maji Maji uprising in 1905–7 and the First World War, colonial rule in 
Southeast Tanzania was characterised subsequently not by its intensity, but by 
haphazard, intermittent intervention paired with neglect. The colonial state 
was meddlesome, unpredictable and feared, but was also distant most of the 
time. The form of local politics in which Islam became implicated grew up in 
the space around the tenuous and dispersed links between the villages and the 
state that was rather lackadaisically governing them.31 
The hands-off attitude of British administrators was an exasperated response 
to persistent economic problems, reflected in embarrassing tax shortfalls. The 
economic marginalisation of the southeast was a process with many facets, but 
one plain root cause: after the demise of the trade in ivory, slaves and rubber, 
there was nothing very profitable to sell. The problem did not therefore lie 
entirely with natural endowment. While the production of coffee, tea or cocoa 
was out of the question, cotton might have become profitable, and the ongoing 
grain trade less precarious, if there had been a railway or even just a good road. 
As it was, though, villagers depended for their cash income on the grain they 
could carry to town on their own shoulders. Tunduru and Liwale, situated so far 
from the towns that this form of market participation became impractical (for 
the sellers literally ate up their profits on the way to market and back), became 
labour reserves.32
The resulting economic stagnation provided a rationale for the government 
to treat this province with disinterest. For many local people, it spelt misery: the 
need to sell foodstuffs for cash, combined with labour migration by young men, 
contributed to a series of famines in the 1920s and 30s. Since famine relief to the 
area was expensive given the poor transport facilities, administrators cited the 
costs of famine relief as a reason not to provide funds for more productive expen-
diture. The government preferred to finance regions with more secure returns. 
The weakness of indirect rule in Southeast Tanzania has entered the literature 
as an example of the failure of this type of regime among stateless people, but 
it would be misleading to attribute the administrative problems wholly to the 
pre-existing political culture of a “stateless” population.33 Unlike other indirect 
rule intermediaries in the British East and Central Africa, the wakulungwa (“big 
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men”) had no rights over land and operated on a small scale; the same was 
true of the liwali (sub-district officials without putative “traditional” legitimacy) 
that supplanted them when the wakulungwa were found ineffective. Moreover, 
administrators were ready to replace them much more quickly than supposedly 
dynastic rulers elsewhere.34 When liwali were introduced, officials even had to 
drop one candidate of their choice in response to popular protest.35 As “native 
authority” posts were salaried, there was never a shortage of candidates. But 
there was little incentive for them to strive to carry out orders.
The weakness of official intermediaries intensified the characteristic 
 ambiguity of colonial rule, its dependence on forceful incursions on the one 
hand, and the weakness of everyday government on the other, where officials 
substituted rhetoric and performance for active interference.36 In this context, 
intermediaries sought their advantage in personalised stratagems. An unofficial 
hierarchy arose among wakulungwa, based on their individual advantages and 
skills, but traceable even in the official record. Among the handful of waku-
lungwa mentioned by name in official records, Salum Nachinuku stands out by 
the liveliness of informants’ recollections of him.37 He had a pedigree of sorts: 
his father had been a local big man who had avoided taking sides against the 
Germans in 1905, but had sought to protect the people of Mnacho against the 
incursions of their pro-German neighbour, Matola. From 1927 until his death 
in the mid-1930s, Salum Nachinuku passed as a “king” in the sub-district of 
Mnacho. He was made “head mkulungwa” by the provincial administration, an 
honorific title that nevertheless came with special perks. Officials considered him 
reasonable and unusually effective. In Mnacho, he is remembered as somebody 
who got administrators to listen, who obtained famine relief and leniency with 
the collection of taxes in bad harvest years, and who “helped” with the payment 
of taxes by letting people perform tax labour on his fields. 
That his success depended on personal skill is illustrated by the fact that 
his sons failed to carry on his reign; they were not equally skilled at building 
consensus. As a small-scale and transient approximation of the indirect rule 
chief that administrators often looked for in vain, Nachinuku throws into relief 
the lack of continual engagement with the colonial order that characterised 
Southeast Tanzania as a whole. He was also the patron of one of the first mosques 
in the region. 
The disinterest of the colonial rulers in an economically marginal region and 
the flat hierarchies of the local colonial regime combined to keep the colonial 
state remote. Because of this remoteness, certain idioms of colonial politics that 
were directed towards colonial officials remained relatively muted. There was 
little talk of ethnicity, of ethnocentric histories, or territorial claims; where it 
occurred, it tended to be voiced with the support of the Christian missions 
and discussed mostly among mission-educated people.38 In the discursive space 
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elsewhere occupied by these themes, villagers in Southeast Tanzania reinvented 
themselves as coastal and Muslim people. The coast was closer than the colonial 
state, and uungwana, being of the coast, mattered more than ethnic affiliation. 
Being Muslim was its most tangible expression. It is likely, albeit not demon-
strable, that the spread of Islam helped dampen the expression of politicised 
forms of ethnicity. Yet allegiance with the coast drew its relevance from a recent 
permutation of social relationships with deep local roots: from villagers’ efforts 
to redefine social relations in the post-big man era. We can trace these connec-
tions by examining more closely the early history of rural mosques.
The Narratives of Mosque Founders
The following account of the foundation of the mosque in Rwangwa is by Issa 
Makolela, an imamu of this mosque. He no longer leads prayers there due to his 
frailty (he is over eighty), but is still involved in its administration.39 
I had a maternal uncle,40 Bakari Chiwaka. He went to Zanzibar to study; 
when he came back they [the elders of Rwangwa] settled on the plan to build 
a mosque. He became its shehe and prayer-leader. The person who advised 
him to build the mosque was Mzee Zuberi bin Athuman, his maternal uncle.41 
 As for where they got their religion from, he [Chiwaka] had studied in 
Zanzibar, but this religion first arrived in Kilwa. It was in Kilwa that the first 
followers of the Prophet lived … from Kilwa it spread to Lindi, in Lindi there 
were shehe who were well educated, one of them had studied in Mombasa, and 
this one who had been to Mombasa taught Shehe Khalifa bin Abdulkarim.42 
So the religion grew … Now when they built this mosque, they realised their 
shehe [Chiwaka] could not teach in it because of his other commitments, so 
they went to the shehe in Lindi and came back with his student mwalimu Bakari 
Cholicho. He came here, they built him a house and he taught the children … 
 [Mzee Cholicho] became a teacher because of his father. When [the father] 
saw that he was a good youth, he brought him to the shehe [in Lindi] to study. 
He was from right here, from the mainland, from Mbemba43 … When an 
elder from round here arrived there [in town] saying we want a youth to come 
to us so he can teach our children, the shehe [Abdulkarim] said yes, we have 
a youth from right where you come from, and gave them Cholicho. 
Makolela specifies a number of key elements in the foundation of this mosque. 
Individual villagers took the initiative to acquire learning, turning to the coast 
as the authoritative source. But the establishment of the mosque required the 
collective initiative of elders, of locally influential men. Often, the role of these 
elders is described by saying that they “provided the plot” for it.44 
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It could seem, then, that by founding mosques the elders finally achieved 
what had long eluded them: a firm grasp of authority based on control of the 
sites of collective ritual. Yet prayer was still far from the only important ritual. 
Moreover, Makolela makes an implicit distinction between religious expertise 
and authority over the mosque. Religious expertise was available to any inter-
ested individual (see Mzee Cholicho, for example) but the authority to establish 
a mosque rested with a particular group of elders. As one Rwangwa informant 
put it, “you can be a shehe because of your learning, or because you are an 
elder”.45 While Bakari Cholicho was the main teacher at the mosque, authority 
over it derived from Zuberi bin Athumani, who is said to have “supplied the 
plot” for it. It had been passed down first to Zuberi’s nephew Bakari Chiwaka, 
then to Bakari Chiwaka’s nephew Issa Makolela. In other words, it followed 
a matrilineal line of succession, in keeping with long-standing local practice. 
The elders who sought to establish a new form of ritual authority still deferred 
to the established pattern. The authority of elders, then, was delicately patched 
together from their family connections, their role in local politics (including, 
but not limited to, the indirect rule regime) and their patronage of ritual sites. 
Information on another location, Nkowe/Mpumbe, confirms this, and high-
lights a further aspect of the multiplicity of sources of authority that elders were 
juggling. Issa Makolela from Rwangwa acknowledged the primacy (in time, at 
any rate) of this mosque: 
The first mosque around here was down there, going down the slope towards 
Nkowe Mission … It was the mosque of Hamisi Mohamed Mbalika … He 
was from right here, from Mpumbe … He had studied in Kilwa. 
The current imamu of this mosque, Musa Saidi Mbalika, breaks the pattern 
of matrilineal succession by describing himself as the son of the founder and 
first imamu, Hamisi Mohamed Mbalika, rather than his nephew. According to 
him, his father studied in Mchinga, a coastal settlement north of Lindi, with a 
teacher trained by Khalifa bin Abdulkarim of Lindi. As in Rwangwa and Mnero, 
it is said that Mbalika the elder was himself the nephew (sister’s son) of the man 
who “provided the plot” for the mosque. This patron, in turn, was one of a group 
of elders who at the time represented the two lineages considered indigenous 
to Mpumbe. Another informant on Mpumbe, Rashid Liegwe, effortlessly passed 
from this group of elders to the figure of the “founder” of one of these lineages, 
“Mzee Chiumbi”, whose shrine was said to have been near the present location 
of the mosque.46 
In effect, Mbalika the younger and Liegwe’s accounts create a historical 
continuity between this powerful non-Muslim ancestor, formerly the patron of 
a shrine, and the present-day mosque. The discursive effort to place mosques 
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at the centre of relationships between leading “indigenous” lineages is tangible. 
Old-fashioned matrilineal succession, from maternal uncle to nephew, is the 
most important inter-generational link in these accounts. At the same time, 
Salum Nachinuku’s career shows that colonial restatements of tradition for the 
purpose of “native administration” and the claim to authority over a mosque 
could be mutually reinforcing. 
The Republicanism of Rural Muslims: Village Politics under 
Colonial Rule
We have now encountered two different narratives of the growth of Muslim 
communities whose members understood their Muslim allegiance as a form of 
participation in the cosmopolitan networks of the coast. On one hand, individual 
villagers became Muslim in a determined bid to shed the “ways of the mainland” 
and acquire those of the coast. On the other, local notables, or aspiring notables, 
came together to arrange for the building of mosques. The question remains how 
these two narratives fit together. Oral accounts by members of the networks 
around mosques give the impression that mosques needed the endorsement of 
elders in order to succeed, but it makes as much sense to say that elders needed 
mosques to substantiate their status. At the same time, while some of the attrac-
tions of the coast are clear enough, we have to ask what being “of the coast” 
meant for ordinary villagers during their everyday interactions in the villages. 
We can arrive at an answer by considering villagers’ efforts to define social 
interaction among Muslims. They indicate that the reference to Islam helped 
in formulating local power relationships that were less harsh, less forceful and 
less confrontational than in the days of the big men. 
This reformulation was the outcome of tense negotiation between notables 
and commoners no less than of shared weariness of the warlike past. The collapse 
of hierarchies based on long-distance trade was felt in the villages as well as on 
the coast. Nevertheless, villagers continued to recognise internal hierarchies. 
The foundation narrative of the mosque in Rwangwa puts a very clear emphasis 
on the pre-eminence of “indigenous” lineages. At the other end of the social 
scale, the missionary Joachim Ammann in the 1930s noted the contempt in 
which former slaves were held in the Mnero area if they had severed their links 
with their former owners and not made a success of living independently: “they 
are like birds who have plucked out their own feathers”.47 Conversely, a niece 
of Salum Nachinuku and granddaughter of Mzee Nachinuku was quite explicit 
about the fact that her grandfather “bought women and men”, and that as his 
descendant she had a privileged position in the village.48 Still, it is difficult to 
get a clear sense of internal hierarchies among villagers. We can take some leads 
from the narratives in Rwangwa and Mnacho. The networks of elders in the 
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two cases were very differently structured: in Rwangwa the network was much 
less clearly focused on one person than the network in Mnacho was on Salum 
Nachinuku. In both cases, though, the mosque elders came from among the 
wenyeji, the “local people” who controlled the good soils of the location. That 
they had protected this access carefully is clear from oral accounts and, in the 
case of Mnacho, the salience of cross-cousin marriage until the interwar period. 
On the other hand, oral accounts also make clear that unlike river valley fields, 
rain-fed upland plots were freely available. The 352,000 inhabitants ascribed 
to Southern province in 1938, after all, shared an area similar in size to that 
of Scotland.49 For more marginal inhabitants of these locations, this implied a 
constant need to weigh advantages: they could stay near the good soils, put up 
with the wenyeji’s privilege-mongering and hope for a share of good valley land, 
or they could move on to open up unclaimed land and leave the wenyeji be. 
The wenyeji, in other words, had to integrate other villagers or risk losing 
them. Like the big men, the wenyeji found they had to have people around them; 
yet, compared to the big men, the wenyeji now had few means of control. The 
ease with which villagers transferred allegiance and residence between different 
wakulungwa’s abodes is a recurring theme in the colonial record.50 There was 
always somewhere else to go. In the words of one informant, even now, after “we 
[people] have flooded the world”, there is fallow land left.51 The interwar period 
was a time of gradual consolidation of settlement, with missionaries noting signs 
of the increase of population from the late 1930s. This probably constituted 
no more than a return to population densities before the disasters of the early 
colonial period. Before those had occurred, the big men had held together their 
people with a balance of threat and patronage. Now, the wenyeji had to look 
elsewhere for a means to hold on to people. Arguably, the public life around 
mosques was part of the answer. 
Villagers outside the wenyeji’s networks, though, had no interest in allowing 
the wenyeji to define their role in the mosques as a justification for quasi-aris-
tocratic privilege. They were challenged to define the role of the mosques and 
their patrons in a way that safeguarded their position within the villages. Here 
lies the origin of the emphasis on collective decisions, on cooperation and the 
absence of force in villagers’ descriptions of social life among Muslims.52 They 
were normative statements. That control over ritual sites or ritual expertise ran 
in families, as in the case of the mosques, was not new. Moreover, the earlier 
big men, too, had had to reckon with independent ritual experts. But the kind 
of leadership that villagers now ascribed to mosque sponsors was very different 
from the bare-knuckled power exerted by the big men of earlier generations. 
Villagers’ interpretation of leadership among Muslims aimed to circumscribe the 
authority of the big men’s successors. In order to pass as Muslim leaders, they 
had to be cooperative. 
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We have one fairly explicit statement of this connection from an earlier 
period. In 1968, just over a generation after the time when the mosques discussed 
here were founded, a respondent from Undendeuli, an area to the northwest of 
the region we are concerned with but part of the same ethnic and cultural 
continuum, claimed that the chief Muslim proselytiser in the area particularly 
impressed his audience “by his assertion that only those who were well thought 
of by others and who respected and loved others could become Muslims”.53 The 
same view still prevails among villagers in Southeast Tanzania. Again and again, 
when asked why one should want to become Muslim, respondents said that 
Islam was a good religion because it made you a “good” person, and that meant 
a patient, cooperative, calm person. 
These claims resonate with several notions that have been operative among 
people in our region over time. They recall the serenity and calm that coastal 
Muslims associated with Muslim scholars. They are also in keeping with a 
penchant for close social control and mistrust of social differentiation that 
have been described as characteristic of peasant societies, notwithstanding 
the fact that peasant societies tend to be imagined as the very antithesis of 
 cosmopolitan ones: as inward-looking and mistrustful of all that is new and 
strange.54 In the present time, they carry an echo of post-colonial officials’ insis-
tence on the docility of villagers. Against the background of what in the 1920s 
and 30s was recent experience, though, they form an assertion of a new way of 
handling local politics, underpinned by a new Muslim identity. The contrast 
with the violent pre-colonial big men could not be clearer.55 Discussing local 
politics among the Ndendeuli at the end of the colonial period, John Iliffe 
remarked on their “republican constitution”.56 Arguably, this republicanism 
was  characteristic of rural Muslim communities all the way from the coast to 
Undendeuli.57 The location of mosques at the centre of villages, rather than in 
the wilderness where traditional sacrificial sites were found, is emblematic for 
their social embeddedness and the subjection of their patrons to the judgement 
of others. 
Conclusions
It is now clearer why the material elements of coastal culture and mulungwana 
identity remained significant among rural Muslims. Being of the coast meant 
not being a pawn in a big man’s game, being the equal of townspeople within 
the Indian Ocean region and, last not least, having a stake in the affairs of 
one’s place of residence. Villagers, then, consciously recognised and appreciated 
coastal towns as cosmopolitan in the sense of “open to and connected with 
the world”, while finding importance in this cosmopolitanism partly for quite 
parochial reasons. 
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Villagers’ appreciation of coastal cosmopolitanism took in both its material 
elements (buckets, sugar) and its ritual and religious ones (Sufi performance), 
without any sense of contrast or contradiction between them. They sought to 
participate in the circulation of goods, but at the same time the rural students 
joining coastal madrasa and returning up country as teachers in their own right 
participated in the far-flung networks of educational exchange with which 
Muslim cosmopolitanism in the western Indian Ocean is more often identified. 
Islamic allegiance was an essential element of mediation between the disparate 
participants in the expanding networks that tied rural areas to the coast. It did 
not, however, fully define this cosmopolitanism: villagers brought their own 
aims and interpretations to their relations with coastal Muslim networks. 
By the last decade of colonial rule, Muslims outnumbered Christians 
and followers of indigenous religion in most districts of Southeast Tanzania. 
Mosques were still being founded. It had become customary to mark the month 
of Ramadhan – sometimes, the missionaries sneered, with a beer fest – and 
even though few people in the villages visited the mosque daily, an increasing 
number of people walked long distances to attend prayers on Fridays.58 Islam had 
become a fundamental, albeit low profile, element of social life. The numbers 
we know of are almost entirely taken from mission statistics. While it is not 
easy to say whether this implies a bias towards exaggeration or underestimation, 
the overall tendency is beyond dispute. For instance, in 1935, missionaries at 
Nkowe estimated the population there at 1,700 Christians, 7,000 pagans and 
4,000 Muslims.59 In spite of the mission presence, Muslims already outnumbered 
Christians. When taking stock after the Second World War, the missionaries 
described themselves as ministering to a minority facing a no longer “pagan”, 
but Muslim majority.60 
The Muslim communities that grew up around mosques were formed by the 
convergence of disparate networks and separate interests, and accommodated 
diverging individual ways of being Muslim. In this sense, they were cosmo-
politan without losing their local and in some ways parochial character. The 
appeal to shared Muslim norms formed part of a process of negotiation over 
their practical application, rather than expressing a pre-existing consensus. 
The idea of “community” was not homogenous, but socially composed; not 
based on consensus, but on a shared language with which to contend for a 
stake.61 Different people in the villages emphasised different aspects of what it 
meant to be Muslim. It was thanks to this openness to interpretation that being 
Muslim became so widely relevant. For aspiring leaders, it was a way of claiming 
authority, while for commoners it gave grounds to make their allegiance condi-
tional upon the leaders’ behaviour. 
Inasmuch as it was a debate over the definition of social relations and obli-
gations, the acceptance of Islam in the villages continued the pattern of pre-
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colonial struggles for citizenship on the coast. In fact, it could be seen as a 
quiet appropriation of citizenship in the Indian Ocean region. Yet neither oral 
memory nor written sources retain information on actual conflict over the defi-
nition of uenyeji (roughly “citizen status”) and its implications. In part, this 
reflects the intrinsic weaknesses of oral sources – the tendency of informants to 
speak of the past using an unspecific “we”, and to discount dissenting voices. 
Nevertheless, the emphasis on consensus is not merely ideological. Compared 
to the pre- and early colonial period, there was now less at stake in local power 
struggles, and they were less destructive.
Although negotiations on an intimate level have shaped the record, the 
process just discussed also forms part of large-scale change, of a new kind of 
integration of the Indian Ocean region that was catalysed by colonialism, but 
entirely independent of its interests. Even if the dynamics of conversion were 
primarily local, it drew villagers into a frame of reference for defining progress 
and citizenship that connected them to other shores of the Indian Ocean, and 
continues to be operational today.
Nevertheless, villagers’ acquisition of this cosmopolitan allegiance did not 
obliterate the differences between them and townspeople, either in terms of 
standard of living or culture, and it was not owed to inclusive attitudes towards 
villagers on the part of most townspeople. Sufi leaders such as Khalifa bin 
Abdulkarim did work to draw villagers into their cultural sphere, but their 
everyday experience in town was still one of marginality. Arguably, villagers 
sought Muslim allegiance partly because of their continuing marginality: rela-
tions of social discontinuity and exclusion between town and countryside, rather 
than the sort of urbane “multiculturalist” outlook it is tempting to associate 
with cosmopolitanism, drove the expansion of the cosmopolitan religio-cultural 
sphere of the Swahili coast. 
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Interrogating “Cosmopolitanism” in an Indian 
Ocean Setting: Thinking Through Mombasa 
on the Swahili Coast
Kai Kresse
Chapter 3
Preliminary Remarks
“Any conception of ‘cosmopolitan society’ … ought to reflect the historical 
struggles on which it builds”.1 This conviction, that Edward Simpson and I 
formulated when discussing a string of research projects on Islam and cosmo-
politanism in the western Indian Ocean, might provide a guideline for this 
discussion of representative historical narratives of Mombasa, an ancient port 
town on the East African Swahili coast. As early as 1505, when the Portuguese 
first conquered and destroyed it, Mombasa was a city with about 10,000 inhab-
itants and multi-storey stone buildings; it was at the centre of Indian Ocean 
trade networks exchanging gold and cloth between Sofala and Cambay, and also 
an important port for ivory and lumber trade. The population consisted largely 
of Africans, had a notable minority of Indian (Gujarati) traders, and was ruled 
by “Moors” of Arab and African complexion.2 My aim here is to interrogate the 
historical underpinnings of the town’s seemingly obvious  cosmopolitan char-
acter. The historical sketches I use are necessarily selective, and the point here is 
to think through some of Mombasa’s urban features and the historical processes 
behind them in order to think critically about “cosmopolitanism” more generally. 
Readers should note that Ibn Battuta’s brief descriptions of fourteenth-century 
Mombasa,3 Portuguese accounts of the city,4 historical dictionaries on Swahili 
language use,5 and biographies of urban residents all provide further entry points 
for discussion, beyond the scope of this chapter. But let us first turn to some 
general considerations.
To my mind, cosmopolitanism is not an exclusively urban phenomenon. 
Even though in pronounced urban contexts we are more likely to encounter 
cosmopolitan attitudes and ways of living – reflecting an open, receptive and 
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
— 32 —
well-informed perspective on a world that seems interconnected – this does not 
mean that people in less urban contexts could not become cosmopolitan. This is 
documented, for example, for rural Anatolia from the late nineteenth century,6 
or for contemporary northern Pakistan;7 in littoral contexts, this also applies 
to coastal southern Tanzania,8 and for the historically developed Hadrami 
networks spanning the Indian Ocean.9 Also, urban experience does not neces-
sarily lead to a cosmopolitan attitude. Georg Simmel’s foundational essay in 
urban sociology, on the “metropolis and mental life”,10 helps to illustrate this. 
There, Simmel shows how individuals confronted with the constant presence of 
others develop protective mechanisms in their psychology and social behaviour. 
These shield them from an over-stimulus of pressures, demands and signs that 
might otherwise harm their mental balance. Such a fundamental ambivalence, 
leading to social distance and estrangement among citizens, is often seen as 
a characteristic experience of Western urbanity and modernity. Living among 
strangers, without the comfort and orientation that comes with being a member 
of a social community, individuals develop habits to avoid social interaction and 
set themselves apart from others – though in fact they are yearning for company. 
So if the “metropolitan” context does not include a “cosmopolitan” sense of 
being but offers potential for as well as resistance against “cosmopolitanism”, 
there is little basis for assuming that the social world of human experience 
becomes more “cosmopolitan” by default or historical progress(ion). 
The realisation of cosmopolitanism as a social and intellectual project remains 
a challenge to people in different contexts and regions around the world. This 
links us back to Immanuel Kant, who was a major inspiration for Simmel and a 
leading advocate of cosmopolitanism himself. For Kant, cosmopolitanism, as the 
vision of a common society of all human beings, is a given task emerging out of 
the fundamentally ambivalent nature of being human. As Kant put it, human 
beings taken collectively are “unable to do without peaceful conviviality while 
at the same time they cannot avoid disliking and despising each other”.11 These 
internal tensions between needs, feelings and obligations lead to the idea of a 
global unity that is constantly threatened from within. The possibility of its real-
isation then seems linked to the successful use of strategies of “adaptivity” as the 
means by which to alter and adjust oneself to changing circumstances of social 
interaction and possible confrontation. For Kant, humans are truly awkward 
social beings who are driven by an unsettling “unsociable sociability” (ungesellige 
Geselligkeit). From this perspective, the need to be sociable creates a drive to 
further exposure to more human beings, an increase of social contacts. Once 
established, these lead to more tensions and antagonisms, and finally a renewed 
need to re-adjust society from within. Thus we see a kind of progressive circular 
movement at work, pushed forward by the discrepancy between a moral vision 
of cosmopolitanism (as a unifying force) and the empirical human diversity. For 
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society, this means we should expect a continuous process of shifting phases of 
social approximation, opposition and re-ordering – a picture of ongoing struggles 
and ever-changing alliances within which individuals find their own pathways.
Interestingly, an ethnography of cosmopolitanism in Jamaica12 uses Kant and 
Simmel to retell “modernity” in terms of local experience, bringing into view a 
largely negative side (or under-belly) of the common Western narrative through 
the historical experiences of displacement, slavery and colonialism, and their 
eventual overcoming. These experiences have shaped the larger social sphere of 
interconnectedness within which Jamaicans now interact. Local consciousness 
of historical woes and social ties to the wider world underpins distinct perfor-
mative ways in which this experience is creatively expressed and negotiated 
in everyday life, for example in music, verbal art, ritual, religion and politics. 
Wardle’s ethnography shows how Jamaicans have cultivated emphatic and 
locally peculiar senses of individuality, apocalypse and egalitarianism, and he 
argues that this represents a more pronounced case of cosmopolitanism than the 
prototypical “Western” one, for better or for worse. 
As we are concerned here with the historical dynamics that constitute cosmo-
politanism on the Swahili coast, some of these comparative features may play 
a role, such as forms of colonial experience and slavery, religion, and different 
social groups and hierarchies interacting and shifting in their relationships. 
Recent research in Indian Ocean contexts has claimed that cosmopolitanism 
may coexist in parallel with “parochialism”,13 or with a “resolute localism” of 
groups whose diasporic networks are organised around a “homeland”. The label 
“local cosmopolitans” for these people14 indicates no contradiction, just like 
“cosmopolitan patriots” for others.15 These aspects however will not play a 
major role in the discussion here, nor will the programmatic aspects of “Islamic 
cosmopolitanism”.16 What I suggest, in the concluding conceptual reflections 
below, is that undergoing a certain set of social experiences under particular 
historical conditions may bring people to cultivate specific ways of dealing with 
their social world, navigating it more skilfully. In conclusion, I reflect on the 
relevance of what I have come to see as three interrelated sub-aspects of cosmo-
politanism (that we may encounter in Muslim contexts as well as elsewhere). 
These are – and casting them in German provides better conceptual clarity and 
visible consistency here, with a view to how the world is perceived, experienced 
and navigated – Weltoffenheit, openness to the world; Welterfahrung, significant 
experience of the world; and finally, Weltgewandtheit, the skill of dealing flexibly 
with the world.
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Mombasa and the Swahili Coast: “Cosmopolitan”?
Mombasa and the port towns of the Swahili coast belong to the kind of social 
urban environments that invite the adjective “cosmopolitan” – an outlook of 
openness to others and the world as a whole, building upon experiences and 
connections that go well beyond the established realms of family, community 
or nation. Over a millennium of coastal social history including the presence 
of Islam and trade networks that connect the urban port settlements to places 
across the western Indian Ocean attest to this. So too does a long established 
lingua franca that has facilitated communication between groups and indi-
viduals of widely different backgrounds. This is Kiswahili, an African language 
which has integrated a large amount of vocabulary from a variety of linguistically 
unrelated languages (most prominently Arabic) through long periods of social 
contact. Finally, interactive connections to relatives and social and religious 
peers all over the world, whether new or long established, are all factors that 
play an important role. Thus the Indian Ocean networks established and facili-
tated through trade, religion, kinship and language are regarded as the pillars 
on which such assumptions of cosmopolitanism can be built. Indeed, the social 
and historical features typical of the towns on the Swahili coast – in terms of 
architecture, the variety of languages heard and the kinds of people seen in the 
streets – may call for the qualification “cosmopolitan” provides more emphati-
cally than many other places, and we can find the label readily employed in the 
literature.17 
Yet we have to take care that the use of “cosmopolitanism” does not become 
superficial or meaningless, nor should it be imposed by the social scientist with 
a particular heuristic intention or research goal in mind. To represent social 
dynamics appropriately, the analytic terms used for reflection upon the historical 
or ethnographic material should emerge from social experience. In this respect, a 
focus on Swahili urban communities may suggest the use of “cosmopolitanism”, 
as multiple and extended connections to the world outside obviously shape the 
inside of their social world. This is well documented in the literature, and below 
I will recount historical processes of urban reconstruction in which outsiders 
become members of the social community. As strangers become insiders, 
insiders may well become cosmopolitans. Indeed, they may become likely to 
see themselves, and act toward others, with a view to a variety of possibilities 
and options, including previously foreign perspectives that have been integrated 
into their own social world. This could be called an attitude of “having a wider 
world in mind” – which is generally what I would describe as “cosmopolitan”. 
The aspect of having options is significant here, since we are concerned with a 
social world that envelops or incorporates others, or at least important aspects 
of them. Such a plurality for the Swahili context has been emphasised by a 
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range of scholars, also with a view to Islam and Muslim identity.18 Loimeier 
and Seesemann19 relate this plurality to an emphatically “global” outlook of 
Muslims in the region, through networks of education, pilgrimage and trade. 
Using the expression “the global worlds of the Swahili” (in itself not unprob-
lematic in presenting “the Swahili” as a unitary group), they highlight a “cosmo-
politan outlook” for this region. Without such a connotation, the term “global 
world” – coined by Claude Markovits in his historical study of Hindu merchant 
networks from Sindh to emphasise their all-pervasive presence and effective 
global networks20 – would seem tautological or redundant. 
Here, I want to convey how such an enduring impression of cosmopoli-
tanism in the region has led to Mombasa being shaped by historical processes 
of outsider integration, in both real and potential terms. Looking at these, I 
discuss the fundamentally related matters of unity and diversity, in relation to 
simple and more complex conceptions of “cosmopolitanism”. Hereby, notions 
of fundamental social “ambivalence” and “adaptivity” internal to the described 
urban context will become crucial. My reflections seek to take on the social and 
cultural specifics of the case of Mombasa but also to contribute to more general 
reflections on cosmopolitanism. I sketch out how a process of “integrating 
difference” shapes the profile and outlook of an urban community that, with 
a view to its sustained yet ever-changing internal diversity, can be described 
as a “community of strangers”.21 Through phases of common historical expe-
rience on the same social platform – rather than through a glossed-over “shared 
history” – groups and individuals create and sustain a heightened awareness 
of internal tensions and ambivalence, in Mombasa and elsewhere. Based on 
the knowledge of difference, then, this also encompasses the sense of an ever-
widening potential of unity – a possible wider world to live in, so to speak. Still, 
the vision of such a potential draws from the experience of coping with disunity: 
“If it makes sense to speak generally of ‘Indian Ocean cosmopolitanism’, it is in 
this sense of social contestation based on a struggle with history that is not so 
much shared as held in common”.22 This also resonates with Kwame Anthony 
Appiah’s reflections on cosmopolitanism as an approach to the way that human 
beings, while living in a “world of strangers” under heightened conditions of 
globalisation, need to engage and interact with each other.23
Introducing Mombasa
With well over half a million inhabitants, Mombasa is Kenya’s second largest 
city. Having East Africa’s biggest modern port terminal, it is the most important 
regional entry point for international trade goods. It has a long and chequered 
history under changing rulers and colonial administrators – the Portuguese, 
the Omani Arabs, the British – attracting merchants, traders, labourers and 
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sailors from along the shores of East Africa as well as across the Indian Ocean, 
integrating newcomers and sheltering refugees. In each case social connections 
between Mombasa and the wider world were fostered by these processes. The 
movements of people back and forth, in and out of the city, shaped different 
historical layers of social networks that were more or less fragile and became 
more or less rooted with every wave of immigrants and emigrants that were 
coming to and leaving the town in intervals that were determined by economic 
cycles, wars or political expansions. 
To illustrate the inherent connectedness of local experience in everyday life 
in Mombasa today, to a diversity of places across the Indian Ocean, let me turn 
to the street where I lived during a year’s fieldwork in the late 1990s. I stayed 
in the Old Town, in the neighbourhood of Kibokoni, near Fort Jesus, built by 
the Portuguese in 1593. The people living around me came from a variety of 
different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds. Most families residing in the neigh-
bourhood had been there for a couple of generations. My flat, rented from a 
Bohra landlady, was on the first floor of a house, above an Ethiopian restaurant. 
Next to me, a flat of the same size was occupied by a young Swahili bachelor 
(and later also his wife). Underneath him was the practice of a medical doctor 
of South Asian descent. Across the street, a Hadhrami-Arab in his sixties ran 
a repair shop for electric appliances together with his son, sub-specialising in 
second-hand fridges. His wife was of part-Arab, part-Indonesian background 
with most of her family based in Bahrain. Next door to them was a Hindu-
Indian ironmonger’s shop on the one side, and a couple of private houses on 
the other. Then came a barbershop run by a Baluchi, completing the string of 
ground floor shops. On the corner, there was a small bakery run by Somalis. 
Opposite it, on my side of the road, was a newly opened Swahili restaurant 
offering popular local dishes for affordable prices, well frequented by the Old 
Town community. 
The shops on the ground floor on the other side of the road included: a 
small convenience store run by Somalis; a pan-leaf shop where a middle-aged 
Hindu man with a fancy rockabilly haircut was in charge; a simple gym or 
fitness studio for men offering weights, boxing and karate classes, from which 
male voices emanated; a laundry; several more convenience stores; and finally, 
another Swahili restaurant further down. The street itself was also creatively 
turned into business space, with Mijikenda women from the coastal hinterlands 
using the pavements as vending spaces for fruit and, on two other spots on the 
pavement, a couple of male tailors (one Mijikenda and one from upcountry) 
with pedal-driven Singer machines were strategically placed; a few more small 
open food and grocery stalls completed the picture. This was rounded off by 
a small mosque with some concrete benches in front of it. Around afternoon 
and evening prayers, groups of men would socialise here in barazas, exchanging 
“Comopolitanism” in an Indian Ocean Setting
— 37 —
their views on local events or discussing the daily news of the world. At home, 
many had satellite TV and followed global news closely, on CNN, the BBC 
or Al-Jazeera, in addition to the national channels. For many, the interest in 
what was going on in other parts of the world had very personal dimensions, 
as they had relatives and friends living abroad. Indeed, many of my Kibokoni 
friends and acquaintances had siblings, cousins, aunts or uncles living in North 
America, Europe or one of the wealthy Gulf States. People in Mombasa, in my 
experience, were often not only well informed about the world, but also well 
connected to its economic and political regions of power, through kin and social 
peers. Also, many of those based in Mombasa at the time had already had long 
and significant travelling and working experiences abroad.
This scene may well evoke a sense of docile intermingling of diverse people, 
and of a vivid sociability on the streets of Old Town Mombasa. It may also convey 
an active interest in the wider world in relation to one’s own (by following 
global news and politics). And it mirrors a sense of inherent connectivity to 
other regions, from the coastal hinterlands almost in sight to faraway places 
in upcountry Kenya, on other Indian Ocean littorals and elsewhere. Indeed, 
without reference to these, urban life here cannot really be understood. This 
illustrates the need for a translocal research perspective, one that anticipates 
and includes the many possible ways in which a spatial as well as historical 
“beyond” (the “trans-”) informs and shapes social action and interaction.24 In 
Mombasa – as elsewhere around the world – appearances on the surface of social 
life already refer to such a beyond and thus bring attention to how the town and 
the wider world are invariably interconnected. From the perspective of social 
actors, such interconnectivity links us to the theme of “cosmopolitanism” as a 
conscious sense of being fundamentally connected to, and embedded within, a 
wider social universe beyond the actual sphere of one’s own immediate experi-
ences. Thinking, acting and behaving “with the wider world in mind”, so to 
speak, constitutes a cosmopolitan attitude for individuals. 
Still, the presence of social diversity in a place underpinned by historical 
layers of comings and goings is not sufficient to qualify “cosmopolitanism” 
completely. While it is clear that Mombasa and other Swahili port towns in 
different historical phases cannot be understood without a view to their connect-
edness to the Indian Ocean and the wider outside world, it does not follow that 
an all-embracing and unifying “Indian Ocean cosmopolitanism” can easily be 
assumed due to the presence of social elsewheres in the local here and now. 
This would be a “lazy” use of cosmopolitanism25 that does not aim to grasp the 
complex social reality and the historical processes leading to it. 
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History of Mombasa: Integrating Outsiders
I will now recount a historical sketch of Mombasa’s urban social dynamics based 
on two seminal accounts of the history of Mombasa.26 Over different periods and 
on different levels, the city’s structural demographic process can be described 
as “integrating outsiders”. Elsewhere I have discussed how the label “Swahili” 
was used as a variable relational term for a range of people in different historical 
phases, and how a “Swahili context” emerged out of the negotiation vis-à-vis 
others, such as “African” and “Arab” – but also “Indian”.27 
With a focus on the Mijikenda hinterland peoples in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, Justin Willis introduces a characterisation of the ethnonym 
“Swahili” as people “of whatever origin, whose personal networks of patronage 
or clientage were located within the towns, participating in a patronage system 
based ultimately on access to the credit networks of the Indian Ocean”,28 and 
functioning largely under the mantle of Islam. This usefully incorporates both 
patrons and clients, which is provocative since it makes the urban patricians 
(waungwana) and their dependants, servants and slaves (watumwa) fall into the 
same general category, as citizens. Wealthy urban traders sought further depen-
dants, since people (in terms of labour) were the ultimate source of status and 
power.29 Newcomers became Muslims and were integrated into the respective 
trade and subsistence systems while accepting dependency status.30 There were, 
however, many levels of dependency, and through success in trade, reward by 
patron or marriage, upward social mobility was possible. In exceptional cases, 
people could transform their status from dependant to patrician, from mtumwa 
to mwungwana. 
According to Frederick Berg,31 paradigmatic processes of the integration of 
related outsiders into the city are clearly documented from the seventeenth 
century onward, when a particular socio-political structure of the Swahili urban 
community of Mombasa developed, the so-called “Twelve Tribes” (Thenashara 
Taifa). The “Twelve Tribe” structure of Mombasa developed out of political 
instability in the neighbouring hinterland regions, causing groups of refugees 
and migrants to move to Mombasa for shelter and security. An urban core 
structure of four taifa evolved on Mombasa Island, around which five incoming 
taifa from urban environments on the northern coast were grouped, forming the 
Nine Tribes (Tisa Taifa). In complementary movements from the south and west 
of Mombasa, three taifa merged forces on the island by the 1630s, to form the 
so-called Three Tribes (Thelatha Taifa) in their own settlement in the southwest 
of Mombasa Island. This spatial division marked the long-ongoing rivalry 
between these two urban moieties. Still, altogether Berg described Mombasa 
as “an exceptionally successful example of a pre-colonial Swahili city state” 
because of its readiness to adopt “foreign” Swahili into the urban community.32 
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As urban subgroups that originated from elsewhere and later became recog-
nised as authentic insiders, the Twelve Tribes mark historical processes of inte-
gration. These could only take place because of a common (or unifying) religion, 
language and trade interests. The town thus functioned as both centre and guar-
antor of political power and social interaction.
So far, I have emphasised how the integration of outsiders was crucial to the 
formation of Mombasa’s urban community, involving aspects of demographic 
social diversity that created a wider social unity. Nevertheless, despite such 
integrative features and appearances, the established public ideology of Swahili 
urban society seemed to be strongly hierarchical and exclusive. Thereby, the 
sphere of civilisation, uungwana, inside the town is juxtaposed to ushenzi, the 
wilderness, outside of it. Characteristics of uungwana also include politeness 
and good manners, with a refined vocabulary and elaborate ways of talking. 
Being Muslim is part of this conception too and, ideally, being wealthy (through 
trade). As most of these features are performance-related and can be acquired 
and developed through practice, there is no categorical division line between 
citizens, despite the hierarchical character of urban ideology.
Mombasa’s urban subdivisions and rivalries of the colonial period were also 
reflected in dance societies, such as the beni for men33 and the lelemama for 
women.34 These organisations served as vehicles for the integration of outsiders 
into urban society, while at the same time they pronounced existent rivalries 
between groups, mostly associated with town quarters, mitaa. As such, they 
were part of an intermediary Swahili continuum, which was open-ended at the 
bottom. Somewhat paradoxically, it allowed access to a society characterised by 
its internal inequality while it was, in principle, open to everyone. While inside 
this urban continuum everything depended on the negotiation of status, no one 
was excluded from the outset. Still, the ideology of hierarchy and status in actual 
social discourse was an important means to conserve the existent hierarchical 
structure of society. This may be why dependency in terms of serfdom or slavery 
(utumwa), structurally a kind of funnel through which outsiders were integrated 
into urban society, was ideologically cast as a concrete layer of distinct status. 
The ambivalence of utumwa expresses the inherent tension between open inte-
gration and strict subjection to social hierarchy. In practice, both aspects worked 
and were employed in different ways at the same time. Utumwa, a dependency 
system linked to urban and Indian Ocean trade networks, sustained the patrician 
class (waungwana) through a wide scope of services by labourers and dependants 
(watumwa), but it also posed a potential danger to it from within. Such ambiva-
lence and interdependence has historically been at the core of social relation-
ships in Swahili urban contexts.
Through this historical sketch, we have seen integration processes making 
incoming migrants members of the inner urban community. Their integration 
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also increased the scope of social experiences from which Mombasa could draw in 
the future. The mitaa and taifa represent a wider political unity, which, however, 
could never be without tension. Rather, internal differences and antagonisms 
were part of the unity that was gained, highlighting the ambivalence of urban 
cosmopolitanism and the processes producing it. Systems and relationships of 
dependency could also be employed as access points and channels into the urban 
community, bearing the possibility of transforming one’s personal status. Thus the 
urban scenario, boosted by the multiplicity of sources, resources and  experiences 
underpinning the community, broadened the citizens’ outlook on the world. Yet 
a restrictive and exclusivist urban ideology remained strong, and its proclaimed 
antagonisms and hierarchies continued to be important reference points. 
South Asians in Mombasa
Another example demonstrating Mombasa’s cosmopolitan potential is that of 
the South Asian communities. Here I deal with the Badala, Sunni Muslims from 
Cutch35 who, as a historical group of sailors and shipbuilders, are reported to 
have integrated well into the Swahili urban community – in contrast to most 
other South Asians.36 I base my account on Cynthia Salvadori37 who worked 
closely with members of the communities and provides personal narratives and 
life histories of Cutchi and Gujarati immigrant families from the mid and late 
nineteenth century.
Trade connections between the West Indian and East African coasts have 
existed for many centuries, and a major boost in economic interest for Cutch 
merchants and traders in East Africa was triggered by Sultan Said’s move from 
Oman to Zanzibar in 1837. This included political and economic control of most 
of the Swahili ports and opened up many opportunities for traders, suppliers and 
middlemen, so that the scale of economic activity and the number of people 
engaged in it reached a whole new dimension. Indian businessmen became 
the financiers not only of the Sultan’s house but also increasingly of Arab 
and European traders. This continued throughout the British colonial period 
(beginning in 1895). Indian merchants financed major economic investments, 
including trade and transport infrastructure; for Mombasa, this meant especially 
the modern port and the East African railway line. Over time, a remarkable 
diversity of South Asian residents, with a range of ethnic and linguistic back-
grounds, social status and religious affiliations was developing.38 Among the 
Muslims, three groups of Shias with origins in Gujarat were especially prom-
inent: the Ismailis, the Shia Ithnasharis and the Daudi Bohras. Other significant 
groups included former railway workers (mostly Punjabis) who stayed on after 
completing their contracts. There were also merchants, traders and shop owners 
of Muslim and Hindu backgrounds, and a number of caste groups who found or 
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created opportunities matching their professions. According to the accounts, 
incoming Indian migrants had a good sense about the services needed, and 
were quick to adapt and contribute, finding their own niche. Often male immi-
grants would come for a trial period before returning to India (or Zanzibar, or 
Lamu) to bring their spouses and families back with them. The occupations of 
Indian groups were very diverse: ironmongers, goldsmiths, launderers (as dhobis) 
and dairy farmers, among others. But probably most prominent and historically 
significant were the merchants and traders who invested in, and partly organised 
and conducted, the trade with African interior markets as well as the trade with 
economic centres and markets across the Indian Ocean, particularly Bombay.39 
The Badala: Indian Muslims becoming “Swahili”?
The Badala, as sailors, seafarers and ship builders from Cutch-Mandvi, have 
had important, long-standing relations with Mombasa. As seasonal visitors, 
incoming citizens (“marrying in”), part-time residents and labour force, they 
have featured in the urban demography for centuries. They were not typical of 
the South Asian immigrants of the nineteenth century, as they were neither 
“newcomers” nor “businessmen” who took advantage of the extended oppor-
tunities. Salvadori highlights as characteristic for the Cutchi Sunnis (which 
include the Badalas) that they associated freely with their Swahili neighbours, 
conversed in good Kiswahili and blended into the urban community – very 
unlike many other South Asians. Having come in as “strangers”, they dissipated 
into and became part of the Swahili social fabric that underlies urban rela-
tions.40 Indeed, due to their readiness to adapt one can argue that they are the 
true cosmopolitans out of a diverse range of South Asians in Mombasa. This 
resonates with observations about Badala–Swahili relations by others41 and, in 
hindsight, also with my own. 
For instance, I worked with two prominent local Swahili intellectuals who 
were brothers: a poet and healer, and an Islamic scholar and former politician 
and publisher. Their paternal grandfather was a Badala captain (nahodha) called 
Juma Bhalo from Cutch who married and (partly) settled in Mombasa in the 
nineteenth century. Both are among the best-known “Swahili” intellectuals, 
in terms of knowledge, verbal capacity, habitus and mannerisms. On many 
different occasions during the months of my fieldwork, I would see them with 
South Asians who were, as I found out, their direct relatives. A close cousin of 
theirs is also known by the name “Juma Bhalo” all along the coast as a famous 
singer of the popular Swahili taarab music, which itself has absorbed prominent 
features of various Arabic and Indian traditions. In fact, the taarab known as the 
prototypical popular “Swahili” music is actually called “Indian taarab” among 
musical experts in Mombasa.42 Most interestingly, such Swahili music, drawing 
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heavily from influences across the ocean, can be qualified in parallel to the way 
that the singer Juma Bhalo is characterised, as “in some way part Indian” yet at 
the same time also as “iconically Swahili”.43 Thus on a different level yet along 
the lines of our discussion above, the Swahili world is again characterised as 
integrating related perspectives, thereby widening its own scope of experience 
and potential in a manner that can aptly be described as “cosmopolitan”.
It is hard to imagine a better illustration of the absorption into the wider 
Swahili community. Under the common mantle of Sunni Islam and under condi-
tions of cohabiting in the neighbourhoods (mitaa) of Mombasa’s urban space, 
close interrelations increased and the sense of community developed accordingly. 
Within the scope of everyday social interaction, intermarriage and common 
participation in religious rituals occurred, as well as in artistic forms of cultural 
creativity (like music). All this contributed to a merging (but not complete 
blending) of groups under the “Swahili” umbrella. There is no lack of evidence 
that urban “Swahili contexts” have absorbed people from various other groups 
over the centuries in similar fashion. Notable examples from “Arab contexts” 
include the Hadhramis and Omanis; from “African contexts” they include the 
Mijikenda and incoming labourers from upcountry.44 For these cases too, Islam 
is a basic common denominator on which social integration is founded. We can 
observe an integration into the Swahili–Sunni–Shafii networks and practices, 
whether on a common historical basis, as in the case of the Hadhramis, from a 
very early stage, or through the blurring of differences between Ibadhi and Shafii 
orientation in the processes of becoming Shafii as in the case of many Omanis in 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, or through conversion to Islam in the 
first place as was the case with some Mijikenda groups and upcountry Africans. 
Beyond religion, the ability to communicate fluently in Kiswahili also unites 
these groups of incoming social agents. 
Interestingly, the Badalas and other South Asian Sunnis hardly feature in 
the research literature on the Swahili coast, while work on the other groups 
has been more prominent. Perhaps this is because their ability to blend into 
their Swahili environment has kept them outside the focus of most research 
conducted so far. In comparison, other South Asian communities are seen to 
be rather inward-looking and exclusive, keeping to and marrying among them-
selves. Largely, this applies to the Muslim Shii Ithnasharis, Ismailis or Bohras, 
but also the Hindus, the Sikhs and the Jains – somewhat reflecting the central 
relevance of caste and social hierarchy in Indian society back across the ocean. 
Consisting then, of a string of distinct social and religious groups linked (partly) 
by shared geographic origin and language, South Asians have overall been seen 
largely as outsiders in East Africa, despite the longevity of their presence. In 
Kiswahili this status is captured nicely by the term wageni, which means both 
“foreigners” and “guests”.45
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Individual Efforts Against Communal Parochialism: An Example
As an extraordinary example among Mombasa’s South Asians, I now discuss the 
case of a prominent Hindu educationalist, social reformer and political activist 
known as “P. D. Master”, following the accounts of his children as given by 
Salvadori.46 He was engaged against norms and restrictions that were imposed 
upon Hindus from within the community, and also against racial bias in colonial 
politics. His example sheds light on the ongoing power of traditionalism, as 
well as liberating activities against it, by committed individuals. P. D. Master 
was born in 1899 in rural Gujarat under the name Purushottandas Dhanjibhai, 
into the Patel community. His journey to Mombasa began when, aged sixteen, 
he ran away from home and school to seek a better education in metropolitan 
Bombay. He enlisted in a school and supported himself as a shoe-shiner. There, 
he was spotted and then employed by a British army officer, first as a valet 
during the First World War and later as a private teacher for his children. They 
called him “Master” as a term of respect, adding this to the abbreviation of 
his first name (“P. D.”), which their father used to call him, and this became 
the name by which he was known. P. D. Master accompanied this family to a 
farm near Jinja in Uganda. Then he left them, heading for Mombasa where he 
became the clerk and administrator for A. B. Patel, an Indian advocate and 
well-known political activist. He became involved in campaigns for civil rights 
and mass education, and helped to build local welfare organisations like the 
Mombasa Women’s Association and the Kenya Theosophical Society. A recog-
nised citizen of Mombasa, well beyond South Asian circles, he was elected to 
raise the Indian flag during the independence celebrations in Mombasa. 
His critical engagement with colonial Kenya is illustrated in a political 
pamphlet (“Master 1923”), in which he spoke out against colonial racism against 
Indians and protested against the ruling of the so-called “white highlands”. This 
had determined that only ethnically “white” people of European origin were 
allowed to own property in the fertile highland region around Nairobi or live 
in certain designated urban areas (also in Mombasa), excluding even wealthy 
Indians who were colonial subjects and had ample financial means. His booklet, 
like other Indian notes of protest, exposed and rejected a basic racist attitude, 
not just among the white settlers but also by the London-based colonial admin-
istration. This, the South Asians felt strongly, actually went against both the 
spirit and the letter of the established rules and conventions of the common 
(and equal) status as “British subject” in a global empire. 
In his own community too, P. D. Master was critical and non-conformist, 
wearing a long beard (against common conventions) as a sign of his “ecumenical” 
leanings and mediating efforts between different religious and social groups. As 
it happened, he seemed to push his liberal views too far when he challenged the 
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traditionalist Hindu prohibition to (re-)marry a widow as unjustifiable. After 
the death of his first wife, P. D. Master decided to look for a Hindu widow 
as his next spouse. He travelled to India and publicised his intentions there, 
despite strong objections from the community and his own parents, who even 
threatened to shun and disown him. He proceeded, and found a much younger 
“child widow” whose parents agreed to marriage. They married and settled in 
Mombasa where they eventually had six children. Yet Mombasa’s Hindu Patel 
community would not accept this rebellion and turned against him, despite all 
his previous achievements. Community leaders decided to shun him and his 
family from community rituals and social interaction. 
In retrospect, one of P. D. Master’s children called her father’s activities of 
social reform “a clash of Global Outlook versus Narrow Views”.47 Her father had 
lived according to his moral convictions that were based on a long educational 
pathway. He rebelled against the rules governing his own community and paid 
the price. We may call this a case of individual cosmopolitan conviction strug-
gling against the strong and ultimately prevailing currents of traditionalism and 
parochialism. This account shows that the emergence of more open-minded 
perspectives and practices by individuals does not easily lead to wider social 
agreement and unity. There is no such rule of “progress” in place, toward a more 
rational or sensitive social world. Similarly, the integration of outsiders into 
an urban community does not resolve the issue of internal conflict, whether 
between or inside groups. 
Conclusion
The Dutch anthropologist A. H. J. Prins48 provides some suggestive ideas about 
the Swahili context as part of a “maritime culture” in general. These are useful to 
consider when thinking about cosmopolitanism in Mombasa as they also help us 
reflect upon the integration of the Badalas into their Swahili urban environment 
in terms other than Islam, highlighting sea-related cultural and occupational 
dimensions in littoral societies with a view to urban dynamics. According to 
Prins, a “maritime culture” is characterised by a specific coastal urban context, 
placed in a wider network of related port towns. It has a range of social contacts 
and reference points to social “elsewhere” in the (far or near) distance who are 
also largely oriented towards the ocean.49 As the basis of a “maritime ethos”, 
underlying a corresponding sense of being or attitude to the world by people, 
Prins sees “adaptivity” to ever-changing circumstances within a scenario of urban 
“ambivalence” and opposition as an analytic key to the understanding of social 
behaviour. He links this to a certain flexibility, forbearance and tolerance of the 
people towards co-citizens, neighbours and kin. He mentions relatively open 
marriage rules and frequent changes in group affiliations, and he also points at 
“Comopolitanism” in an Indian Ocean Setting
— 45 —
openness toward strangers, who he says “have always been accepted into society 
on an equal footing, provided they embraced Islam”.50 Prins also refers explicitly 
to the historical example of Mombasa and its “Nine Tribes” who are presented as 
“original” groups of the town although they were clearly constituted by fugitive 
groups seeking shelter in Mombasa, as mentioned above.
Prins develops a conceptual emphasis on “adaptivity”, including openness, 
tolerance and the integration of strangers as social features of Swahili ports, 
in response to “ambivalence” as basic social experience. This does not mean 
that intolerance, prejudice, ethnocentrism and unease towards “outsiders” did 
not occur – the ethnographic and historical literature attest to these as well. 
Yet the overarching model of social relations provided pathways, loopholes and 
justifications to declare someone in whom one had an interest an “insider”– and 
thus to increase one’s number of affiliates, associates and dependants within the 
given framework. Even though distinct and exclusive ideologies of urban social 
hierarchy existed – emphasising difference rather than unity – social practice 
in the Swahili context historically tended to facilitate the integration of 
outsiders, or at least maintain it as a possibility. From here, we could argue that 
“maritime cosmopolitanism” is characterised by the following: the creation of a 
wider urban unity, through the multiple connectivities that a specific maritime 
context facilitates, leading to a wider perspective upon the world at large. This 
also includes the potential of a larger arsenal of experiences, and of responses to 
social problems that can be drawn from – which again could not be had without 
the kind and scope of connectivity that “maritimity” provides. 
This would lead us to think about cosmopolitanism along the lines of a 
“resource” (that can be drawn from) and a set of acquired and developed “skills” 
(that can be employed). If cosmopolitanism could be seen as a kind of resource, 
this would mean it was a pool of knowledge, ideas and related practices, drawing 
from experience and a longer period of exposure to the presence of, and inter-
action with, knowledge, ideas and practices from elsewhere. In social settings 
like Mombasa, which build on the historical underpinning of the integration of 
“other worlds” into the common social experience, something like a “widening 
of horizons” of experience and of knowledge and perspective happens, and 
this can then be used as a resource to address and tackle challenges posed to 
the community. In this way, conscious reference to and active use of skills is 
made – skills originating from a wider world than the immediate social context. 
Through such reference and use being made, the scope of the actual social world 
itself is broadened, becoming more of a “global world”. But this does not mean 
that internal differences are thereby eradicated, diminished or appeased for good 
(even if this were attempted). The renewed and intensified eruption of social 
tensions and antagonisms always remains within the scope of possibilities, and 
part of the challenge. 
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Overall, the processes of “integrating outsiders”, seen here as central to the 
discussion of Mombasa, happen through mediatory channels within which the 
incoming outsiders are already anticipated or identified as a (remote) part of 
the social world. This is not a process of integrating a (pronounced) “other” 
or turning aliens into equals. Rather, the social funnels and channels through 
which outsiders are integrated could draw from an expanded yet blurred field of 
“potential dependants” and “potential partners”. Due to a certain quantum of 
previous contact, however limited or indirect, these are not aliens but “related 
strangers” who, while outsiders, are already somewhat familiarised (at least 
partly) with the community they have come to join – comparable perhaps to 
distant relatives. 
For the conception of cosmopolitanism in Mombasa, we could perhaps say 
that in terms of social dynamics urban society here seems always “ready”, on 
the lookout, for newcomers. It has cast a net toward the outside world, half 
invitation, half bait, to attract potential contributors from within a kind of 
cultural corridor that is “facing both ways”,51 looking seawards and towards the 
hinterland. This corridor is marked by a sphere of influence made up of the 
towns and individual merchants or traders, as well as by political, military or 
religious bodies that create (and hold together) networks of partners, members, 
dependants and followers. Thus we could speak of a historical process of “being 
in touch” with an urban network that precedes and gradually turns into one of 
becoming integrated or linked into. From an internal perspective we could speak 
of a consciousness and anticipation (even if loose or vague) about a wider social 
world beyond the one that is immediately visible and to be experienced. In this 
sense, then, urbanites on the Swahili coast (and in many places elsewhere) are 
“living with a wider world in mind”. If appropriate, this may be a suitable char-
acterisation of cosmopolitanism more generally. 
I have focused here on conveying a picture of the ways in which historical urban 
dynamics that underpin and envelop the social action of individuals were them-
selves shaped and transformed, in relation to and in interaction with the (nearer 
and wider) world outside the town. Here it seemed important that the divisions 
between town and related hinterlands (or other towns) were not drawn clearly, 
so that interaction with, and integration of, outsiders could remain potential 
steps and stages of the same process of recruiting further citizens. Through this 
process, the standing, scope, outlook and sphere of influence of the town would 
be boosted while for individual actors (in different historical contexts and with 
changing needs) promises and rewards of security, prosperity and liberty could 
be sought and (sometimes) realised. At the junctions described here, we have 
seen that certain intersecting aspects matter particularly in marking or shaping 
cosmopolitanism. Due to an emphasis on the historical social processes here, an 
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initial openness toward the wider social world was particularly prominent in this 
discussion, in connection to the ways in which forms and cases of interaction 
between town and outside world work, creating a large pool of experience that 
can be drawn from as a resource for the future. 
To my mind, these two, firstly an openness to the world (in German: Weltof-
fenheit), opening up and leading to secondly, a pool of experience of the world 
(Welterfahrung), characterise two out of three core instances of an overall 
conception of cosmopolitanism. The third and perhaps most relevant one is 
well summed up in the German word Weltgewandtheit – what in English we could 
call the “skill to navigate the world”, based on one’s previous knowledge and 
experience.52 Literally, this means something like one’s flexibility to move in the 
world and deal with it. If this is what really marks cosmopolitanism in instances 
of concrete and observable social action, this had to be neglected here as we 
were concerned mostly with the historical struggles and social contexts under-
pinning, framing and enveloping it. Having here explored and interrogated 
the kinds of Weltoffenheit and Welterfahrung that characterise cosmopolitanism 
in Mombasa, we could, in a next step, investigate Weltgewandtheit because we 
now know how it is framed. This would mean determining, documenting and 
discussing how the skills acquired within such a framework, based on particular 
sets of experiences, are employed and made to work in specific cases by indi-
viduals.52 What I have tried to do here is to clarify the perspective on some of 
the internal features, instances and processes that mark Mombasa, in its setting 
on the Swahili coast, as “cosmopolitan”.53 As we have seen, Islam here was 
an important factor helping to link “town” and “outside world”, and to act as 
the social glue that holds diverse citizens together – but it was by no means an 
exclusive determinant aspect.
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Translators of Empire: 
Colonial Cosmopolitanism, Ottoman 
Bureaucrats and the Struggle over 
the Governance of Yemen, 1898–1914*
Thomas Kuehn
Chapter 4
During the long nineteenth century, imperial administrators around the world 
were acutely aware that theirs was a time of heightened competition among 
different empires for control over resources and strategic positions. Increasing 
competition prompted British, Dutch, French, Ottoman and Russian policy-
makers to observe more closely the governmental techniques of other empire-
states and made them more willing to learn from these techniques with a view 
to governing their own subjects more effectively and to better fending off the 
encroachments of their rivals.1 From the mid-nineteenth century onward, the 
gathering and transmission of this imperial knowledge was greatly facilitated 
by the expansion of new forms of transport and communication, such as rail-
roads, steamships and the telegraph that allowed people and ideas to move with 
unprecedented speed. The term “colonial cosmopolitanism”, I suggest, captures 
well this awareness of living in a world of competing empires and the sharing 
and adaptation of techniques of governing colonial subjects across imperial fron-
tiers. While historians have studied instances of colonial cosmopolitanism in 
the context of Tsarist Russia and the overseas empires of Britain, France and 
the Netherlands, this phenomenon remains virtually unexplored with regard to 
the Ottoman Empire.2 This chapter is concerned with one particular instance 
of Ottoman colonial cosmopolitanism. Specifically, I explore how Ottoman 
 policymakers debated and sought to learn from British practices of colonial 
governance in order to maintain their rule in Yemen, one of the most notorious 
trouble spots of the Ottoman Empire at the turn of the twentieth century. While 
it has been suggested that during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
the Ottoman Empire functioned increasingly like a nation-state,3 Ottoman 
attempts to learn from European techniques of colonial rule for the purpose of 
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governing Yemen demonstrate that administrators at one level still thought and 
acted very much as rulers of a differentiated empire-state. 
As historians have recognised for some time, Ottoman policymakers during 
the period under study were all too aware that they were living in a period 
marked by the global territorial and economic expansion of European imperial 
powers, especially Britain, France and Russia. Indeed, accounts of late Ottoman 
history regularly make the point that Ottoman efforts at military, administrative 
and fiscal reforms from the reign of SelÈm III (1789–1808) onward were in part 
undertaken with the express intention of making the empire more resilient 
against these encroachments of its European competitors into the Ottoman 
lands. 
In this context, the importance of European expertise for these reform efforts 
has often been emphasised: Ottoman reformers, so the argument attests, saw 
European, and particularly French, state institutions and practices as the keys 
to European success. Hence the need, to (re)build the Ottoman military, the 
empire’s administrative structures as well as its judiciary along European lines.4 
Overall, the historiography of Ottoman reform during the long nineteenth 
century is largely based on the assumption that Ottoman policymakers sought 
to learn from the institutions and practices of European metropolitan states, most 
notably France and Britain, with the ultimate goal of transforming the Ottoman 
Empire into a modern, unitary (nation)state under the banner of Ottomanism, 
a form of imperial patriotism. This perspective is in part informed by the idea 
that nineteenth- and twentieth-century Middle East history was – at one level 
– marked by the transition from empire to nation-state. Eugene Rogan and Erik 
Jan Zürcher among others have shown that many of the institutions and prac-
tices that were crucial for the creation of post-Ottoman nation-states, such as 
the Kingdom of Jordan and the Republic of Turkey, were forged during the late 
Ottoman period.5 These studies look at the late Ottoman Empire from a post-
imperial vantage point and cast the Ottomans as the precursors of post-Ottoman 
state-builders without asking what was actually imperial about the late Ottoman 
Empire. An exception to this approach is an article by Selim Deringil that 
argues that Ottoman rule over the empire’s Arab provinces during the reign of 
‘Abdül˙amÈd II (1876–1909) and the Second Constitutional Period (1908–18) 
was characterised by what he terms a “borrowed colonialism”.6 While innovative 
in its attempt to explore Ottoman governance within the larger world historical 
context of nineteenth-century colonial rule, the article remains unclear as to 
what exactly Ottoman administrators borrowed from European colonial rulers 
and how this borrowing actually worked.  
In this chapter, I suggest a different perspective by arguing that Ottoman 
soldiers and administrators debated and sought to learn from the practices of 
British colonial rule, and especially their ways of governing “backward” peoples, 
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with a view to better running what was still a large, spread-out and differen-
tiated empire. I focus on Ottoman Yemen because the southwest of the Arabian 
Peninsula was the frontier region of the empire where the Ottomans perhaps 
came most closely into contact with manifestations of British colonialism. More 
important still, the question of to what extent these forms of colonial rule might 
serve as models for Ottoman provincial governance was most vigorously debated 
with reference to Yemen: from the turn of the twentieth century the Ottoman 
central government faced the increasingly determined opposition of the ZaydÈ 
imams and of the æAsÈrÈ Sufi leader A˙mad b. Mu˙ammad al-IdrÈsÈ along with 
the rapidly spiralling human and financial costs of major counter-insurgency 
operations. By contrast, especially British colonial rule in the neighbouring 
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Aden or India seemed to be successful at ensuring 
effective control over these areas at relatively low cost. 
At the same time, I demonstrate that Ottoman administrators were not 
actually interested in adopting those forms of British colonial governance that 
ensured the mastery of the colonised through their exclusion and institution-
alised discrimination. Rather, the aspect of British colonial rule that policy-
makers in Istanbul and Yemen found most attractive was the practice of ruling 
particular areas indirectly through the devolution of power to local leaders. I 
argue that in pointing at the effectiveness of this particular form of colonial 
rule Ottoman officials sought to rehabilitate in government circles the practice 
of institutionalised autonomy for local leaders – a form of governance that had 
served the Ottomans well for centuries but that since the period of the TanΩÈmÅt 
(1839–76) and particularly since the rise to power of the Committee of Union 
and Progress (İtti˙Åd ve Tera.k.kÈ CemæÈyeti) from 1908 onward had become asso-
ciated with territorial fragmentation and imperial decline. As we shall see, these 
ideas did not remain on paper but informed the DaææÅn agreement of October 
1911, which introduced a significant measure of autonomy into the governance 
of the highland region of Ottoman Yemen on the eve of the First World War. 
The agreement, which brought to an end more than two decades of fierce conflict 
between Imam Ya˙yÅ and his predecessors on one side and the Ottoman central 
government on the other, was certainly inspired by forms of British indirect rule 
but it owed more to the long-standing Ottoman practice of devolving power to 
the leaders of religious communities. 
Background: Ottoman and European Imperial Competition in the 
Red Sea and the Western Indian Ocean Regions
Twice, from 1538 to 1636 and from 1849/72 to 1918, the Ottomans succeeded 
in extending their rule over large parts of present-day Yemen. Both periods of 
Ottoman rule in southwest Arabia were intimately connected with the larger 
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context of inter-imperial competition that pitted the Ottomans against their 
rivals in the Red Sea region and the western Indian Ocean, be it the Portuguese 
in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries or the British and Italians two 
hundred years later. In 1516–17, the Ottomans conquered the BilÅd al-ShÅm 
and Egypt, destroyed the Mamluk sultanate that had ruled this region for close 
to three hundred years and replaced the Mamluks as protectors of the holy sites 
of Islam at Mecca and Medina in the Hijaz. For the Ottoman ruling elite, Yemen 
now assumed a crucial role as an imperial line of defence against Portuguese 
incursions. Until the end of the Ottoman Empire, control of the Hijaz and 
the protection of the yearly pilgrimage to Mecca (˙ajj) would remain central 
elements of the Ottoman dynasty’s claim to legitimacy.7 The first period of 
Ottoman rule in Yemen was brought to an end not by the Portuguese, but by 
the QÅsimÈ line of ZaydÈ imams who forced the Ottomans to abandon their 
province in southwest Arabia in 1636.
It was primarily concern about British expansion from India into the Red 
Sea region and the Arabian Peninsula that prompted the Ottoman central 
government to reassert its sovereignty over southwest Arabia more than two 
hundred years later. As during the sixteenth century, Yemen was again perceived 
as a buffer to prevent other imperial powers from occupying the holy sites of 
Islam at Mecca and Medina. Initially, during the 1830s, the central government 
attempted to regain control of their former possession with the help of Me˙med 
æAlÈ Pas¸a, the governor-general (vÅlÈ) of Egypt. This, however, proved ultimately 
unsuccessful and led Britain to occupy the port of Aden in 1839. In response, 
Ottoman military forces established a foothold in the TihÅmah in 1849, but 
suffered a severe defeat in their attempt to occupy ÍanæÅ’. The opening of the 
Suez Canal in 1869 and the military setbacks suffered at the hands of the ruler 
of æAsÈr, Mu˙ammad b. æå’i∂, in 1870–1, made the spectre of British expansion 
appear much more tangible to Ottoman policymakers who now considered 
Ottoman control of both Yemen’s coastal region and the highlands necessary 
to deter Britain from expanding north towards the Hijaz. In the spring of 1872, 
military forces dispatched from Istanbul moved beyond Ottoman strongholds 
in the TihÅmah. By early 1873, they had re-conquered large parts of Yemen’s 
northern and southern highlands. The years 1872–3 marked a turning point in 
the history of Ottoman Yemen. They featured the arrival of a new order with the 
disempowerment of the most prominent lords in the highland region and the 
incorporation of the re-conquered territories into the new and more centralised 
Ottoman provincial system that had been fashioned in the context of the 
TanΩÈmÅt. Most prominent in this connection were a clearly defined hierarchy of 
administrative sub-divisions (province, sub-province, district and sub-district) 
as stipulated in the law of provincial administration of 1871, an administrative 
council at each level of provincial government as well as a municipality in 
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the new provincial capital ÍanæÅ’. The ideological outlook of the conquerors 
was also new: they now represented their actions as a mission to “civilise” and 
“uplift” a “backward” local population. 
Yet, especially in the northern highlands, local opposition to the imposition 
of more direct rule remained widespread and partly rallied around successive 
ZaydÈ imams. As a result, more intrusive forms of TanΩÈmÅt-style governance, 
such as cadastral surveys, censuses and conscription were never implemented 
in Ottoman Yemen. For the next three decades, Ottoman administrators would 
attempt to control southwest Arabia by adapting governmental practices to 
what they considered the “manners and customs” (æadÅt ve emzice) of the local 
population.  
To an important degree, Ottoman rule rested on the ability to concentrate 
military power against armed resistance and to co-opt significant portions of 
the local elite. While many jurists (æulamÅ’) and descendants of the Prophet 
Muhammad (sÅda) were absorbed into provincial officialdom as low-to-medium 
level judges and administrators, the lesser local lords (usually referred to as 
mashÅyikh) became indispensable to the functioning of revenue collection. 
For their own personal gain, they often colluded with officials from outside 
the province in overtaxing the local people. Overall, the province of Yemen 
remained far less integrated into the structures of the Ottoman Empire than 
most of Ottoman Syria and Anatolia.8
Throughout the 1870s and 1880s, the ZaydÈ imams al-Mutawakkil Mu˙sin (d. 
1879) and al-HÅdÈ Sharaf al-DÈn b. Mu˙ammad (d. 1890) were largely unsuc-
cessful in their attempts to project their power beyond the unoccupied parts of 
the Yemeni highlands. However, the increasing availability of modern firearms 
from the 1880s, severe droughts and fiscal pressure, especially on the people in 
the northern part of Ottoman Yemen, partly explain why in 1891–2, 1898–9, 
1904–7 and 1910–11 the imam al-ManßËr bi’llÅh Mu˙ammad b. Ya˙yÅ ÓamÈd 
al-DÈn (d. 1904) and his son and successor al-Mutawakkil æalÅ ‘l-‘llÅh Ya˙yÅ b. 
Mu˙ammad (d. 1948) succeeded in carrying their insurgencies deep into the 
province of Yemen.
In terms of its impact on Ottoman governance in this part of the empire, 
the uprising of 1904–7, and especially two events during the year 1905, were 
of particular significance. In April 1905, the fighters of Imam Ya˙yÅ tempo-
rarily captured the provincial capital ÍanæÅ’ and forced the Ottoman central 
government to evacuate administrators, military personnel and their families to 
the coastal region of Yemen. After the reoccupation of ÍanæÅ’ by the Ottoman 
military in the autumn of the same year, a large expeditionary force under Field 
Marshal A˙med FeyżÈ Pas¸a suffered a crushing defeat near the imam’s stronghold 
at ShahÅra in the unoccupied part of the northern highlands. These military 
debacles brought Ottoman rule in Yemen to the brink of collapse and prompted 
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an unprecedented debate about the governance of this province among Ottoman 
imperial administrators in ÍanæÅ’ and Istanbul. Why, these bureaucrats asked, 
had the Ottoman central government been unable to establish full control over 
southwest Arabia during the thirty years since the creation of the province of 
Yemen in the early 1870s? Why had armed opposition under the leadership of 
the ZaydÈ imams become more and more effective despite the increasing scale 
and length of counter-insurgency operations? These debates intensified from 
the summer of 1908 when the Young Turk Revolution forced æAbdül˙amÈd II to 
reinstate the Ottoman constitution of 1876 that had been suspended since 1878. 
The junior bureaucrats and military officers who led the revolution were driven 
by a keen sense of urgency to wrestle control of the state from the sultan whose 
incompetent leadership, so their argument went, had furthered the fragmen-
tation of the empire. It was in keeping with their objective to put the Ottoman 
state on a more secure footing that the precarious state of the Ottoman position 
in Yemen was among the issues they sought to address. Moreover, with the 
end of the sultan’s autocratic regime and the lifting of censorship, the debate 
about the nature of Ottoman rule in Yemen entered the floor of the newly 
elected parliament and the pages of the now uncensored press. The magnitude 
of Ottoman military defeats in 1905 and the demise of the Hamidian regime 
prompted commentators both inside and outside government circles to be bolder 
in their attempts to devise policies that would stabilise Ottoman rule over the 
empire’s southernmost province. It was in this connection that some of them 
looked towards forms of British, French and Italian colonial rule in India, the 
Red Sea region and North Africa.  
Reading Colonial Rule Through an Ottoman Lens
There is evidence that even before the revolution of 1908, elements of British 
colonial governance were on the minds of those policymakers in ÍanæÅ’ and 
Istanbul who sought to find a solution to the “Yemen question”.  Throughout 
the reign of æAbdül˙amÈd II, Ottoman bureaucrats appear to have been keen 
observers of the ways in which Britain – and other European powers – governed 
their colonial dependencies.9 In the early 1880s, governors-general Muß†afÅ 
æåßım Pas¸a and İsmÅæÈl Óa.k.kÈ Pas¸a had forms of indirect rule in British India 
and the Indian army in mind when they proposed to rule parts of Ottoman 
Yemen through local leaders and created a locally recruited auxiliary force, the 
æAsÅkir-i ÓamÈdÈye (literally, the Hamidian soldiers), respectively. However, it 
is only from the turn of the century that top-level administrators in Yemen and 
the imperial capital seem to have taken a greater interest in elements of British 
colonial governance for the purpose of running the empire’s southernmost 
province. In an undated draft memorandum, probably drawn up during or after 
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the completion of a stint in Yemen as a member of a commission of inspection 
in 1906–7, the official æAlÈ EmÈrÈ thought the British policy of paying stipends 
to the protected chiefs in the Aden hinterland partly applicable to Ottoman 
Yemen.10 Similarly, in a dispatch to the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward 
Grey, Britain’s ambassador to Istanbul, Sir Nicholas O’Conor, noted on 27 June 
1907 that the example of British rule in the Aden hinterland had been referred 
to during a meeting of the council of ministers ten days earlier in connection 
with a discussion of an autonomy scheme for the province of Yemen.11 Appar-
ently, the council had discussed the report of a special commission on Yemen 
that proposed 
… a certain measure of self-government, setting forth that, in order to flatter 
the native Sheikhs and to satisfy their ambition, it would be well to choose 
the Kaimakams and Mutessarifs from among their number instead of sending 
Turkish [sic] officials from Constantinople, the post of Vali being alone 
retained for a Turk [sic] …12 
There are several reasons for the increased interest at this stage. First, the 
British, French and Italian conquests of the Sudan, Djibouti and Eritrea during 
the 1880s and late 1890s meant that the province of Yemen was the frontier 
where the Ottomans came most directly into contact with various forms of 
European colonial rule. In this context, the southern portion of Lower Yemen, 
where Ottoman and British-Indian officials sought to demarcate their spheres of 
influence during the early 1900s, was not the only site for imperial encounters. 
For instance, traveling to and from Yemen by steamer provided Ottoman offi-
cials with opportunities to meet British and Italian soldiers, administrators and 
businessmen onboard ship and “talk shop”.13 Stopovers in colonial port cities 
such as Port Sudan, Massawa and Aden allowed them to experience some of 
the most important physical manifestations of European colonialism in the 
southern Red Sea region.14 More broadly, the very fact that Yemen was part of 
a region where different colonial powers – and forms of colonial governance – 
met and competed for influence may have contributed to raising the awareness 
of Ottoman bureaucrats of the ways in which these powers governed “unci-
vilised” peoples. This appears to have been the case particularly from the early 
1900s, when the Ottoman government faced increasingly stiff opposition from 
the ZaydÈ imams while European colonialism in other parts of the Red Sea 
region and in British India appeared to be successful – despite the defeats that 
the Italians had suffered at the hands of Ethiopian troops in 1895–6.15
While Brigadier-General Rüs¸dÈ Pas¸a in his book Yemen hÅ†ırası (“Memoirs of 
Yemen”) did not explicitly advocate the staffing of the key posts of the provincial 
administration with local shaykhs, or the paying of stipends, he nevertheless 
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urged the government to apply to the province of Yemen a mode of ruling through 
these leaders similar to what the British practiced in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
and in the hinterland of Aden.16 Moreover, he recommended the adoption of 
two other central elements of British governance in the Sudan, namely the 
retention of local forms of administering justice and the large-scale recruitment 
of the provincial security forces among local volunteers.17 Thus, Rüs¸dÈ suggested 
that European colonial powers and particularly Britain were successful mainly 
because they effectively used their knowledge of the mechanisms of local soci-
eties to “manage” the latter in a way that made their rule acceptable. 
æAbdülganÈ SenÈ, who served in Yemen as vilÅyet mektËbcısı (head of the 
governor-general’s chancery), elaborated on this point much more carefully in 
a series of articles that he published in the Istanbul-based journal MülkÈye. In 
contrast to Rüs¸dÈ and the above-mentioned officials, the vilÅyet mektËbcısı was 
less interested in highlighting particular practices of British colonial governance 
that could be implemented in Ottoman Yemen and, in fact, strongly cautioned 
against simply copying elements of British or French administration in India and 
Algeria, respectively.18 Rather, his main focus was on exploring their underlying 
principles. For instance, he argued that the key to the success of the British 
in building and maintaining their rule over such a vast empire was primarily 
their ability to adapt their governmental practices to the civilisational levels 
of the various peoples in different imperial dependencies. In other words, the 
British always governed according to the “customs and dispositions” of the local 
peoples. As a result, æAbdülganÈ claimed, no territory within the British Empire 
was governed alike – this was true for Scotland, as well as for Australia, Canada, 
the Cape Colony or India.19 Therefore, by applying this principle to the different 
parts of the Ottoman Empire, the vilÅyet mektËbcısı meant that areas like Albania 
(Arnavutlu.k) or the provinces on the Arabian Peninsula (æArabistÅn) could 
not be ruled like Anatolia or other areas. At the same time, however, he was 
careful to insist that only Tripolitania and Yemen should actually be ruled as 
colonies.20 Making this administrative distinction between these two provinces 
and other vilÅyets was imperative, he argued, because of the “customs and dispo-
sition” of its inhabitants (bunlarıñ kendilerine mahßËß … †abÅyiæ ve me’lËfÅtı) and 
“their separation and distance from the centre” (merkezden ayrılı.kları, baædÈyetleri 
˙asebiyle).21 While æAbdülganÈ did not elaborate on the case of Tripolitania, 
it is clear from some of his other writings that, in his view, the population 
of Ottoman Yemen still occupied a far lower stage in the hierarchy of civili-
sations than the people in other parts of the empire.22 The vilÅyet mektËbcısı 
subscribed to the idea of a civilising mission in Yemen, but, unlike the authors 
of previous memoranda and articles on Ottoman Yemen, he wanted to formalise 
the perceived cultural hierarchy between the locals and the officials outside the 
province by placing the province under a special administrative regime. That is, 
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for æAbdülganÈ, the term “colony” implied – to borrow Thomas Metcalf’s words – 
a “demarcation of spaces meant to separate” the local population from the more 
“developed” people in provinces such as Syria or Bursa.23 At the top of a future 
colonial administration in Ottoman Yemen, æAbdülganÈ envisaged a governor-
general with decision-making powers considerably more extensive than those 
of an ordinary vÅlÈ. In his work he would be assisted by a provincial assembly.24 
While Rüs¸dÈ Pas¸a did not recommend that Yemen be formerly declared a colony, 
he emphasised that certain administrative techniques used by European colonial 
powers should be adopted for the purpose of governing “exceptional” (müstesnÅ) 
parts of the Ottoman Empire, such as Yemen.25
The perspectives of æAbdülganÈ or Rüs¸dÈ on Yemen were generally in tune 
with the efforts of modern bureaucrats of this period to categorise, manage and, 
ultimately, reform social groups that were perceived as “deviant” from those who 
espoused, by and large, what Selim Deringil has called “the values of the centre”. 
This approach was also reflected in the creation of the “school for tribes” (æaşÈret 
mektebi) in Istanbul in 1892. The brigadier-general and the vilÅyet mektËbcısı 
applied this logic to an entire province and its population. In this sense, Rüs¸dÈ’s 
argument that Yemen was an “exceptional” part of the empire that could only 
be controlled through techniques from the context of European colonial gover-
nance and æAbdülganÈ’s idea of creating a colony of Yemen were only slightly 
different expressions of the same notion. In the particular case of Yemen, the 
group that needed to be categorised and thus designated as a “case” or an “issue” 
to be dealt with by the modern state were not dispersed, as it were, throughout 
the empire. Rather, they were concentrated in a particular area, which could, 
therefore, be separated by the institution of a specific administrative regime 
labelled as “colonial”. These bureaucrats thus proposed to carve out a separate 
space for the “uncivilised” within the larger space of the Ottoman imperial 
system. In short, for Rüs¸dÈ and æAbdülganÈ, colonialism in the Ottoman context 
meant the territorialisation of savagery.
It is noteworthy that some of the high-ranking soldiers and administrators 
who were involved in hammering out an autonomy agreement with Imam Ya˙yÅ 
during the years after 1908 looked toward forms of European colonial rule for 
models of how to integrate the ZaydÈ leader successfully into the political and 
administrative structures of the empire’s southernmost province. Like Rüs¸dÈ 
Pas¸a, these policymakers favoured a solution that centred on the devolution of 
power to local leaders, not, as æAbdülganÈ had proposed, on a powerful governor-
general. On 29 March 1909 the members of an interdepartmental commission 
on Yemen introduced their recommendations for a settlement that would give 
Imam Ya˙yÅ a substantial measure of control over tax collection and judicial 
affairs in the ZaydÈ parts of the province, with the remark that they had taken 
into consideration the principles and rules (ußËl ve .kavÅ’id) that some states 
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adopted in connection with the administration of their colonies.26 Three months 
later, A˙med æİzzet Pas¸a, the chief of the general staff and a member of the 
commission who played a key role in the negotiation of the DaææÅn agreement 
during the summer and autumn of 1911, specifically pointed out that the form 
of indirect rule that the British exercised over the princely states of India and 
the local leaders in the hinterland of Aden provided a model of governance 
that could be adapted to the conditions of Ottoman Yemen for the purpose of 
ensuring government control over this province.27 The paşa proposed a reform 
plan whereby the portion of the province with a ZaydÈ majority population 
would be governed by Imam Ya˙yÅ. At the same time, a high ranking Ottoman 
administrator would reside in ÍanæÅ’, Ottoman garrisons would be stationed 
both in ÍanæÅ’ and along the strategically important road between the provincial 
capital and the district of Jabal ÓarÅz, and the construction of roads and bridges 
was not to be obstructed.28 These measures were meant to ensure that the imam 
would receive a significant degree of autonomy but not de facto independence. 
For those parts of Ottoman Yemen that would not fall under the autonomy 
agreement with the imam, A˙med æİzze Pas¸a proposed to organise the local 
tribes according to their size into districts and sub-districts and to appoint their 
leaders governors of these new administrative sub-divisions. Crucially, the chief 
of the general staff wanted to tie the shaykhs to their respective tribes and did 
not envision postings around the province or careers in provincial officialdom 
for them. These leaders, he insisted, should never be rotated to administer tribes 
other than their own. By the same token, .kÅyma.kÅm positions in the larger cities 
and the governorships for the sub-provinces (mutaßarrıflar) should be filled with 
civil administrators and military officers, presumably from out of the province.29
In making elements of European colonial governance the principal point of 
reference for the restructuring of the provincial government in Ottoman Yemen, 
A˙med æİzzet Pas¸a, æAbdülganÈ SenÈ and Rüs¸dÈ Pas¸a also contributed to a larger 
Ottoman debate about governance more generally. Ottoman bureaucrats and 
members of various oppositional groups had been discussing the issue of how 
much administrative centralisation or decentralisation was necessary to ensure 
the empire’s survival since before the restoration of the constitution in July 
1908. One of the most prominent advocates of administrative decentralisation 
was ÍabÅ˙addÈn Bey, a nephew of æAbdül˙amÈd  II and a leading member of 
the opposition in exile before 1908.30 As we shall see, the leaders of the CUP, 
by contrast, strongly opposed forms of decentralisation – including governors-
general with extraordinary powers or regional autonomy – and insisted on “the 
extension of central authority to the widest extent possible and the standard-
ization of administrative and fiscal practices.”31 On 4 September 1908, for 
instance, Óüseyin CÅhid [Yalçın], the editor of the Istanbul-based daily ÊanÈn, 
wrote, 
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If our remote provinces that have not yet attained an advanced stage in their 
political lives were to be administered on the basis of decentralization, and a 
kind of autonomous administration evolves in these areas . . . the result will 
be lawlessness.32
It is possible that for CUP leaders – as for æAbdül˙amÈd II – the terms 
decentralisation and autonomy also conjured up Me˙med æAlÈ Pas¸a’s rise to 
power in Egypt, or the cases of Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia, 
Samos, Crete or Mount Lebanon, where European powers had pressured the 
Ottoman central government into accepting measures of local autonomy that 
either severely limited the latter’s authority on the ground or created the polite 
fiction of Ottoman sovereignty over de facto independent territories. In other 
words, for these observers, local autonomy was associated with a hundred years 
of political fragmentation, territorial contraction and European dominance, 
and was thus tainted as a political concept. Referring to forms of autonomy 
and devolution of power in the British Empire as possible models for governing 
Yemen was therefore an attempt to rehabilitate these concepts in the context 
of Ottoman imperial governance and to “re-brand” something that stood for 
imperial decline into something associated with the modern, scientific and cost-
effective management of large, spread-out and highly differentiated imperial 
domains. Neither æAbdülganÈ SenÈ nor Rüs¸d or A˙med æİzzet Pas¸a discussed 
British colonial governance in the Sudan, Aden or India in any particular detail. 
For instance, none of them made reference to the residency system that was at 
the core of British indirect rule over the princely states of India even though 
Ottoman observers were clearly aware of it. What these officials found attractive 
about British colonial governance was thus the idea that devolution of power 
could serve as a means to stabilise and firmly establish imperial rule rather 
than any particular administrative arrangements. In other words, the British 
experience demonstrated that governing according to the “customs and dispo-
sitions” of the local people could be a successful way to build an empire and 
not to undermine its foundations. Indeed, both æAbdülganÈ and A˙med æİzzet 
Pas¸a suggested that the forms of governance they proposed would create the 
conditions on the ground that would allow the central government to properly 
exploit the natural resources of the province, especially in the fields of agri-
culture and mining. By the same token, the refashioning of provincial gover-
nance would be the first step toward integrating Ottoman Yemen more firmly 
into the empire: the devolution of power to local elites was to be accompanied 
by an expansion of state education at the local level and the creation of a 
provincial assembly. Over time, both officials argued, a more educated popu-
lation and the integration of non-elite Yemenis into provincial policymaking 
would undermine the power of the old elites. 
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However, European colonial practices were not the only point of reference 
for those who wanted to advocate a greater devolution of power to local elites 
in Yemen. A˙med æİzzet Pas¸a pointed out that forms of self-government were 
actually very common in many provinces that were – these practices notwith-
standing – integral parts of the Ottoman Empire. Among the examples he listed 
were the Hijaz, Najd and certain districts in the province of Basra and the BilÅd 
al-ShÅm. Already, in his 1905 proposal for a sectarian order meant to contain 
and control Yemen’s ZaydÈ community by appointing a representative of the 
government’s choosing over them, the minister of the interior, MemdË˙ Pas¸a, 
invoked the Ottoman practice of devolving degrees of autonomy to religious 
communities, a practice which, in various forms, had been a standard feature 
of Ottoman imperial rule for several centuries.33 And in February 1912, he 
suggested that there were other Ottoman precedents for the devolution of power 
to provincial leaders in Yemen, namely the rights (˙ukË.k) and special privileges 
(imtiyÅzÅt) that Sultan SelÈm I (r. 1512–20) had granted to local elites in Egypt 
and Kurdistan.34 In referring to these particular examples these officials implied 
that there (had) existed forms of autonomy in the Ottoman Empire that did not 
stand for territorial contraction. Drawing attention to these Ottoman examples 
of autonomy was important because some observers viewed European colonial 
rule with skepticism. In their writings, A˙med æİzzet Pas¸a and AbdülganÈ SenÈ 
emphasised that even though Algeria was a colony of France, it was no less a 
part of France than those territories that constituted the French metropole.35 
In so doing, they addressed the concern that declaring Yemen a colony and 
granting this province a certain degree of autonomy would compromise the 
unity and cohesion of the Ottoman “fatherland” because these measures implied 
forms of imperial ties that were somewhat loose and demarcated a political space 
that was not quite an integral part of the Ottoman lands. Thus, there appears to 
have been a concern among Ottoman officials that declaring Yemen a colony 
would undermine central elements of the Ottoman politics of legitimacy, not 
only in Yemen, but also in the empire’s Arab provinces more generally.
The work of the Yemen commission produced an autonomy plan that Grand 
Vizier Óüseyin ÓilmÈ Pas¸a presented to the Ottoman parliament in the spring 
and summer of 1909. It adopted the central idea of the commission: Imam 
Ya˙yÅ was to be governor-general of a new province that would consist of the 
highland districts of Ottoman Yemen with a ZaydÈ majority population. Except 
for a garrison in ÍanæÅ’, Ottoman military forces were to be withdrawn from 
this province. Despite A˙med æİzzet Pas¸a’s efforts to make a case for the grand 
vizier’s plan, Ottoman MPs were not impressed. To them the proposal must have 
looked like a thinly disguised Ottoman withdrawal from highland Yemen. The 
role that the autonomy plan accorded to the imam probably reminded them of 
the positions of de facto independent rulers that the Khedive of Egypt or the 
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Prince of Bulgaria had held for many decades in the Ottoman Empire. Critics 
of the plan were also concerned that autonomy for a portion of Yemen would 
embolden Arab nationalists in other Arab provinces of the empire. Similarly, 
Ma˙mËd NedÈm Bey, one of the senior administrators with most experience 
in Yemen and later the last vÅlÈ of the province, argued that making the imam 
the autonomous ruler of the highland portion of Ottoman Yemen would invite 
encroachments of the British from their sphere of influence in the hinterland 
of Aden.
Imam Ya˙yÅ in turn rejected Óüseyin ÓilmÈ Pas¸a’s plan mainly because he 
wanted autonomy for a greater portion of the highlands. It was only after yet 
another uprising led by the imam in late 1910 and early 1911, in which neither 
the central government nor Ya˙yÅ were able to win a decisive victory over 
their opponents, that negotiations resumed between the two sides. These led 
eventually to the conclusion of the DaææÅn agreement on 20 October 1911. In 
the agreement, the central government accepted key demands of Imam Ya˙yÅ, 
but it did not make him the autonomous ruler over the ZaydÈ parts of Ottoman 
Yemen. Rather, the province of Yemen remained intact and under the authority 
of a governor-general from outside the region. However, an imamic-Ottoman 
condominium was created over the sub-province (sanca.k) of ÍanæÅ’ and those 
districts of the sanca.k of Taæizz where ZaydÈs constituted at least fifty percent of 
the population. Here, the imam exercised authority insofar as he nominated 
the judges who would deal with cases involving members of all sects from the 
area covered by the agreement according to the ZaydÈ version of the shari‘a, 
as well as the presiding judge and members of a court of appeals that would 
be based in ÍanæÅ’. Further, only the canonical taxes were to be levied. At 
the same time, all the other administrators continued to be appointed by the 
central government, and Ottoman garrisons were to be maintained. But even 
in judicial matters, the imam’s authority was limited. The imperial government 
reserved the right to approve the imam’s judicial nominees. More important 
still, in cases that involved penal judgments based on the principle of retali-
ation (qißÅß) the ultimate decision remained in the imperial capital. Outside the 
province of Yemen the agreement made Imam Ya˙yÅ a dependent ruler under 
Ottoman sovereignty: Istanbul provided the imam with a yearly stipend and 
military assistance that allowed him to survive a crucial power struggle with 
his most important rival in the northern highlands, the æAsÈrÈ ruler and Sufi 
leader A˙mad b. Mu˙ammad al-IdrÈsÈ. In this sense, the arrangements of the 
DaææÅn agreement helped lay the foundations for the creation of an independent 
Yemeni state under the imam’s leadership following the end of Ottoman rule 
in the aftermath of the First World War. At the same time, in turning Ya˙yÅ 
into an ally who would remain loyal to the central government until the end 
of Ottoman rule, the agreement was at least partly successful in stabilising the 
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Ottoman imperial presence in southwest Arabia after decades of fierce military 
confrontation.
Conclusion
This study has focused on how Ottoman bureaucrats and military officers learned 
from the British experience of managing “backward peoples”. The debates of 
these officials about what strategies of British colonial rule might be most suitable 
for the purpose of running the province of Yemen more effectively are examples 
of what I have termed colonial cosmopolitanism: bureaucrats like æAbdülganÈ 
SenÈ, æİzzet Pas¸a or Rüs¸dÈ Pas¸a were not only aware that the Ottomans were 
indeed part of a wider world of imperial powers, but in the specific circumstances 
of turn-of-the-century Yemen they also came to the conclusion that some of 
the ways in which Britain in particular governed colonial subjects in some of its 
dependencies around the Indian Ocean might be adapted to ensure Ottoman 
domination over the “uncivilised” peoples of southwest Arabia. What Ottoman 
observers primarily associated with, and found attractive about, British colonial 
governance was its ability to rule “according to the customs and dispositions” 
of the local peoples and, more specifically, through their leaders. The principal 
reason for the success of British colonial rule seemed to be the native chief or 
local ruler under British sovereignty who governed on behalf of the crown and 
ensured British domination in a cost-effective way, not the Oxbridge-educated 
district officer of the Indian Civil Service who managed the locals under his 
charge. In this respect, policymakers and political commentators in Istanbul and 
ÍanæÅ’ resembled many of their French, German, Japanese, Russian or American 
contemporaries who often looked toward forms of indirect rule in various parts 
of the British Empire for models of how to run distant colonial dependencies. 
As we have seen, Ottoman interest in this particular form of British colonial 
governance stemmed not only from the fact that it promised to offer a solution 
to the perennial problems of running the empire on a shoestring; indirect rule 
also attracted the attention of policymakers because there were precedents for 
it both in the long Ottoman history of governing a large, spread out and differ-
entiated empire, and in the way some of the empire’s internal and external 
peripheries were run. 
Associating the devolution of power to the ZaydÈ imam with a style of gover-
nance that seemed to ensure the greatness of the world’s foremost imperial power 
was a way to repackage and rehabilitate a form of imperial rule that had served 
the Ottomans well in the past, but that many bureaucrats from the early nine-
teenth century on viewed as furthering the empire’s disintegration. Thus, while 
the Ottomans did not actually adopt the residency system, or any other specific 
form of indirect rule practiced in Britain’s Asian or African colonies, the British 
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practice of ruling through local leaders in general inspired those policymakers 
in ÍanæÅ’ and Istanbul who attempted to refashion provincial government in 
the sense that it enabled a debate about the possibilities for local autonomy in 
Ottoman Yemen. At the same time, the DaææÅn agreement shows the influence 
of Ottoman forms of communal and regional autonomy. The position of the 
imam as defined in the agreement looked more like that of a millet leader or of 
the amir and sharif of Mecca than that of an Indian prince. Imam Ya˙yÅ became 
a dependent ruler only in areas that were not part of the province of Yemen. As 
we have seen, these arrangements reflected the central government’s concern 
that granting autonomy to a part of the province of Yemen would encourage 
nationalist groups in other parts of the empire and invite British intervention in 
Ottoman Yemen. In other words, real and perceived threats at the regional and 
larger imperial levels made the adoption of indirect rule as practised in British 
India or the hinterland of Aden appear unsuitable. In short, Ottoman readings, 
especially of British colonial rule, helped fashion the political order that was 
ushered in through the DaææÅn agreement. These readings, in turn, reflected the 
empire’s connections to a larger colonial world dominated by European powers.
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Islampolis, Cosmopolis: Ottoman Urbanity 
Between Myth, Memory and Postmodernity
Ariel Salzmann
Chapter 5
On the morning of 23 January 2007, mourners gathered before the Istanbul head-
quarters of the Turkish–Armenian Agos newspaper at the point where, four days 
earlier, the editor-in-chief had been murdered. Within an hour their numbers 
had grown by tens of thousands. Together, they formed an enormous cortège 
that embraced the hearse carrying the body of the slain civil rights activist to the 
church. From verandas and windows along the route, or via  televisions, computer 
monitors and cell phone cameras around the world, millions witnessed a silent 
multitude whose hands were held aloft with placards bearing black and white 
photographs of a middle aged man’s haggard face. “We are all Hrant Dink”, read 
signs in Turkish, English, Kurdish and Armenian. In the same streets where his 
teenage assassin reportedly bragged of having “shot the gavur”, an Agos reporter 
heard Muslim young people shouting, “Long live the Armenians”.1
By their silent witness, Istanbul’s citizens defied the hatred that had cut 
down one of their own. A resounding answer to those who would stop the 
dialogue between Turks and Armenians, the marchers formed the largest protest 
against racism and religious discrimination in the history of the Middle East. 
The ultra-nationalist lawyers who persecuted Hrant Dink, the prosecutors who 
had indicted him by deliberate misinterpretation of his words, the judges who 
convicted him of Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which makes it a crime 
to “insult Turkishness”,2 the bigots who staged menacing rallies before the court 
room and academic conferences and the police who had ignored the threats 
against him, were all now forced to yield the streets to those who believed in 
his path of truth, reconciliation and coexistence. The municipal government 
hastily announced it would be releasing doves and passing out carnations. The 
bureaucratic machinery in Ankara facilitated delegations of dignitaries and poli-
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ticians from the Republic of Armenia, the United States and the European 
Union. Under the glare of the international media’s spotlight the ruling Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) belatedly dispatched cabinet members to the 
funeral at Saint Mary’s Church.
The students, intellectuals, office workers and labourers who joined this 
solemn procession represented the ethnic and religious majority of a mega-
lopolis of more than twelve million inhabitants. Muslims far outnumbered the 
Armenian mourners, a community that has been reduced to less than 60,000 
souls. Shoulder to shoulder with their compatriots, Turkey’s Christian and Jewish 
citizens, they formed a great human wave that swept along the roads from ŞiŞli 
to Taksim, Beyoğlu and TarlabaŞı. Before crossing the Golden Horn on their way 
to the church in Kumkapı, the mourners walked through streets and neighbour-
hoods that official histories seek to erase; they passed what had been the homes 
of Armenians who had been deported in 1915, the small factories of Jews and 
Dönmes – descendents of the followers of Sabbatai Zevi (1626–76) – whom the 
Varlık Vergisi (a discriminatory wealth tax) had bankrupted or sent to forced 
labour camps in 1942 and the display windows of Greek-owned businesses along 
İstiklal Caddesi that had been shattered and looted during the 1955 pogrom.3 
Istanbul’s streets, neighbourhoods, mosques, churches and synagogues bear 
silent witness not only to twentieth-century atrocities. They also testify to 
centuries of urban life shared by many peoples and cultures. For an Ottoman 
historian whose sources largely deny access to the subjective realms of this multi-
religious encounter, it is hard to repress the urge to ask how these individuals 
of diverse backgrounds and persuasions perceived themselves and others when 
they assembled in this multicultural funeral procession. What so moved a young 
man, who had never known an Armenian or had a Jewish neighbour, to join this 
march? What spurred him to embark on a day’s bus ride from the eastern city of 
Van to take part in Dink’s funeral? 
Social media archives the emotions and thoughts of those who participated 
in the funeral procession or watched it from afar. One young Turkish woman 
text-messaged her immediate reactions to an American friend from the funeral 
cortège:
I look around me; everyone is here: friends, young, old, men, women, 
students, grandmas, children, Turks, Armenians, Kurds, other minorities, 
business people, artists, activists, political groups . . . 100,000 people beating 
as one heart, with one mantra: we are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenian. 
I am surprised, I am shocked. I don’t know if I am crying with sorrow of his 
death or for this overwhelming feeling of unity . . . We are all here to embrace 
Hrant Dink and what he stands for: Peace and Reconciliation of the peoples 
of Anatolia …4
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Other observers left less charitable commentary about their countrymen 
and women on the worldwide web. A Turkish scholar, studying abroad, whose 
heartfelt words were circulated among the Armenian diaspora’s websites, chided 
her compatriots that “yesterday was not the first time we shot Hrant Dink in 
the back”, adding 
even if it was not us, even if it was not our mothers, fathers, grandfathers 
who actually held the swords and the rifles that took Armenian lives, the 
catastrophe of 1915 remains … a crime committed in our name, it remains 
to be a crime against humanity and human plurality committed in the name 
of “Turkishness”.5
Armenians who watched this extraordinary event from afar registered many 
different emotions: bitterness, anger, surprise and hope. A year later, a Turkish–
Armenian who attended an Istanbul commemoration on the anniversary of 
Dink’s death confessed: 
As an Armenian taking part in the rally, I was there only because Hrant 
Dink is Armenian, and was killed, from what I understood, exactly for his 
nationality. However, for those thousands of people protesting in the street, 
he was much more then an Armenian. Yesterday I also I found out, that he 
is one of the symbols of Turkey’s future.6
In today’s Istanbul historical narratives continue to collide daily. When its 
dwindling Jewish, Greek, Armenian and Süriyani/Syriac communities struggle 
to maintain their cultural heritage in the face of a new, religiously exclusive 
sociability, when Kurdish workers and Alevi worshipers challenge the official 
ethno-religious uniformity in celebrations and ceremonies, and when critical 
intellectuals, activists and thoughtful citizens of all backgrounds pursue justice, 
truth and rights for all, they test the frontiers of past, present and future. Hrant 
Dink gave voice to the silences in the official history.7 Each time he demanded 
respect for his multiple identities – as a person who was Türkiyeli, a “Turkish 
citizen” but not an ethnic “Turk”, as a Christian by religion and as an Anatolian 
by history – he mediated between seemingly irreconcilable worlds. He scolded 
members of the Armenian diaspora in Europe and North America who chose to 
humiliate and defame contemporary Turks rather than to educate a generation 
indoctrinated by propaganda and purged textbooks while he challenged Turkish 
society to acknowledge the massacres, expropriation and genocidal deportations 
of Ottoman Armenians during the First World War. In publishing an article 
concerning the Armenian birth of Sabiha Gökçen, Atatürk’s illustrious adopted 
daughter and the first female military pilot, for whom Istanbul’s second airport is 
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named, he braved the wrath of the Turkish military command and secret service 
to demonstrate the inextricably intertwined fate of his peoples.8
Rather than being an obstacle to historical reconstruction of the multi-reli-
gious past of the Ottoman Empire, the physical re-enactment of the shared space 
of what had once been one of the world’s most culturally complex cities serves to 
provoke new questions about cosmopolitanism as a generic concept and multi-
religious urbanity as a lived relationship in time. The words of Hrant Dink and 
the persistence of Turkish citizens who march, discuss and hold vigils to bring 
about the truthful accounting and cultural reconciliation that he strove for point 
to questions that have either not been raised or have been answered with too 
little reflection on the specific dynamics of ethno-religious diversity within the 
coordinates of pre-modern cities. These struggles point to the elusive patterns of 
togetherness that governed an urbanity that was neither the bewildering, Babel-
like cosmopolis portrayed by European visitors, nor the paternalistic hoşgörülü 
[“tolerant”] Islampolis represented in the Turkish Republic’s textbooks. In 
foreswearing the adjective cosmopolitan for the implicit multi-religiousity and 
multi-ethnicity of Ottoman urbanity, this essay pays homage to the historicity 
of place and the social morphology of peculiar, metropolitan settings, such as 
Istanbul and Izmir in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Despite and 
because of their acute vulnerability to the dictates of power and nature, it was 
the peculiarity of these pre-modern urban environments, I argue, that fostered 
multifaceted ties and cross-cultural cooperation even as they facilitated forms of 
communal autonomy and, in the twentieth century, provoked rupture. 
The Anxiety of Difference
In refocusing my attention on Ottoman urbanism as a specific locus of inter-
religious and inter-ethnic contact, reflection on the previous historiography on 
“Muslims and non-Muslims”, believers and dhimmis, is unavoidable. Few studies 
have had greater impact on an emerging branch of inquiry than the two-volume 
set of essays, Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a 
Plural Society (1982).9 Three decades ago, its historians undertook the laudable 
project of examining the religious diversity of the Ottoman state and its peoples. 
Yet they did so within peculiar coordinates: the essays divided the empire into 
two parts. In binding essays on “the Arab lands”, apart from those on Ottoman 
Anatolia and the Eastern Balkans, the “central lands”, its editors, Bernard Lewis 
and Benjamin Braude, posited historiographical boundaries in conformity with 
the prevailing nationalist and area studies paradigms. With few exceptions, these 
essays discussed the experience of subordinated groups in terms of binary rela-
tionships between a subordinated group, identified or confined within a church 
or community, and the Muslim political authority. Most authors, too, attributed 
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change in this dyadic rapport to the intervention of western European churches 
and governments rather than the shifting positionality of social groups within 
the Ottoman polity and world economy.  
The volumes opened with a legalistic overview of the concept of the dhimma/
dhimmi. But almost no attention was paid to the implications of distinct settle-
 ment patterns on the Ottoman experience of cultural diversity, such as its 
Mediterranean metropolises, small Balkan towns, Syrian port cities and Eastern 
Anatolian countryside and pasturelands. Despite the dominance of the city 
in the historical imagination and transmission of all major faiths, sustained 
reflection on the urban environment itself, a hub of inter-regional commerce, 
governance, military force and high population density is strangely absent. Thus, 
Benjamin Braude, who performed an important service to a nascent programme 
of study by identifying the anachronistic usage of nineteenth-century notions, 
such as the millet, with respect to communities of non-Muslims during earlier 
centuries and recognising the “imagined community” projected by church-
centred  narratives, did not really consider how the physical setting itself might 
have shaped many aspects of inter-communal relations.10 Certainly, the patents 
between Christian churches and the Ottoman state were modelled after the 
so-called “pact of Umar” through which the new Muslim authority pledged to 
protect the religious and communal rights of “peoples of the book” in exchange 
for their financial, legal and sumptuary subordination to the religious majority. 
However, the endurance of these relationships, as legend and as organisa-
tional praxis, depended on more than the goodwill of the victor. Despite the 
bloodshed and the asymmetry of power, the agreement (of which we have no 
written copy) that bound the Greek Universal Patriarch and Conqueror, Sultan 
Mehmet II (1432–81) owed to an urban realpolitik: the necessary cooperation 
of sovereign and subjects within a setting of physical proximity and economic 
dependence.
Multidisciplinary studies, especially on cities, have helped us to re-evaluate 
these distinctly Ottoman settings. Unlike earlier capital cities, such as Brusa/
Bursa in western Anatolia which evolved from a provincial marketplace to 
the centre of a small principality, the transformation of Constantinopolis into 
“Islambol” (a wordplay on the vernacular Greek “the city” and the Turkish 
“brimming with Islam”) epitomised an imperial, urban policy, an ethno- religious 
engineering (sürgün and şenlendirme) that stamped newly conquered cities.11 
Although Ottoman administrators did not leave the conquered countryside 
unchanged, forcibly relocating Muslim populations from Asia, including nomadic 
pastoralists, and implanting new strata of military officers, Sufi networks and 
Islamic judges in the Balkan and Aegean countryside, they could not funda-
mentally overturn the pre-existing confessional composition or the bases of the 
agrarian economy. By contrast, the fifteenth- and sixteenth-century conquests 
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radically reworked the social morphology of cities. Trabzon, converted from a 
predominantly Christian Greek city-state to a Muslim-majority port within a 
generation, represented one extreme.12 In other cities, imperial policies favoured 
religious admixture rather than uniformity: in addition to creating an Islamic 
physical infrastructure of mosque-complexes, pious endowments and comman-
deering non-Muslim properties for new palaces, garrisons and the residences 
of its officialdom, the empire transplanted Jews and Orthodox Christians from 
other regions into the urban grid. Throughout the sixteenth and early seven-
teenth centuries, this ethno-religious urban “renewal” in cities was ongoing: 
Sephardic refugees were directed toward Thessaloniki/Salonika while Belgrade’s 
native Jewish population was resettled in the emerging port city of Izmir.13
If aspects of this characteristically Ottoman urbanity endured until the very 
end of the empire, it was not simply because of the outgrowth of sultanic policies 
toward what had been the Christian cities and towns in the Balkans or the lack 
of internal dynamism among the multi-religious inhabitants of former Mamluk 
cities in Syria and Egypt. The great cultural diversity that defined Ottoman 
cities was continually refracted in a Mediterranean mirror in which Catholic 
port and inland cities, intentionally or not, remained their contraries.14 Where 
in the eighteenth century a Jew of Aleppo, a Greek of Istanbul or an Armenian 
of Diyarbekir might choose to settle in one of many mixed or relatively homo-
geneous mahalle of his native city and remain a fully imperial subject whether 
at home or abroad, the Jew or Muslim in Venice, one of the most cosmo-
politan cities of western Christendom, was physically confined to a special 
neighbourhood or locked in his lodging in the Fondacco dei Turchi. The Jewish 
charters of residence in Venice explicitly precluded Jews, born of parents who 
had lived for generations in the republic, from claiming to be a cittadini of the 
city. The ghetto, a pre-eminently urban institution that constrained movement 
and occupation in cities like Rome well into the nineteenth century, consti-
tuted a spatial signifier, as one scholar has recently argued, for a distinctly Latin 
Christian sovereignty.15
To point to the glaring differences in the cultural composition and social 
morphology among the Mediterranean’s Catholic and Muslim urban settings 
should not lead us to presume that Ottoman cities were either havens of social 
tranquillity or utopias of tolerance. In pre-modern times large administrative 
cities with their garrisons, tribunals and other state institutions conferred 
greater personal security on their inhabitants than the “lawless” countryside, 
particularly in the seventeenth century.16 In the teeming neighbourhoods of 
Istanbul in particular, crimes against persons and property were widespread.17 
In addition to the extremes of wealth and poverty, the extraordinary personal 
power of elites and the abject vulnerability of the enslaved, many city-dwellers 
were recent arrivals and strangers. These migrants included peasants and 
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artisans put to flight by corrupt officials, famine and marauding mercenaries; 
single men and women who found petty crime and prostitution their only means 
of survival and transient populations of demobilised soldiers and sailors (both 
Muslim and Christian). If non-Muslims were disproportionately  represented 
among such eighteenth-century migrants due to increased rates of the poll tax, 
which led them to occupations that provided cash income,18 they, along with 
their Muslim neighbours, were victims of theft, murder and rape. 
Fears of crime as well as the continual human flux of populations from distant 
imperial provinces provoked anxieties among and between communities. For 
Jews and Christians, subordinates to the dominant Muslim community whose 
polemics over the relative truths of their “empty” faiths were typically of little 
concern to either the ulema or imperial authorities, the friction of daily life 
together could and did manifest itself in crude public demonstrations of distain 
such as epithets against the other’s religious beliefs and even the burning of 
effigies. Yet rather than proof of an enduring “mutual contempt and hostility” 
between the city’s confessional groupings,19 the very gestures and bigoted expres-
sions which offend modern sensibilities must have served to maintain confes-
sional boundaries in congested neighbourhoods. Moreover, in pre-modern times 
they discharged the anxieties provoked by proximity and difference in ways that 
fell far short of large scale physical aggression between groups. 
Certainly it was this quotidian urban experience in such large Ottoman cities 
that gave rise to a specifically eighteenth-century Turkish literary genre based on 
insults. In one of the better-known texts, the Risale-i Garibe (“The Treatise of 
the Strange/Grotesque”) an anonymous, presumably Muslim author revels in a 
verbal virtuosity that expresses the profusion of ethnic stereotypes.20 His insults 
fly, targeting what seems to be the unbearable diversity of peoples crowding eigh-
teenth-century Istanbul. Romanians are “treacherous”, there are “Jew–Poles”, 
Albanians “speak Turkish incorrectly”, Georgians “don’t know how to use the 
oar” and Armenians “meddle in every affair and trade”. But it is precisely the 
author’s juxtaposition of characters whom he might plausibly pass in his daily 
activities within the mahalle with unlikely types – Hindus, “cursed” Yezidis and 
Buddhist Kalmyks “dogs” – whose appearance even in Istanbul’s markets or in an 
Anatolian caravanserai could only have been a rare, if not extraordinary event, 
that turns what might otherwise be read as pure bigotry into a form of social 
satire and a means of multicultural catharsis.
The Risale’s barbs and invective do not spare Istanbul Muslims, rich or poor. 
From Üsküdar to Eyüb, Muslims are accused of impiety, lasciviousness, hypocrisy, 
corruption and arrogance. Muslim prostitutes pass for respectable women and 
wealthy Muslim matrons abuse their servants while lavishing affection on their 
pet dogs and cats, which are even given human names! Neophyte Muslims 
convert to avoid paying the poll tax or as a pretext for begging before mosques. 
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The city’s officials and officers are liars, drunkards and thieves who steal from 
the public weal and charities. In fact, the urban anomie depicted in the Risale is 
not really the result of the cacophony of idioms and cultural practices, though 
these irritated the author to be sure. Rather, his berating of the variety of ethnic 
groups and religious communities living in the city serves to frame a potentially 
more dangerous critique aimed at the Muslim authorities. It is the municipal 
officials who are to blame for the city’s collapsing infrastructure, evidenced by 
corruption and immorality and seen in everything from the actions of its citizens 
of all religions to the defective goods sold in the marketplace and the filth in 
its public baths.
The Overlap between Common and Communal Spaces
If the Risale fails to identify the exact nature of the resentment, disdain, affection 
or distrust between Istanbul’s Muslims, Christians and Jews, the multiplicity of 
characters that crowd its pages leave no doubt that it was impossible for urban 
inhabitants to avoid one another. Some of Istanbul’s eighteenth-century suburbs 
were predominately Muslim. However, the most populous boroughs, including 
Üskudar, remained home to many different confessional communities.21 Istan-
bulites jostled one another and European residents in the streets of Galata and in 
the city’s many open and covered markets. Jewish and Muslim boatswains ferried 
women and children across the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus. Craftsmen and 
merchants haggled over products and bought raw materials from one another. 
Tradesmen exchanged services: Jewish butchers sold the hindquarters of slaugh-
tered animals to Muslim butchers. Everyone relied on neighbours of other faiths 
to police the morality and safety of the young and vulnerable.22 In the high-
priced real estate of a densely packed social site where conflicts over private 
space were common and neighbours tried to build courtyard walls higher to 
prevent prying eyes, even those who wished to remain separate in life could not 
avoid spending eternity with others, buried side by side, in crowded cemeteries.23
The streets and markets were not the only places of multi-ethnic and multi-
religious encounters, there were also interiors where the city’s residents met 
regularly. One of the most significant of these was the imperial kadi or Ottoman-
Islamic court.24 As litigants and defendants, both Muslims and non-Muslims 
throughout the empire’s towns and administrative cities brought their disputes 
over guild practices, borrowed money and crimes great and small, before Muslim 
judges. In Damascus, Jews and Christians even took cases concerning disputed 
inheritance and divorce to the Islamic court, preferring the impartiality of the 
kadi to the opinion of their own religious authorities.25 Jewish responsa reveals 
that Muslims and Christians in Istanbul also testified in cases presented to 
rabbinical courts.26
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There were other interiors that hosted multi-religious gatherings. Jews, Chris-
tians and Muslims visited each other’s workshops and shops. However unusual 
it may have been, on occasion mixed religious company gathered in private 
homes for weddings and parties.27 If the coffee and boza houses in much of 
Istanbul tended to be religiously exclusive, the taverns of Pera saw not a few 
Muslims customers imbibe wine with Ottoman Christian and Jewish tradesmen 
and European merchants. For centuries the bathhouses remained an inter-faith 
milieu in Syrian and Anatolian cities.28 Jewish women eagerly awaited this 
weekly outing. They made their way in groups for safety in the streets and for the 
pleasure of company in the bathhouses where they washed themselves, preened, 
relaxed, ate, drank and played music. The urban bath played an important role in 
cross-cultural socialisation. Despite differences in language, this informal milieu 
for men and women opened a conduit for the transmission of gender standards, 
norms of masculinity and femininity, as well as for the sharing of musical forms 
and cuisine.
Although the inequalities faced by non-Muslims remained palpable in a daily 
life marked by differentiated clothing, distinct calendars of worship, diverse 
languages and mannerisms, these obstacles did not prevent them from laying 
claim to the physical beauty of a city whose monuments, houses of worship 
and popular housing were products of their own hands. In his Turkish-language 
poem after the 1766 earthquake, the Armenian folk poet Minas Ceryanoğlu 
(1730–1813) lamented the devastation of “our beautiful, garden-girded Isdanbol 
[sic]” and its terrible toll on a city that was “one big family”.29 Expression of a 
shared ownership of a material setting, including of the mosques and minarets 
of the dominant religious group, may seem all the more surprising when we 
consider the fate of many non-Muslim congregations. The Karaite Jews of 
Istanbul, whose synagogue had been relocated to Karaköy after the Ottoman 
conquest, again forcibly ceded their building to the future Yeni Câmi, a project 
undertaken by the Queen Mother (Valide-Sultan) Safiye Sultan (d. 1603) 
but which was only finished in 1663.30 Fires provided an excuse for Muslim 
municipal authorities to grab Jewish and Christian real estate in Istanbul or, as 
in eighteenth-century Izmir, to delay permits for the rebuilding of non-Muslim 
houses of worship for decades.
Non-Muslims were not alone in experiencing the inequities of an early modern 
city. All or parts of many poorer inner-city neighbourhoods were torn down to 
make room for celebrations and processions for the circumcisions of princes and 
the marriages of princesses in the eighteenth century.31 After urban rebellions, 
such as the janissary and guild uprising of 1730, it was poorer Muslims who bore 
the brunt of political purges. The Muslim elite converted state property into 
family endowments; wealthier guildsmen gained quasi-proprietary rights over 
urban ateliers and hereditary claims to guild offices. In fact, not all non-Muslims 
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lost in this privatisation of imperial space and authority: courtiers who built new 
palaces along the Bosphorus in Beßiktas and Bebek must have encouraged their 
Jewish, Armenian and Greek bankers and commercial agents to follow them. 
By the early nineteenth century, the fact that many of the neighbourhoods in 
Ottoman cities, from Istanbul to Diyarbekir, remained quite mixed in terms of the 
religious identities of their inhabitants belies any systematic policy on the part 
of the state or Muslim religious authorities to impose a segregated urban plan.32
The shared vulnerability of neighbours, whatever their faith, in the face 
of the many natural disasters that convulsed these cities precluded individual 
or communal schadenfreude. In the aftermath of fires, earthquakes and floods, 
Istanbul residents braved the elements together: those who lacked housing 
either left town or shared rooms with neighbours and entire neighbourhoods 
slept in tents in the streets in fear of aftershocks. When floodwaters polluted 
wells or filled them with sand, everyone felt thirst. In an Armenian coda to 
his post-earthquake dirge, Minas Ceryanoğlu enumerated the destroyed palaces, 
khans and toppled minarets; he mourned his co-religionists and sadly recalled 
the moans of his Muslim and Jewish neighbours trapped beneath the rubble.33 
An Armenian witness to the flood of 1789 wrote movingly of Christians who 
had died without forgetting to mention the tragedy of Hussein of Cengelköy 
whose two young daughters were swept out to sea.34
If most Muslim elites did not deign to devote more than passing mention 
to non-Muslims, and then only to chastise those who overstepped their status, 
neither did they recriminate them for some of the city’s worst disasters. Derviß 
Efendi-zade Derviß Mustafa Efendi left a record of the great Istanbul fire of 
1782.35 Over the course of more than four days, the flames spread rapidly, incin-
erating people, houses and monuments in many quarters of the city. He dutifully 
recorded the fact that the fire began in a Jewish house in Balat, but did not dwell 
on its source. Rather, after carefully analysing the combination of natural and 
human causes that turned a small house fire into a conflagration – including 
the strong winds which blew embers from one neighbourhood to another, the 
lack of rain and the poor training of the city’s firefighters – Derviß Mustafa 
Efendi pointed an accusing finger at the Muslim ruling classes: the tragedy that 
befell the city, he concluded, was divine retribution for their immoral and selfish 
behaviour toward the city’s poor.
From Ottoman Urbanity to “Philanthropic Cosmopolitanism”?
In the nineteenth century unprecedented events drove a wedge between the 
many different social and cultural groups that made up Ottoman cities.36 The 
precarious balance of power between the empire and its rivals in Europe and the 
Black Sea reverberated through town and countryside from the Aegean coastline 
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to the Gulf of Basra. Wars with Czarist Russia and then with the new Balkan 
states strapped the resources of urban centres in particular: Ottoman citizens 
furnished strategic manufactures and paid extraordinary taxes; after the conflict 
they paid the empire’s indemnities while enduring shortages of raw materials 
and food. The fears and resentments of the majority were stoked not only by 
the nationalism among Balkan Christians but also by new trade concessions to 
foreign merchants that benefited their local Christian and Jewish brokers and 
agents. The adoption of novel forms of sociability, from Masonic lodges and social 
clubs to chambers of commerce and theatres,37 diverted Muslims, Christians and 
Jews from the streets, bathhouses and marketplaces where they had once shared 
moments of laughter at puppet shows, heard the chanting and hymns of other 
faiths and comforted each other in moments of collective distress. 
If nineteenth-century Ottoman cities proved more susceptible to inter-faith 
violence, it may owe to the fact that even as many of the older zones of shared 
contact disappeared, the close quarters of the city remained highly communi-
cative. Neighbourhoods quickly turned into rumour mills, where information 
– true and false, feared and hoped for – spread quickly from ear to ear. The 
sultan’s informants in Istanbul’s coffee and boza houses have left us fragments 
of conversations overheard during the second and third decades of the nine-
teenth century.38 Most of these conversations were mundane; the documen-
tation reveals residents grumbling about taxes and the like. Surprisingly, both 
Christians and Muslims shared worries about the impact of Sultan Mahmud II’s 
sumptuary reforms, which mandated uniform dress and the fez, on intra- and 
inter-communal relations. Yet otherwise mundane complaints and innocent 
rumours could fan mistrust and provoke suspicions in new circumstances: when 
the Morea emerged as a single, religiously uniform, Greek “nation”; when 
Mehmet Ali Pasha’s armies marched deep into Anatolia; or when citizens antic-
ipated a Czarist fleet sailing through the Bosphorus, how could the experience 
of Ottoman urbanity remain unchanged? Parochial beliefs, cultural anxieties, 
and petty grievances took on decidedly new meanings when the intrigues of the 
Great Powers threatened to destroy the very premises of the territorial empire.39
In addition to these geopolitical strains upon the urban social fabric were 
the contradictory legal and political consequences of the Tanzimat (1839–78) 
legislation. The great promise of a bill of rights for all, promulgated in the 
Gulhâne Rescript of 1839, was undercut by the timetable and modalities of 
implementation dictated by the Great Powers (many of which had only begun 
to emancipate their own Jewish, Protestant and Catholic religious minorities). 
If the new millet congresses, formed for each non-Muslim confessional grouping 
according to the 1856 Imperial Rescript, furnished sectarian communities of 
Christians and Jews with an outlet for cultural and political expression, it would 
take another generation before Ottoman citizens of all faiths and ethnic back-
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grounds could assemble together in the first constitutional parliament of 1877. 
In cities, the Tanzimat produced contradictory results. On the one hand, 
no longer could the imperial elite or Muslim religious officials unilaterally 
determine changes to the urban plan. Greater political rights gave Jews and 
Christians a voice in municipal policies. For example, in the aftermath of the 
terrible Pera fire of 1870, non-Muslim property owners successfully blocked the 
Istanbul municipality’s plan to widen streets at their expense by expropriating 
private homes and commercial properties.40 On the other hand, greater security 
of property and real estate helped to entrench wealthier groups in ethnically 
homogeneous mahalle. Over the second half of the nineteenth century, the 
records of middle-class patrons of the Ottoman Bank point to increasing spatial 
segregation of the nascent Ottoman bourgeoisies. With the exception of certain 
newly integrated suburbs in Istanbul and Izmir, well-heeled Christians, Muslims 
and Jews preferred to live apart and keep their own company.41
All the same, it must be remembered that these new, later nineteenth-
century residential patterns affected only a small portion of the city’s inhab-
itants. While the newly settled Levantine merchants and foreign missionaries 
took shelter in the suburbs, for those who remained in urban centres natural 
disasters continued to level cultural differences.42 Despite new precautions, 
epidemics ravaged Ottoman coastal and inland cities and towns over the nine-
teenth century. The terrifying bubonic plague epidemic of 1812 was followed by 
two dozen outbreaks of the plague in the Aegean region alone during the first 
half of the nineteenth century.43 Quarantine stations in Ottoman port cities 
would mitigate older contagions but new diseases continued to make land: Asian 
cholera, initially carried from Russia and later brought by pilgrims returning 
from the Hijaz, became a recurrent event in the second half of the nineteenth 
century. Hundreds of thousands of Ottoman citizens died from cholera in the 
five major epidemics that struck the empire in the half century before the First 
World War.44
Despite considerable attention to the modernisation of the urban plan, which 
included European-influenced monumental architecture, enlarged thorough-
fares, street lighting and new modes of transportation, state involvement in social 
welfare during the nineteenth century remained circumscribed. For centuries, 
it had been the soup kitchens and other endowments that provided support 
for the poor, widows and orphans, founded by pashas, princesses and queen 
mothers, that served to blunt the sharp inequalities that might lead to social 
unrest.45 Other than forgiving taxes and regulating the prices of staples, such as 
bread, in times of dearth, the imperial state did little to address perennial urban 
problems of unemployment, poverty, overcrowding, homelessness and illness. 
While charity continued to be the province of wealthy individuals and religious 
organisations throughout the nineteenth century, involvement in philanthropic 
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
— 80 —
activity among urban populations appears to have intensified. Whether it was 
the tough Jewish youth of inner-city Izmir who set up a charitable association 
to aid women after an outbreak of childbed fever, or the middle-class Christian 
and Muslim ladies of Istanbul who pledged their spare time to uplift their poorer 
co-religionists,46 the imperative of providing relief for those less fortunate crossed 
social classes. Dozens of new charitable societies were officially approved by the 
state between 1876 and 1908.
The repressive apparatus of the government of Sultan Abdulhamid II (1876–
1908) and the widening cultural gulf between Muslims and non-Muslims-
notwithstanding, the Ottoman regime acceded to many of these altruistic 
impulses. To prevent politicisation of these philanthropies, the regime moni-
tored their income and activities and made sure that trusted minority and 
Muslim elites led the better-funded and larger organisations. Although same-
faith organisations raised little question, inter-faith fundraisers did alarm the 
regime. Charity balls and lotteries that spilled over confessional boundaries 
threatened religious norms and the confessional policies of the Hamidian 
regime. State officials were especially wary of the dubious morality of the lottery, 
piyango, as a form of gambling.47 Yet as participation in piyangos spread from 
minority communities in the Aegean islands to coastal cities and the general 
population, popular pressure prevailed. By 1883, provincial governors regularly 
issued permits for lottery drawings, albeit restricting the funds involved to a 
maximum of 50,000 piastres. 
The very existence of such inter-communal fundraisers suggests the new 
social realms of communication and novel cultural possibilities of late Ottoman 
urbanity. Did such fundraising activity represent a bridge between the shared 
past and the increasingly fractured public space of the nineteenth-century city? 
Had the previous centuries of shared urbanity under Muslim rule given way to 
a modern cosmopolis or, as Nadir Özbek suggests, an emerging multi-religious 
public sphere48 in which residents could begin to realise shared beliefs in the 
common good, social welfare and collective representation? Or was the combi-
nation of altruism and avarice that informed the act of gambling for charity 
merely a metaphor for a transitory cosmopolitanism, a brief intersection of 
parochial identities and interests amid the centrifugal forces tearing apart the 
Ottoman city?
Inspection of an Ottoman lottery ticket from Izmir – to be exact, number 
2,979 of the 4,000 printed – in the author’s possession might provide a semiotic 
chart or linguistic mapping of the structure of this cosmopolitan public sphere 
in the last Ottoman decades. In this case, the ticket represents a fundraising 
endeavour sponsored by a Jewish philanthropic society in 1874 (Jewish year 
5634). Centred within the nearly square (20.5 x 22.5 mm) sheet is the caption 
loteryah [lotería] in Rashi-Hebrew letters followed by a Ladino description of its 
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purpose and the members of the “Israelite” committee that organised it. The 
objectives of the lottery were clearly stated: to raise money for the marriages of 
orphaned young people. Below the Ladino text is a table of the lottery drawings 
and the value, in piastres, of the prize money printed in Western numerals. 
Framing both, in a clockwise fashion, are translations of the text in Ottoman 
Turkish, French, Armenian and Greek. 
Perhaps the first question that arises when surveying the ticket’s multi-reli-
gious linguistic architecture, is not which languages are included, but which are 
absent. Obviously, the fundraising committee did not see the need to represent 
all the Jewish communities of Izmir. There is no linguistic trace on the ticket 
of the small and impoverished Ashkenazi community of the city. The French 
translation, compressed into the lower right-hand corner below the Ottoman 
Turkish translation, signals that already this language could be considered the 
second “Jewish” tongue of the empire as well as the language of international 
commerce (and hence a common language of many of Izmir’s Levantine commu-
Figure 5.1 Jewish Society lottery ticket, 1874. Dimensions 20.5 x 22.5 mm. 
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nities). Nevertheless, it should be noted that the “12 membres notables de cette 
Societé” who launched the lottery did so independently of the increasingly influ-
ential Francos, the French Jewish missionaries of the Alliance Israélite Univer-
selle.49 After years of controversy, pitting Izmir’s rabbinical authorities against 
the French Jews who were bent on “modernising” Ottoman Jewry, the Alliance 
had just succeeded in establishing the first boys’ school with a French-language 
curriculum. A few years after this lottery, the first Alliance girls’ school also 
opened its doors.
Could this rivalry with the Francos explain in part, the Izmiri Jews’ recourse 
to lotteries? The community had other means for raising funds. The Jewish 
hospitals were funded by the Gemillut Hassadim (Acts of Loving Kindness) 
association in addition to foreign donations while the Ozer Dalim (Help for 
the Needy) societies were dedicated to the care of underprivileged brides, 
stranded travellers and the sick.50 Yet the needs of the community continually 
outstripped its means. In appealing for help from their non-Jewish neighbours, 
the community elders must have considered the cause carefully. An indisputably 
deserving group, such as orphans, would elicit sympathy even across communal 
fault lines. Marriage was both a universal bond and a social investment, the 
bedrock of urban stability. Many of the Jewish orphans who were approaching 
marriageable age must have been survivors of the cholera pandemic of 1864, a 
tragedy that had struck Izmir’s Muslims and Christians with equal ferocity.
Translation of the ticket into Ottoman Turkish was therefore more than 
a formal requirement. The prominence of the Ottoman Turkish in the right-
hand corner reflected not only deference to the state or the dominant group, 
but perhaps a recognition of the Sephardim’s longstanding political affinities 
with the Ottoman authorities, including the now defunct and disbanded local 
janissary units. In any event, Jewish relations with their Muslim neighbours 
could only have been better than their relations with Izmir’s Greeks. Only two 
years before the lottery, a Greek accusation of the ritual murder of a Christian 
boy had ignited violence against the Jewish community.51 Greek mobs attacked 
Jews and their property; tens of shops and houses in Karataß and in the more 
mixed neighbourhood of Kemeraltı were torched. In addition to loss of life, a 
long blockade of the Jewish mahalle had pushed the poor to the brink of star-
vation.
Judging from the size and prominence accorded to the Greek translation on 
the upper left-hand corner, the lottery’s organisers knew they could not ignore 
their Greek neighbours. Whether or not individual friendships or business rela-
tions between Jews and Greeks had survived the recent violence, Jewish leaders 
could only concede Greek commercial clout and numerical superiority. Indeed, 
given the tendency of under-enumeration of minority inhabitants by the official 
census takers, Greeks likely made up a plurality of the urban population during 
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the last quarter of the nineteenth century.52
Other inter-communal relationships remain in the shadows. Although they 
were only half the size of the Jewish community itself, Armenians were important 
enough to the fundraisers to be part of the linguistic hierarchy of the lottery 
ticket. In fact, the Armenian majority may have shared Jewish concerns about 
the impositions of the Francos, given the pressure on the Apostolic Church 
by native and overseas missionaries. Together with Catholic and Protestant 
denominations, Armenians made up the smallest of the four largest ethno-reli-
gious components of the city. Yet, the Jewish organisers depended upon their 
skills for printing and perhaps translating their ticket. Catholic Armenians, 
who had developed a Turkish vernacular written in the Armenian characters, 
published many works in Armeno-Turkish. The presumably Catholic printer 
of the lottery tickets, B. Talikian, who affixed his imprimatur and the date of 
printing, 6 February 1874, clearly possessed a well-equipped shop. Setting the 
type for the Hebrew, Greek, Armenian and Latin texts, he used a lithographic 
technique to overprint the ticket with the Ottoman rik’a script.
Although the lottery ticket offers some fascinating visual suggestions about 
the positionality of religious groups constituting this late Ottoman urban setting, 
it would be imprudent to suggest that this lottery demonstrated the emergence of 
an inter-communal public sphere, much less constituted a form of “print cosmo-
politanism”. The peculiar strengths and weaknesses of each Ottoman religious 
community acquired more distinct political and sociological relief as the nine-
teenth century drew to a close. Despite help from their French co-religionists, 
the Jews of Anatolia remained one of the empire’s smallest, albeit determinedly 
urban, populations. By and large, Ottoman Jews showed little inclination toward 
territorial nationalism. Given their size, they remained dependent on the good 
will of their non-Jewish neighbours. Although the Jewish community of Izmir 
was one of the largest in the empire (after Salonika and Istanbul), only one out 
of every nine of late nineteenth-century Izmir’s roughly 210,000 inhabitants 
was Jewish.53
Throughout the empire, but especially in Izmir, their demographic inferiority 
to both the Greeks and Muslims was compounded by the relative poverty of the 
Jewish community. Of the estimated 3,500 Jewish families in the city, only about 
a hundred could be considered well-to-do, not a few of whom had already opted 
for Italian and Dutch passports.54 If about half of Izmir’s Jewish families clung 
onto the rungs of the lower middle-classes, earning their wages as tradesmen, 
labourers and shop-owners, more than a third of the total, by dint of destitution 
or dedication to religious study, depended on co-religionists for their support. 
As they contended with the wrenching economic and political changes of the 
late empire, Ottoman Jewish philanthropy had the most to gain by courting 
an older inter-communal sense of Ottoman urbanity despite their struggle to 
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maintain their cultural and organisational autonomy in the face of the Francos’ 
mission civilatrice.
Conclusion: The Postmodern Erasures of Istanbul/Islampolis
The vernacular sources and lottery tickets considered in this essay are but flick-
ering images of an Ottoman urbanity long past. They provide no conclusive 
answers to the question of individual and collective emotional responses to the 
multi-religious and multi-ethnic environment of the city. Yet it is safe to say 
that if the 1874 lottery ticket of the Jewish Society fell to earth today in Izmir, 
few of Turkey’s urban residents would understand its meaning. Ladino, and other 
Jewish vernaculars, have been overtaken by the languages of western Europe 
and, for the many Turkish Jews who immigrated to Israel, by modern Hebrew. 
The Muslim majority no longer uses Arabic script and few citizens read Ottoman 
documents. Most of the peoples who formed large and prosperous urban commu-
nities are gone: the Greeks and Armenians who wrote poems, memoirs, religious 
texts and novels in Turkish (using Greek and Armenian characters) either fled 
before persecution, were murdered, forcibly converted to Islam or, in the case of 
thousands of the Greeks of the Aegean coastal region and smaller islands, were 
deported to Greece after 1923.55
These citizens, along with their cultures, practices and languages, were the 
foundation of an Ottoman urbanity that was uprooted between the last decade 
of the empire and the first decades of the republic. Many of the Muslim refugees 
from the former Ottoman Balkans and Czarist Russia who arrived in Ottoman 
cities (as well as in the countryside) at the end of the empire never truly experi-
enced urban life together. The young Yusuf Akçura (1876–1935), one of the key 
ideologues of Turkish nationalism, was such a late Ottoman citizen.56 A Tatar 
born in Simbirsk along the Volga River, he and his mother arrived in Istanbul as 
inter-faith relations deteriorated, particularly during the anti-minority pogroms 
that followed the 1896 Armenian Dashnak Party’s takeover of the Ottoman 
Bank, a desperate attempt to bring world attention to the Hamidian massacres 
of Christians in Cilicia and Anatolia (1895–7).57 Understandably, the young 
Akçura – who contemplated the future of the empire in his Uç Tarz-ı Siyaset 
(Three Political Paths) in Cairo,58 four years before the Young Turk Revolution 
(1908) – dismissed out of hand the possibility of forming “an Osmanlı Milleti 
[an Ottoman nation]”, akin to “the American nation in the United States of 
America”. For that matter, the pan-Islamic project, too, seemed hopelessly 
vague and unrealisable: far too large for a defensible territorial unit or to create 
a uniform cultural project.
The post-1913 Ottoman leadership set the empire on Akçura’s third, 
religio-ethnically exclusionary path, one that successive Turkish Republican 
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governments have never repudiated. From the First World War onward, this 
exclusionary programme dictated the last Ottoman government’s policies of 
genocide in both Ottoman cities and in the Anatolian countryside. With the 
declaration of the republic in 1923 and the establishment of a new capital city 
in Ankara, nationalists sought to leave many of the contradictions between the 
republican present and the Ottoman past safely behind.59 Over the course of a 
few decades, discriminatory policies and pogroms further reduced the minority 
populations of the Turkish Republic. As Turkey’s rapid urbanisation began, 
Muslim migrants from villages and small towns sought work in factories and an 
education for their children. They joined bureaucrats, teachers, businessmen 
and resettled Muslim refugees from the Caucasus, Central Asia and later the 
Balkans in industrialising cities such as Izmir, Istanbul, Bursa, and Ankara. In 
1927, one of every four Istanbul residents spoke Greek, Armenian or Jewish/
Ladino; by the mid-1960s, more than 95 percent of its population was Muslim 
and either Turkish or Kurdish speaking.60
A rapidly changing cultural demography in the cities demanded a new political 
formula as well. Over the last decade and a half, rural migrants swept religious 
parties to power, first in the Turkey’s largest cities and then in national elec-
tions.61 Beginning his career as mayor of Istanbul in 1994, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
promised that moral rectitude could rein in corruption and provide ordinary 
people with true representation in municipal government.62 His administration 
delivered water and sewage to the poor in the gecekondu neighbourhoods made 
up of recent and semi-legal settlements that ring the city of Greater Istanbul. His 
and subsequent Islamically-inflected administrations turned the city’s waterways 
into public spaces lined with flowers and tea gardens where families could spend 
their free time at little or no expense. It was Ottoman Istanbul, rather than 
Republican Ankara, that became emblematic of the Islamist reform agenda, 
symbolising the (re)birth of lifestyle of overt piety and religiosity and witnessing 
government aims to reimagine the Islamic imperial past with respect to the 
modern, layik or “secular” nation-state.63 
It is interesting to consider that, while many secular Turkish intellectuals 
feared the motives of these newcomers to state office, Hrant Dink was not one 
of them. Dink hoped that the new, religious parties would break the sclerotic 
hold of Kemalism and the military on the Turkish state and serve as the midwife 
of a truly democratic order.64 Yet after more than a decade in power, the urban 
policies of the new political leaders reveal much about their relationship to the 
imperial past. The new Islampolis/Istanbul does part company from the Repub-
lican imaginary. Yet the silence concerning Ottoman urbanity continues. In 
sprawling middle-class suburbs and housing developments, the party faithful 
maintain their distance from the multitudes, turning their back on the last 
multi-religious neighbourhoods of the inner-city. The monumental shopping 
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malls created by “Islamic capital” pay no homage to the Jewish women peddlers 
(kiera) who brought finery to the harem, or to the non-Muslim merchants whose 
taxes build the empire. Tourists are invited to marvel at the city’s architec-
tural landmarks, such as the Dolmabahçe Sarayı and the Süleymaniye Mosque, 
without being informed of the Armenian architects and Greek stone masons 
who built them.65 In 2010, when Istanbul became Europe’s Cultural Capital, 
significant cultural opportunities were missed. Had the Justice and Development 
Party mayor publically celebrated the 1877 Meclis-i Mebusan (the first Ottoman 
parliament), where Turkish, Arab, Kurdish, Cypriot, Macedonian, Bulgarian, 
Serbian, Bosnian, Albanian, Jewish, Armenian, Maronite Christian, and Greek 
representatives deliberated imperial legislation, he might have educated Turkish 
citizens as well as members of the European Union about what a truly inclusive, 
multi-ethnic government once looked like.   
In Turkey today, urban history and democratic change remain closely inter-
twined. From Mardin to Izmir and from Kars to Iskenderun, Turkey’s non-
Muslim populations embody a fragile but critical link between the Ottoman 
past and the Mediterranean’s democratic future.66 As researchers who navigate 
parochial memories, cosmopolitan imaginaries and postmodern cityscapes strive 
to steer clear of the extremes of “dhimmitude” and facile accounts of Ottoman 
convivencia,67 we must continue to reflect on the varied motives and emotions of 
the multi-ethnic and multi-religious multitude who peacefully and respectfully 
claimed Istanbul for all its inhabitants on 23 January 2007. Far better than any 
academic historian, the civil rights leader they mourned understood the costs of 
loosing and the value of recovering an Ottoman urbanity: asked why he, in the 
face of threats to his life and daily insults, choose to remain in Turkey, Hrant 
Dink explained that his Armenian-ness could never be insular or freestanding. 
His identity was forged by a “dialectic” between a millennial Anatolian heritage 
and the quotidian sights and sounds of the Muslim society that surrounded him.68
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Cosmopolitan Cursing 
in Late Nineteenth-Century Alexandria
Will Hanley
Chapter 6
In 1889, a dispute broke out in an alley in Damanhur, a large town near Alex-
andria. As Mohammad Effendi Safwat, tax collector for the local government, 
passed along the alleyway, he met Mohammad Abu ‘Agila, a twenty-five-year-old 
merchant of Tunisian origin, who was coming out of his house. The tax collector 
seized the encounter (and indeed may have planned it) to serve the Tunisian 
with a demand for payment of back taxes on his property. The Tunisian replied 
that, as a foreign subject, he was not required to pay any such tax. Witnesses 
claimed that he threw the assessment papers to the ground and trampled them. In 
the course of their argument, one or both of these men uttered an Arabic phrase 
that was later rendered into French as “maudit soit ton père” (“curse your father”).
A certain vision of cosmopolitanism – ethereal yet worldly, bohemian yet 
wealthy – takes the Alexandria of Forster, Cavafy and Durrell as its key site.1 
In this vision, Alexandria is not a Muslim context. Arabs, Muslims and indeed 
ordinary people feature only as a non-cosmopolitan backdrop that accentuates 
the exceptional character of the leading players. As this book demonstrates, the 
cosmopolitanism of Muslim contexts warrants different treatment. This essay 
recasts Alexandria as a site where a Muslim majority encountered non-Muslim 
and foreign minorities. Cosmopolitanism – curiosity about boundary crossing 
underpinned by a universalist ethical project – demands this inclusive frame 
of reference. This vision of cosmopolitan Alexandria – a society of mundane 
communication and the management of minor misunderstandings – is a more 
accurate depiction of the past, and a more realistic basis for thinking about 
cosmopolitan projects in the present day. The alleyway curse reveals a cosmo-
politanism more genuine, if perhaps less glamorous, than the polyglot literature 
of elite salons.
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In a sense, the Tunisian was correct: under the Ottoman–European capitula-
tions agreements, foreign subjects were indeed exempt from most local taxation, 
as well as prosecution before state courts of the local government.2 We know 
about this altercation because the Egyptian government pressed charges against 
the Tunisian on behalf of its tax collector. The case was heard by the French 
consular court in Alexandria, which had extraterritorial jurisdiction over its 
imperial subjects.3 Over ten pages, the court’s register records a manoeuvre 
repeated countless times in the late nineteenth-century Muslim world: the 
 transposition of an interpersonal dispute into the language of a modern, 
Western, state court. Typically, this transposition involved two steps. The first 
was legal: in this case, the prosecution classified the tax collector’s injured 
dignity as that of a public official, and the insult to his person became an insult 
to the authority he served. The second step was linguistic: the language of the 
alley was translated for the court, and the voices of the actors were isolated and 
recorded.
This particular case amplified the typical process of transposition. The 
legal and linguistic meaning of the curse, exchanged by two Arabic-speaking 
Muslims, was obscure to the three French-speaking Catholic assessors who 
presided over the trial. Efforts to probe the meaning, intent and justicability of 
this insult dominated the hearing, and the tribunal resorted to an unusual source 
of expertise to inform its deliberations. After being questioned on what he had 
seen, each witness was asked, in a sort of ethnographic survey, his opinion of the 
insult itself, and, as a point of law, whether it was a punishable offence.
In interpreting the curse, witnesses insisted on the importance of context. 
One neighbour, a dyer, testified that the insult “was without importance when 
exchanged between friends, but if addressed to a stranger triggers a complaint 
to the Tribunal”. Another dyer said that “curse your father” should not really 
be considered an insult; while the words could be spoken in anger, they could 
also be a joke. A guard at the French consular agency in Damanhur agreed: it 
was a “plaisanterie” between friends, but an actionable offence between strangers. 
A certain Gamal, an unofficial government messenger who was given a bit of 
food for his work, suggested that “curse your father” was a serious insult when 
used amongst locals (“entre habitants du pays”), and could be considered defa-
mation. The social and legal meaning of the insult, according to this testimony, 
depended on the relationship between the cursers; the signified – the curse on 
the father itself – had little independent force.
Clearly, the Tunisian and the tax collector were not friends, and the curse was 
no joke. But the court, working to distinguish one Muslim Arab from another, 
showed further curiosity about the difference between these men who shared 
language and religion. In what sense were they strangers? How did the alter-
cation reveal lines dividing Arab Muslim society? Naturally enough, the court 
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sought to impose its own legal and social categories onto the field of insult. 
Could there have been a religious dimension? A Christian from the town, not 
present at the incident, when asked his opinion, said that the curse was nothing 
between friends, but serious if said to a Muslim. What about nationality? A dyer 
said that the tax collector had replied “curse your father, and your protection”. 
While “protection” seemed a plausible line of difference, only a few witnesses 
provided support for this idea. This line of questioning proved inconclusive, and 
the witnesses were unable to satisfy the court’s sense that a hidden social code 
might clarify the offence.
In the end, the judges resorted to the most legible divide, that between officials 
and the population. They trusted the authority of the local headman, who had 
been present during the incident. He testified that in the native justice system, 
this particular phrase normally led to a twenty-franc fine and five days in prison, 
but was pursued only if there were witnesses and judgement could be assured. 
As a result, the insult was rarely punished. As far as the court was concerned 
though, the charge itself turned on yet another distinction, that between offi-
cials and ordinary people. The French code had a rich vein of law protecting 
the dignity of public officials, and the Tunisian was pursued on this basis.4 But 
something was lost in the translation between Egyptian and French officialdom, 
and the court (citing “continuous jurisprudence”) found that the foreign (i.e. 
non-French) tax collector could not be considered a public servant according to 
French law.5 The charge was thus reduced to a private insult. Because there was 
no clear consensus among the many witnesses, the court again deferred to the 
account of the neighbourhood headman, a man “beyond reproach”, who said he 
heard nothing. The Tunisian was acquitted.
Easy communication is a hallmark of the cosmopolitan, but that commu-
nication is typically genteel and literary. Cursing is a more puzzling form. It 
certainly qualifies as communication: without some bond between curser and 
cursed, words intended as insult are gibberish. As Thomas Conley argues in 
his recent study of insult, the practice is “at once ‘antisocial’ and constitutive 
of social relations”.6 In a multilingual, multicultural context, this paradox is 
even more striking: insulting speech drives people apart, but it requires intimate 
knowledge of the culture and language of the other in order to have this effect. 
Effective cursing seems to demonstrate exactly the sort of boundary crossing 
that cosmopolitanism should entail. But while most notions of cosmopolitanism 
cast a warm and rosy glow, cursing brings a dimmer pallor to social description. 
Combining the two may clarify our view of each. This paper examines a handful 
of curses from turn-of-the-century Alexandria. It considers, in turn, the chal-
lenge of cosmopolitan communication, the meanings of the curses themselves, 
and the case of insults against officials, who became the law’s ideal cursing 
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victims. The closing section suggests several connections between this example 
and broader debates about cosmopolitanism.
The cursing that makes its way into court records was often a public act: 
insults had to be uttered in a public place to meet the juridical definition of 
defamation. One morning in 1885, for example, one man stood before another 
at a café where they were regulars and shouted: “you are a thief, an assassin. I 
thought you honest, but I was wrong . . . I’m not only going to say it here, I’m 
going to other places where you’re known and tell them what you are.” And 
indeed he did go on to say the same words elsewhere.7 Such determined public 
cursing required a vocabulary comprehensible to most bystanders. Conventional 
accounts of cosmopolitan Alexandria hold that its lingua franca was French.8 
These public insults were (probably) uttered in French, but records of non-
elite practice show the marginality of Alexandria’s francophone elite.9 Systems 
of communication were improvised, and depending on circumstance, Italian, 
Greek, Arabic, Maltese, English and French could serve as common languages. 
Because courts often recorded details about language choice, significant data 
about this inherently social characteristic are available. These data make it clear 
that while language use did not conform in any strict sense to nationality or 
citizenship, language formed a natural bond between certain categories of people 
and a barrier between others. Cursing in the streets reveals the practical poly-
glossia that was the medium of everyday communication.
Cosmopolitan insults emerged from their linguistic context to assume a place 
in the shared language of the city. While the Arabic “maudit soit ton père” had to 
be translated for the court, other taunts made their way untranslated into court 
transcripts. Two Maltese men looking for trouble in the street, for example, used 
the Greek word pallikari, which means tough young man or brave: “Tonight I 
want to fight. Whatever ‘pallikari’ is in the Haret el Maltie let him come and 
fight as I am not afraid of anyone.”10 The resulting assault was tried at the 
British consular court. Neither the Maltese toughs nor the court’s clerk spoke 
Greek, but the word was reproduced unproblematically in the court record. 
Many residents of Alexandria were promiscuous language users: Maltese and 
Italians signed their names in Arabic letters when necessary or convenient; 
Greeks used Arabic signet seals. To communicate in a mixed society, people used 
insults of convenience in the same way that they used languages, alphabets and 
nationalities of convenience.11
On the other hand, despite the cosmopolitan myth of language transparency, 
the archival record shows that much social experience involved opacity: malen-
tendus, misreadings, misunderstandings and meanings inaccessible to outsiders. 
When one could not make him or herself understood by another, and when 
there was a presumption of bad faith, the barrier was both linguistic and moral. 
The whole field of exchange across languages was sometimes the locus of blanket 
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animosity. This was the case in an 1886 brawl. In the aftermath, two battered 
sailors testified that their opponents spoke French to each other and “looked 
French”. They reported that one of the men had said to them “sacré bleu or 
sacré bousse or sacré boof ”. One of the sailors, confident of his comprehension, 
told his companion that this phrase meant “bloody bugger”, and the fight was 
on. (It turned out that the men were not speaking French at all.)12 Linguistic 
misunderstanding was an essential element of everyday cosmopolitan commu-
nication. Misunderstandings marked the key social boundary around the speech 
of the inexperienced, those lacking social and linguistic fluency, who produced 
and received unintended insults.
This was a porous boundary with both openings and barriers. The struggle to 
understand the curse that opened this paper is just one example of the uneasy 
translations required to unravel such cases. There are many others. When 
Sa‘id Habib al-Daraghi insulted his father-in-law Hamida ben Khalifah in the 
courtyard of the building where he kept his shop, he certainly did not do so 
in French.13 The court record reads “cochon, maquereau, teneur de C.”, but, as 
in the story that opens this essay, this was a translation for the benefit of the 
judges. The same was true of the words Hundsfott (“scoundrel”) and Schwindler 
(“charlatan”), used by a Romanian pharmacist (and French protégé) named 
Ladislas Lucaci against the Austro-Hungarian medical doctor Pecnik as the men 
were leaving a medical meeting.14 Another brawl broke out in a raucous beer 
shop near the port just before midnight on 31 December 1879. One Maltese 
witness testified that “. . . there was music – we were dancing – there were girls. 
I asked one of the girls to dance with me – she said I do not know you – I then 
asked prisoner [the accused] to tell her to dance with me. He said he was not a 
Dragoman.” The prisoner, accused of stabbing and shooting, was also Maltese. 
He took offence at the suggestion that he should act as dragoman (or translator), 
which is to say that he should facilitate communication on behalf of another. 
While alcohol and bravado were contributing factors, the position of interme-
diary itself was also despised in this instance.15
The linguistic challenge of even rudimentary communication, of which 
effective cursing is a central example, shows one limit of easily imagined cosmo-
politanism. Genuine boundary crossing depends on a more patient social ethic 
than the actors in these cases displayed. Hospitality is a critical mechanism in 
cosmopolitan visions, notably Kant’s seminal 1795 essay on perpetual peace.16 It 
is prescribed as an international ethic for the treatment of strangers, for instance 
in the formulation of asylum laws.17 But defective and failing hospitality in 
everyday practice, of the sort just seen, rarely receives the attention it warrants. 
Although this is a failure of implementation rather than principle, it had very 
real consequences for the misunderstanding majority. This evidence tends to 
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support more gradualist and tentative cosmopolitan models, which are often 
criticised for their caution.18 
Many curses were misunderstood, but in what way did the content of the curse 
matter in the first place? In December of 1882, the Alexandria police charged 
a local subject with assault and with insulting Islam (sabb al-diyana al-muham-
madiya).19 Peaking with inferno, riot, bombardment, invasion and occupation, 
1882 was a year of extraordinary tension.20 According to the narrative of a 
mixed city breaking along sectarian and national lines, this insult appears easy 
to interpret. In this case, however, the man who insulted Islam bore the unmis-
takably Muslim name of Muhammad Ramadan. What then was the meaning of 
his insult? Speech acts (such as cursing), like identity labels (which abound in 
cosmopolitan settings), possess content and form. When one Muslim insulted 
the religion of another Muslim, it was clearly the person and not the religion 
that was being cursed. In this case, the damage to the religion must be considered 
collateral: one person said to another “curse your religion”, and that religion 
happened to be the same as the religion of the curser. And yet the offense was 
classified (here by a native rather than foreign authority) as an injury against 
Islam itself. It was a curse that (in the eyes of the court) did not depend on 
context, it was one of the “inherently abusive” phrases that Thomas Conley 
argues are so vanishingly rare.21
It may be helpful here to propose a simple cursing typology. Montagu’s classic 
history of swearing is typical of the genre: it is a scholarly genealogy of the origins 
of terms and concepts that populate a swearing lexicon.22 But it is utterly specific 
to a single tradition, that of the English-language texts that are its source. In this 
sense, it is of little help in understanding cosmopolitan cursing. Anecdotally, it 
is clear that most of Alexandria’s insults probed a similar set of moral and social 
boundaries: parents, women and family honour were key themes, as was religion; 
in a sense, the terms thief, assassin, pimp, bugger and whore were stock insults. 
But neither Montagu’s reading of these concepts, nor the finely-shaded distinc-
tions in Muslim jurisprudence on blasphemy are sufficient to describe Alexan-
dria’s curses.23 Instead, we might best analyse Alexandria’s curses by their effects, 
which crossed all social and cultural boundaries. In doing so we follow the logic 
of the legal institutions that recorded them. Broadly speaking, there were three 
kinds of effect: speech injury (both to individuals, in the form of defamation, 
and to God, in the form of blasphemy), social injury (to public order, in the form 
of actual or potential violence incited by speech acts) and civil injury (to the 
state, by disrespect of its servants).24 
This is a rather narrow list in light of present day debates over cursing in 
Muslim contexts. In his recent work on Islam and religiously injurious speech, 
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for example, Andrew March argues (against prominent critics of Western secu-
larism) that blasphemy can produce the broadest possible range of injuries: 
emotional and social (to the believer) and religious (to the belief system itself).25 
But the insult to Islam cited above was one of very few such prosecutions in the 
legal records of Alexandria. More often, even these most weighty words were 
judged entirely by context, which is to say that their effect superseded their 
meaning. In 1900, a port policeman named Hassan Al-Sa‘aran told an eighteen-
year-old French subject named Salomon Brakkha to step away from the edge 
of the quay. Brakkha’s retort, something like “I’ll get whoever makes me leave 
here to leave his religion”, was, the court noted, considered an insult according 
to local customs. Here too it is clear that the insult required translation, both 
literally and figuratively.26 The court did not consider the case serious, however, 
and the fine was the desultory sum of five francs. Modern readers might be 
tempted to classify this conflict between a French-protected Jew and a local 
Muslim along sectarian lines. But such conclusions must be approached with 
caution. Many of the most devastating critiques of cosmopolitan (and indeed 
multicultural) societies hold that they are about signalling, about the form of 
diversity, but provide limited space for its true realisation.27 In other words, the 
content is of little importance. 
While the bias to misunderstanding discussed earlier might dampen cosmo-
politan expectations, the bias to context offers a more hopeful and practical 
formula. We must consider one further facet of Alexandria’s evidence that may 
shed light on cosmopolitan dilemmas, however: the bias to power. By the turn of 
the century, the law came to shield a certain class of individuals – officials – from 
all insults, over and above the religious and national lines that are presumed to 
mark obvious boundaries in mixed cities.
Two decades after 1882, a French subject named Mahmud Hassan Ghimé was 
gambling with students outside Alexandria’s École des Frères. When children 
who had lost their money started to cry, a police officer named Mustafa ‘Allam 
came over to investigate the commotion. Mahmud called Mustafa a pimp and 
the son of a dog, then said that all police were pimps and that their religion was 
cursed (“maudite”, the records says).28 Again, all evidence suggests that both 
men were Muslims (and of course the religion of most policemen was Islam), 
and the blasphemy was not pursued. Instead (as in the opening story), it was 
officialdom that gave these curses their most actionable force.
Insults to officials have special status in the legal records of Alexandria. The 
emerging cosmopolitan class of officialdom provided a legible frame for the pros-
ecution of curses. Whereas insults between private individuals depended on a 
close investigation of the whole context, insults to officials could be classified 
unilaterally: if the official felt insulted, it was enough. As we saw in the opening 
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story, translation of this feeling into the legal context was not always successful. 
Often, however, it was. Edouard Maroque, a French citizen, was arrested when 
a man he was walking with called a mounted policeman, Sulaiman ‘Ali Ghazal, 
a “blind donkey”. The court did not consider this case conclusive: “because it 
happened at nine o’clock in the evening, it would have been impossible for the 
policeman, who was crossing a crowded alley at full gallop, to tell who had said 
something he didn’t like”. Maroque’s mistake came later, at the police station, 
when he was overheard calling a police captain a “Maltese captain pig”.29
This growing category of cursing was compounded by official sensitivity to 
offence, which only added to the repertory of insults available for use. A Tunisian 
facing a policeman in Kafr al-Zayat (a town outside of Alexandria) managed to 
roll all insults into one stream: “maudit soit ton père, maudit soit ton gouvernement, 
fils de chien etc.” (“curse your father, curse your government, son of a cur, etc.”).30 
Officials themselves could also draw on this stock: a guard mocked a man who 
was especially officious in challenging a fee increase by calling him “chef de 
village” (“Mr. Biggety-Big”).31 It will be noticed that none of the insults cited 
thus far invoked national, ethnic or racial categories (except for the Maltese 
captain, who was probably most upset to be called “pig”). The boundaries that 
mattered in vulgar speech were linguistic, spatial, moral and official.
Modern officialdom cut across social and indeed class lines, reshaping and 
constraining numerous social categories. It was a dispenser of benefits, such as 
employment. In this role, it could also be a lightening rod for injurious speech. 
The Maltese Carmelo Psaila, for example, brought a civil dispute with his sister-
in-law to court in 1890. He claimed that she had shouted, in public, that he had 
won his government job by pimping his own daughter to his superiors. In her 
statement, the sister-in-law corrected him: she had actually said it was his wife. 
The court awarded him one farthing in damages.32 As Ann Stoler has recently 
argued, archival sources are at their best in telling these stories of officials, who 
were their own best constituency.33 It is not surprising, therefore, that legal 
reflection on the nature of the insults made a clearer and clearer distinction 
between the lawmakers and the litigants. In 1911, for example, a policeman 
named ‘Ali Sid Ahmad Musa arrested Yussuf Makluf Huta’s eleven-year-old son 
because he was playing in the street with a wagon belonging to the municipality. 
The men began to argue, and Yussuf, a French subject, was arrested for insulting 
a policeman. “The insults (which probably went in both directions) are, as it 
were, traditional in this country”, the court ruled. “Undoubtedly, the accused 
uttered them almost on instinct, as occurs in all discussions which take place in 
the street.” The altercation was not of great importance, but because “the police 
would lose all authority if this sort of abuse went completely unsanctioned”, 
the father was sentenced to six days in prison.34 Context again overwhelmed 
content – the street was a site of routine cursing, produced on instinct, but the 
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dignity of the forces of order was the primary concern. Officialdom became a 
means to simplify the complex social transactions that cursing registers, to make 
the practice legible for prosecution before Alexandria’s courts, and to preserve 
the dignity of the powerful.
The conventional image of cosmopolitan Alexandria fails to describe its 
historical reality because it requires the conjuring of a faceless, voiceless non-
cosmopolitan mainstream of poor Muslim Arab Egyptians who, by definition, 
cannot be cosmopolitans. They exist, submerged as a sort of human ballast, 
in order to elevate the cosmopolitan pinnacle. They are the context that 
creates cosmopolitan Alexandria, from which they are excluded by definition.35 
Exclusion plays a similar role in certain key works of modern political theory. 
The just, liberal state described by John Rawls, for instance, insists resolutely on 
its boundaries.36 Will Kymlicka’s multicultural citizenship is a project restricted 
to a handful of Western liberal democratic nationalisms.37 Kwame Anthony 
Appiah’s cosmopolitanism is marketed to (and flattering of) elites.38 Clearly, this 
exclusion is a theoretical rather than empirical shortcoming: an abundant and 
growing literature (including this book) shows that Muslim and non-Western 
cosmopolitanisms exist.39 But the challenge is not to expand existing models of 
cosmopolitanism to include Muslims. The problem is to describe a cosmopoli-
tanism that does not require the non-cosmopolitan.
The historical example treated in this essay is intended to qualify the 
received image of Alexandria. I also believe that the question of cursing has 
some relevance to modern-day efforts to grapple with a complex, globalised 
society. Political theory seeks usable pasts, and it seems to me that the story told 
here is useful in two ways.
First, this story corresponds to the stakes of modern-day politics. Cosmo-
politanism is not merely about cultivating a broad cultural palette. It is about 
tackling injustice: cosmopolitanism, like cursing itself, is meaningful only when 
it is dangerous, when it hurts. Craig Calhoun’s brilliant “Class Consciousness 
of Frequent Fliers” provides a glimpse of actually existing cosmopolitanism – 
elitist, consumerist, neo-liberal, secular – as a plaisanterie entre amis.40 Echoing 
David Harvey, he depicts a capitalist cosmopolitan class that rejects communi-
tarianism by celebrating postmodernism and neglecting local particularities.41 
This cosmopolitanism corresponds exactly to Alexandria’s conventional image. 
The remedy, Calhoun argues, is to battle the Western, capitalist cosmopolitan 
consensus by making room for multiple national and religious solidarities. This 
is the task of more difficult cosmopolitan projects, which are full of uncertainty 
and risk. And here it is essential to note that Muslim experiences and Muslim 
symbols (the veil, human rights, democracy, terror) provide the content for 
the genuinely dangerous debates that most incisively challenge the present-day 
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globalised slate of liberatory programmes: feminism, multiculturalism, human 
rights, cosmopolitanism.42 These debates are unresolved, obviously, and their 
danger is palpable in much Western liberal treatment of Muslims, who have in 
many ways assumed the suspicious figure of the “rootless cosmopolitan” once 
assigned to Jews.
The second usable past that everyday cosmopolitanism of the sort presented 
in this paper might contribute to contemporary theory is the virtue of the banal. 
I have argued that cosmopolitan cursing exhibited biases to misunderstanding, 
context and power. The effort made in the opening case to probe the meaning 
of the insulting words themselves was ultimately fruitless when it came time to 
issue judgement. In practice, difference was managed through attention to the 
concerns of the actors involved. A similar concern for the effects rather than 
the ultimate causes of cosmopolitan conflict might assuage present-day debates. 
In debates over the Islamic veil in Western states, for example, the insistence 
on principle has blocked an approach at once less fraught and more profound, 
which acknowledges that there are relatively few burqas and, on a collective 
scale, their effect is almost negligible. These historical data support cosmopoli-
tanism theory that privileges local context and is wary of the misunderstandings 
and the bias to power that results from insistence on pure principle.
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Kebabs and Port Wine: 
The Culinary Cosmopolitanism of
Anglo-Persian Dining, 1800–1835
Nile Green
Chapter 7
My fare is really sumptuous this evening: Buffalo’s humps, tongues, and 
marrowbones …
The Journal of Meriwether Lewis, 13 June 1805
Introduction
Although better known for their commercial and scientific achievements, the 
travels of the small exploratory parties, which between 1750 and 1850 contributed 
to what William Goetzmann termed the “second great age of discovery”, were 
also parties of gastronomic discovery.1 The intensified patterns of social inter-
action that emerged as these journeys became regularised into repeatable routes 
of commerce and diplomacy fed a growing appetite for travel writing in which 
the discussion of food habits played a significant and practical role.2 Although 
largely recorded in the general books of travel that placed commercial and ethno-
graphic data alongside geographical and historical observations, this literature of 
cultural description was practical in nature. In a period in which Anglo-Saxon 
hegemony was far from established, knowledge of “manners and customs” laid 
the social basis for developing what were still, on their frontiers at least, empires 
of negotiation.3 The collection of this knowledge was not unique to Euro-
American travellers and from around 1800 there emerged a corresponding travel 
literature in Persian concerned with European cultural practices. As Britain’s 
imperial meridian widened, members of the court and bureaucratic elite of Iran 
were dispatched on similar fact-finding missions to Britain. 4 Despite the growing 
imbalance of power, as increasing numbers of Iranian elites reached Britain, 
there emerged a considerable reciprocity of practice and process in the methods 
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of travel and knowledge production in Persian and English.5 Within this pattern 
of reciprocity, travellers on both sides brokered exchanges through food culture. 
Such elite culinary interaction was not inherently new and owed much of its 
character to an older emphasis on the civility of diplomatic personnel.6 What 
was new to the decades after 1800 was the emergence of a substantial two-way 
literature, in Persian no less than English, of Iranians describing English foods 
no less than Englishmen describing Iranian foods. It is this literature that allows 
us to capture at a distance of two centuries something of the flavour of a tenuous 
cosmopolitanism that emerged through common dining. 
As British interests incrementally extended from India to the Persian Gulf 
and as Iran sought allies against an expansive Russian Empire in the early 
1800s, the underlying causes of the increase in travel between England and 
Iran were political in nature. But as each party of diplomats and scholars spent 
time in the other’s country, the ramifications were also cultural. Indeed, the 
cultural, political, intellectual and commercial elements of these travels and 
of the knowledge they produced were interdependent. The most enduring 
cultural product of this period of exchanges is the set of travelogues composed 
on each side in Persian and English. The following pages draw on these writings 
to explore the perceptions and descriptions of food cultures on both sides of 
the exchange in order to assess to what degree these adventures of the palate 
amounted to a pattern of culinary cosmopolitanism. The main sources are drawn 
from the circle of Iranian and British travellers that surrounded the embassies of 
Abu al-Hasan Khan to England in 1809–10 and of Sir Gore Ouseley to Iran in 
1810–12, in particular the travelogues of Abu al-Hasan himself and of the young 
Iranian statesman Mirza Salih Shirazi, who spent four years between 1815 and 
1819 studying the ways and languages of the English as the foundation of what 
would become his own diplomatic career.7
Before moving on to the accounts themselves, let us focus a little more closely 
on the significance of such commensality or food sharing. As O. A. C. Anigbo 
has noted, “the principle of commensality is eating together for a purpose” and 
a substantial anthropological literature has now explored in detail how “rituals 
of dinner” serve as profound purveyors of meaning, from hierarchy and status 
to belonging and exclusion.8 Amid the globalised food industry of the twenty-
first century, it is easy to take the interaction of food cultures for granted. But 
amid the nascent global interactions of the early nineteenth century, common 
food experiences were far from universal and in many contexts the simple act of 
eating together faced profound cultural barriers on one side of the table or the 
other. In India, British interaction with Hindus was restricted by caste taboos 
that presented food sharing as polluting, taboos which in a diplomatic context 
were all the more vexing for their more scrupulous observation by elites.9 In 
Africa, the obstacles were often on the British side, as travellers were confronted 
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with foodstuffs and eating practices that seemed repulsive to their own sensibil-
ities.10 In other regions, food sharing was not the most important mode of social 
interaction and the sharing of commodities other than food was often more 
important. Diplomatic interactions in Eurasia had long relied on the exchange 
of robes, a practice whose uncertain implications caused considerable concern 
to East India Company officials before their own social rituals gained leverage.11 
In the westward expansion of America, travelling negotiators had to adjust to 
an Amerindian culture of interaction based around ritual pipe smoking that 
survived well into the 1800s.12 Like robe giving and pipe smoking, food sharing 
was an important medium of interaction. It was also one that, in the greater 
scheme of global interactions, was similarly held by Christians and Muslims. 
Beyond this shared theoretical recognition of commensality, its actual 
practice was rendered easier through the use of broadly familiar foodstuffs that 
resulted from older patterns of Eurasian trade and the related ecologies of food 
production between the Middle East and Europe. An Iranian might find English 
food habits unusual but never incomprehensible and rarely repulsive, and the 
same was true vice-versa, particularly through the impact of Britons returned 
from India on food culture in England.13 Since the Christian English lacked any 
clear food taboos beyond the modifiable criterion of “taste”, food sharing was 
an obvious first choice for diplomatic interactions with other peoples.14 And 
while Muslim travellers were in principle restricted by the dietary regulations 
of shari‘a, in practice such restrictions were often more honoured in the breach 
than the observance. This was particularly the case with alcohol consumption, 
which in any case had a long history in the food culture of Persianate elites, 
for whom the bonds of shared drunkenness had a history that reached from the 
epic heroes of the Shahnama and bibulous männerbund of the emperor Babur.15 
In the larger global context of social interaction in the second age of discovery, 
English and Iranian elites therefore faced relatively few barriers for culinary 
sociability. In a period in which the strangeness of new peoples was increasingly 
confronted through the experience and literature of travel, the sharing of food 
offered a simple but effective means for what was a fragile but nonetheless face-
to-face cosmopolitanism. 
Food culture is never static and over the longer term such patterns of culinary 
interaction forged inroads into the actual substance of food cultures on both 
sides.16 Recent work has shown how, by the eighteenth century, British food 
culture had been massively infiltrated by dietary commodities introduced mainly 
from the First British Empire and by the early nineteenth century Britain was 
receiving a second wave of influences from the Second British Empire in the 
East.17 Whether as “Worcestershire” sauce and coronation chicken or kalbas 
sausage and dubbal-roti sliced bread, as the nineteenth century wore on, discrete 
food items and recipes were adapted to the palates of England no less than Iran 
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and India. It is not our purpose here to trace these longer-term developments, 
but rather to focus on a shorter period in which (for its participants at least) 
respective food cultures appeared to be stable. Whether such stability actually 
was the case is not the point (and the increasing interactions of the period 
suggest it hardly can have been). 18 Instead, the aim here is to show how expe-
rience and understanding of eating habits fitted into a wider body of cultural 
knowledge collected, in Persian no less than English, to smooth the way for 
elite and principally diplomatic interactions. This need to contain food prac-
tices in coherent and thereby useful prose had an innate tendency to present 
food cultures in terms of stable systems. As a result, writers in both Persian and 
English tried to codify their dining experiences into coherent systems described 
in such a way as to enable their readers to master the rules and participate. Like 
travel writing more generally in this period, the description of food culture was 
intended to be practical and instructive. If the tone of the English sources had 
not yet attained a Victorian gravitas, surrounding the enjoyment of food were 
the grand politics of the high table. Even so, pleasure was central to the purposes 
of such sociability and so, in the early 1800s no less than today, such culinary 
interactions formed the easiest of cosmopolitanisms because they were the most 
enjoyable. In this way, shared food and drink became more than diplomatic 
devices: they became brokers of understanding and even affection. It is some-
thing of that levity of the table that is sought in the pages that follow.
Dining Together: Ethnography at the High Table
It is easy to imagine that Muslim visitors to Regency England faced all manner 
of ritual injunctions restricting their dining with Christian hosts: was wine being 
drunk at table, for example, or pork being served; indeed, was any of the meat on 
offer halal? From a theological or even a prescriptively multiculturalist reading 
of Muslim mores, we might imagine that the moveable feast of Regency high 
society presented Muslims with religious obstacles to the conviviality of shared 
food and drink. In practice, this seems not to have been the case. While there 
certainly were Muslim travellers for whom the difficulty of accessing, for example, 
halal meat was a cause of upset (such as the eighteenth-century Bengali scholar, 
Mirza I‘tisam al-din), we have no evidence that this was the case with our chief 
exemplar, Mirza Salih, who did not mention the issue of haram and halal food, 
nor the “problem” of alcohol, in the entire course of his travelogue.19 Nor was 
he alone in this gastronomic liberalism, for the travel diaries of the Indo-Persian 
traveller Mirza Abu Talib between 1799 and 1803 and of the Iranian ambassador 
Abu al-Hasan Khan between 1809 and 1810 substantially cohere with Mirza 
Salih’s attitudes in the following decade. Of course, the possibility remains that 
Muslim travellers also prepared more licit foods on their own account, and in 
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the case of Abu al-Hasan Khan, who travelled with a substantial entourage, this 
does seem to have been the case. But the facts remain that, firstly, even if they 
did so, they did not consider this worth making a point of in their travelogues 
(which were after all written for an audience of fellow Muslims for whom we 
might easily consider such matters to be of importance) and, secondly, when 
eating either in public or as guests, they joined in with the dining customs of 
those around them. Although it might be argued that shari‘a is traditionally 
accommodating to the difficulties experienced while travelling, the journals of 
such figures do not suggest personalities especially concerned with or learned 
in the finer points of dietary law. Instead, the dinners, dances and high teas 
that Mirza Salih and his fellow travellers enjoyed in Regency England suggest 
that social interaction between “Muslims” and “Christians” was anything but 
predictable through the theoretical prescriptions of religious law.
Compared to the culture of the vigorous sportsman that would emerge from 
the public schools of Victorian Britain, Mirza Salih’s picture of the Regency 
English in his travelogue is of a surprisingly domesticated people. The picture 
he presented of the typical Englishman’s daily cycle was remarkably quotidian: 
he dressed, shaved, took breakfast, went to work (usually, pace Napoleon, in a 
shop!), came home and ate supper (enjoying cheese or sweets for his pudding), 
before reading and retiring to bed.20 Turning to food customs, he then gave a 
description of the kinds of food that were eaten in England. What is striking 
about the account is its vivid awareness of the intersections between food, 
economy and class. Mirza Salih’s discussion of British foodstuffs included a 
section on the Atlantic fishing industry, for example.21 Transcribing the English 
term for the fish in question, he described how a certain fish “which they call 
haran [herring]” is usually salted and can then be stored for years. Such is its 
importance, he added, that in Scotland no fewer than 15,000 fishermen are 
employed in catching its vast stocks, with many more people employed in the 
subsidiary jobs of transporting and selling herring. Many other people in England 
and Scotland, he added, are similarly “busy in catching a fish that they call kad 
[cod]”, which after being salted is then traded with France, Germany, Italy and 
other countries of Europe.22 Most striking of all is Mirza Salih’s awareness of the 
fact that much of the cod was ultimately acquired from fishermen operating in 
the ports of distant niwfirlund, that is, the Newfoundland for which there was 
no existing name in Persian. 
In a reflection of the class with whom he was mixing, Mirza Salih then 
described the main foodstuffs of the gentry as comprising beef, veal, mutton, 
venison and boar, alongside chicken, pheasant and goose.23 Detail mattered 
and a good sense of the thoroughness with which Mirza Salih observed English 
eating habits can be found in his account of eating practices as such, which 
covered everything from the times at which the English ate to the etiquette 
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they observed while doing so.24 Breakfast, for example, was said to consist of 
either coffee or tea, along with bread, butter and a “half-cooked” egg; aged 
cow’s tongue (“which is delicious”) was also sometimes eaten.25 Before he ate 
breakfast, Mirza Salih explained, the Englishman would dress in the clean and 
elegant clothes that his servants had laid out for him and by the time he and 
his family sat down to eat, a knife, fork and spoon would have been laid out 
on a table in front of a chair for each person, a method of eating which was 
of course quite foreign to Iranian floor-and-hands eating. Before even arriving 
at the breakfast table, Mirza Salih repeated, it was necessary to don appropri-
ately elegant dress, to wash one’s hands and face and, for men, to also shave. 
However fine the plates and cutlery, no one was allowed to exchange utensils 
with another person at table.26 One also needed to display good manners and 
make polite table talk throughout the mealtime. 
Noting the different dinner times for workers, artisans and gentry, Mirza Salih 
then described the manner in which British families always ate together, men, 
women and children, no matter how large the family. Not only did women 
eat with, and even sit between, men at table, the master of the household 
always placed his wife at the head of the table and himself sat opposite her 
at its foot.27 A shift in the social order of eating, then, from the “sitting atop” 
(bala nishastan) by which only male hosts and their chief guests sat at the head 
of the table in Iran. Even so, the scene in the special English dining room was 
a graceful one, with white tablecloths and clean napkins laid out. Dinner itself 
consisted of a meat broth, followed by fish, chicken, what Mirza Salih described 
as “kebab” (presumably England’s famous roasts) and other “elegant foodstuffs”, 
none of which one was allowed to touch with one’s hand. Afterwards, servants 
brought sweets, then what Mirza Salih referred to by the Persian combination 
“cheese and herbs” (panir u sabzi), followed finally by wine served with fruit 
and almonds.28 Lest wine drinking among women seem too shocking to his 
countrymen, he added that English women never took more than one or two 
glasses of wine themselves and that the drunkenness of any guest was considered 
a grave offence. As we have already seen, such travelogues were not intended 
to be idiosyncratic or personal memoirs, but practical and instructive works 
aimed at smoothing the way for future interactions. In the Persian ethnography 
of the Russians that was written during the Iranian embassy to Saint Petersburg 
in 1830 (which Mirza Salih accompanied as by then an accomplished cultural 
intermediary), we thus find a parallel description of Russian dining habits.29 
Served with gold cutlery and crystal glassware, dinner in the imperial capital was 
presented as a much grander affair than the bourgeois manner of the English.30 
As with the account of English dining, the description of Russian food customs 
was primarily intended to serve as practical and preparatory advice for future 
Iranian travellers, primarily those in state service.
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The topic of food also led Mirza Salih to the subject of hunting. In an implicit 
contrast to the hunting practices of Iranian elites which Mirza Salih’s friend 
Sir John Malcolm (1769–1833) described in his account of Iran, Mirza Salih 
noted how England’s hunters were mostly limited to rabbit, adding that some 
of the aristocracy also kept deer on their land.31 In contrast to the wide variety 
of animals still found in the mountains and on the plains of Iran, aside from 
rabbit and deer, the English hunter had to make do with the humble quarry 
of the bird and fox. When we compare this to the fact that, during his stay in 
London from 1809–10, Ambassador Abu al-Hasan liked to begin his days with 
a ride in Regent’s Park hurling javelins (niza) at his retainers, the sporting life 
of John Bull must have seemed tame indeed.32 But here too there was room 
for exchange. When Abu al-Hasan returned to Iran in Malcolm’s company, 
to amuse as well as feed one another en route, the British and Iranian parties 
demonstrated their ways of hunting and, as Malcolm noted, “if we were amused 
by the field diversions of the Persians and Arabs, they were equally so with our 
mode of hunting”.33 Nonetheless, Abu al-Hasan took back with him to Iran 
a pack of English fox hounds as a present for the crown prince, ‘Abbas Mirza, 
for in spite of the difference in particulars, the aristocratic pastime of the hunt 
was itself held in common. Between Iran and England in the early nineteenth 
century, as it would in imperial India still more, the hunt formed an important 
medium of elite interaction.34
In another section of his safarnama, Mirza Salih gave an account of England’s 
emergent culture of consumption by way of the tea garden, coffee house and 
what he termed the public “kitchen” (ashpaz-khana).35 While this might seem 
unremarkable to the modern reader, it is worth emphasising the sheer novelty 
of a restaurant culture. Through its provision of an ostentatious setting for 
dinner for a class lacking a grand dining room and servants of their own, the 
restaurant was an innovation that signalled the rise of the bourgeoisie.36 Even if 
the “restaurant” as such had not yet truly developed in Regency Britain, and was 
still regarded as a characteristically French phenomenon at this time, the public 
“kitchens” and “hotels” that Mirza Salih described were novel to an Iranian 
audience. While early nineteenth-century Iran did have its travellers’ inns or 
musafir-khanas at which a sojourner might find shelter and even food, he would 
have to be a needy traveller to do so.37 When travelling in their own country, 
Iranians who could afford to do so would typically set up their own camps, 
surrounded by their own guards and attended by their own cooks and servants. 
The same was true for dining in one’s native city, where one would entertain at 
home – whether in the public or biruni section of the house or better still in the 
pavilion of a private garden – rather than resort to a public “kitchen”. There was 
as yet no Iranian middle class who desired imitation aristocratic dining rooms in 
which to show off in public.38 The public gathering places of early nineteenth-
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century Iran were not the showy hotels that Mirza Salih observed in London and 
which he described as being not only impeccably clean but as serving food with 
fine plates and silver cutlery.39 Still, even here there was common ground to be 
found and it is possible to gauge the degree of culinary familiarity and difference 
that Mirza Salih experienced through his varying resort to either native Persian 
words or English loan-words to describe what he saw in London. While for 
tearooms and coffee houses he found easy Persian equivalents in the chai-khana 
and qahva-khana, for the “hotel” and the “inn” he was forced to transcribe the 
English terms into Arabic script. Driven by a similar sense of familiarity to the 
Iranian tradition of sweetmeats, Mirza Salih also wrote about the pastry and 
sweet shops to which he said the English retreated when tired and in which one 
could be served all kinds of sugary or fruity confections by the young women 
who worked there.40 In order to describe what were surely sticky puddings of 
a very English kind, he again drew on his native vocabulary of gastronomy by 
labelling them as shirini, halva and nakh band, sweets which his Iranian readers 
would recognise at once. As the future founder of Iran’s first newspaper, Mirza 
Salih also pointed to the fact that London’s coffee houses were places to which 
people retired to read the kaghaz-e akhbar or “newspaper”.41 Food culture, then, 
was also a medium for other forms of cultural adaptation and exchange.
From Food to Hospitality: Patterns of Elite Sociability
While it would be naïve and plainly false to suggest that all Muslim visitors were 
well treated in Regency England, in the early nineteenth century their presence 
was still relatively uncommon and, for elite and wealthy travellers at least, that 
rarity lent them an enhanced status. In the diary of the residence in England 
of the Indo-Persian gentleman Mirza Abu Talib between 1799 and 1803, we 
find strident compliments on English hospitality towards a Muslim traveller. 
In Mirza Abu Talib’s words, “hospitality (mihman-gharib) is one of the most 
esteemed virtues of the English; and I experienced it to such a degree, that I was 
seldom disengaged. In these parties I enjoyed every luxury my heart could desire. 
Their viands (ta‘am) were delicious, and wines (sharab) exquisite.”42 Amid his 
endless invitations, Mirza Abu Talib appears to have been a solitary Eastern star 
in this scene, though a few years after his departure the still brighter presence 
of Ambassador Abu al-Hasan took his place on the London social circuit. Not 
only did Abu al-Hasan supply the thrill of the exotic in an age of fashionable 
orientalism, he was considered a wit and dandy to boot. As the pseudonymous 
mannerist Philoxenus Secundus described him in a book he wrote on Persian 
etiquette for would-be hosts of the Iranian delegation, the ambassador was “a 
fine handsome dark man”, albeit one who “was sometimes much annoyed by the 
insatiate admiration, fixed stare, and intense regard of the British ladies”.43 Such 
Kebabs and Port Wine
— 113 —
was the prestige of his presence at London’s soirées in 1809 and 1810, and again 
on his return between 1818 and 1819, that at the insistence of his proud hosts, 
newspapers regularly publicised his attendance at dinners.44 
Abu al-Hasan’s diary gives us a good idea of Iranian assessments of the gath-
erings he attended, one of which comprised that British custom which continues 
to confound foreign visitors to the present day: the fancy dress party.45 At 
this breakfast (brak fas), the ambassador witnessed the spectacle of scores of 
Englishmen dressed up not only in the old standbys of ancient Romans and 
hoary seadogs, but also in the more fashionably oriental manner of Iranians, 
Turks and Indians (bih libas-e Iran va Turani va Hindi).46 Amid the exchange of 
clothes, food, drink (wine?) and “kebab” (ta‘am va sharab va kebab) was being 
served in the little garden where the people gathered.47 Abu al-Hasan noted in 
particular a man with a thick false beard made of cat’s or goat’s hair, who was said 
to be dressed as an Iranian and to be able to speak Persian, though when Abu 
al-Hasan spoke with him, he was quickly divested of his pretentions to sartorial 
no less than grammatical accuracy and left helpless and bewildered (‘ajiz va 
hayran).48 By way of recompense, Abu al-Hasan provided a more accurate recre-
ation of Iranian life in the parties he hosted at his lodgings in Mansfield Street 
for such diplomats as James Morier and Sir Gore Ouseley, where he provided 
Iranian food prepared by the domestic staff who had accompanied him from Iran. 
According to a newspaper report in the Morning Post of 21 December 1809, the 
ambassador hosted his Persophile friends to “an entertainment, called in the 
Persian language a Pillau; it was composed of rice and fowls stewed together with 
spices”. To try to give British readers a better sense of the exotic feast, in the same 
way that Mirza Salih resorted to the familiar language of kebabs and halva, the 
English report added in plainer terms that “the [Persian] dish was prepared in the 
same way as marinaded chickens”.49 From this dinner, as well as his later culinary 
experiences in Iran itself, Gore Ouseley’s own kitchen arrangements changed, 
such that in future he would be serving Persian food to his own guests. When 
in December 1827 the German traveller Prince Pückler-Muskau was invited to 
dine at Ouseley’s country house, he recorded that he was served “some Oriental 
dishes, and drank genuine Schiraz [wine] for the first time in my life”.50
The most vivid picture of this reciprocity between Iranian and English dining 
is found in an account of the residence of two Iranian princes in London in 
the mid-1830s written by their official host or mihmandar, James Baillie Fraser 
(1783–1856). There we find the following opinions of the Iranians recorded 
about the food they encountered in London: 
[W]hen asked what dishes they preferred, the usual reply was, “Oh! anything; 
just what you English eat.” There were, however, exceptions: some dishes 
they would not eat; two have been mentioned already, – turtles and lobsters. 
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To these at first was added oysters; and, in fact, their aversion seemed to 
extend to all shell-fish with one exception, and that, strange enough to say, 
was shrimps. To these, or something of the sort, they had been accustomed 
in the south of Fars, and [Prince] Timour especially was very fond of them. 
To turtle and lobsters they obstinately maintained their antipathy, refusing to 
taste them, although mock-turtle soup was one of their favourite dishes; but 
one day, as a dish of nice scalloped oysters was put on the table at Mivart’s, 
I pressed Timour Meerza to taste a little bit.51 He confessed that the dish 
looked very well, and smelt very well; and after a queer imploring look at his 
brothers, and a glance of irresolution at the morsel, he put it in his mouth. His 
countenance betrayed that the taste was not displeasing; he asked for another 
morsel – swallowed it – and then desired the whole shell to be sent to him. 
This he gobbled up without a word; and then, turning to his brother, said, 
“Dadâish, by your head, it is capital! what fools we have been! Saheb Fraser, 
pray order that dish of these same oysters be set down at table every day we 
dine here. Ajaib-cheezee ust! – A wonderful sort of thing it is!” In fact, after 
this, he ate so much of them, that they were, I do believe, a principal cause 
of a sharp illness that he had soon after.52
There is certainly an element of teasing, even cruelty, in Fraser’s pushing of 
the horrid crustaceans, not least in view of their “abhorred” (makruh) status in 
Islamic dietary law (though, again, neither of the princes apparently mentioned 
this). Even so, as mihmandar, it was Fraser’s task not chiefly to pander to the 
princes’ wishes but to safely introduce them to English ways. And, amid this 
diplomatic cultural exchange, Fraser also described how Persian techniques of 
cooking found their way into the English kitchen at James Mivart’s famous 
Claridge’s Hotel.
Another dish of which they became very fond was a preparation of cream, 
under the name of Charlotte Russe. The Wali, in particular, was a great admirer 
of it, and ate, as he always did when he got what he liked, to excess, making 
all of the time puns and bon-môts in Persian on the sweetness and fairness of 
his favourite dish as compared with the living Charlottes of his acquaintance. 
Still, after they had been for some time in London, they began to long for 
some of their Persian fare; and, as one of their servants was a cook, by the 
assistance of Mr. Mivart’s artiste the matter was easily managed, and pillaws 
of various sorts, and sundry stews, mutemjâns, fizenjans, moosommahs, cookoos, 
and vegetables à la mode de Perse – made their appearance at their table. That 
same artiste of Mr. Mivart’s, if he had the true gastronomic genius, must have 
got some good hints for new dishes; for though the Persian cookery deals 
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much in butter, and may be too greasy for many palates, it has points that 
proper modification could not fail being turned to good advantage.53
Fraser’s account of the Iranians’ exploratory gastronomy is not only of interest 
as a period piece, but also for its hints at the reciprocity of English and Iranian 
food learning. The English share in this bill of exchange appears most clearly in 
the interest taken in the cultivated table talk studied by this class of Iranians, 
who, on this count, claimed Philoxenus Secundus did “resemble the French in 
the days of Gallic civilization more than any other nation of Europe”.54 We can 
glimpse something of this display and delight in witticisms, puns and bon-mots 
in Fraser’s account of the princes at table, comparing the sweet cream charlotte 
russe with limpid-skinned ladies of the same name. Memorised, improvised, 
or parodied, poetry was central to this art, and both the Persian and Arabic 
literary traditions preserved a vast treasury of verse on the pleasures of the sweet 
life.55 (We would do well to remember that when Britons wrote in condem-
nation of Islamic morality in the nineteenth century, it was not as today for 
their puritan denial of the good life but for what they considered the excessive 
sensuality of Islam.)56 Since Iranians expected any man of culture to carry a 
collection of rare verses or anecdotes in his repertoire, the entry of the Iranian 
travellers to London society led to English attempts to participate in this culture 
of dinner talk. As we have already seen, the desire of London hosts to master or 
at least appreciate this conversational art had in 1812 led Philoxenus Secundus 
to publish his Oriental Recreations on the correct forming of verbal nuqtas and 
latifas. A number of Abu al-Hasan’s own gallantries were described by way of 
example: when an English lady “wished to know if he believed in talismans, he 
said the ladies were the only talismans he knew”.57 Not every Englishman was 
ready to adapt this line of charm and for his part, George, the Prince Regent, 
chose the rather blunter approach of telling Abu al-Hasan his own favourite 
latifa about the length of his brother’s penis (zakar).58 In an age of sensibility, 
it is scarcely surprising that the Indo-Persian traveller Mirza Abu Talib found 
his more refined conversation had a pleasing effect on his hosts, recording that 
“my society was courted, and that my wit and repartees, with some impromptu 
applications of oriental poetry, were the subject of conversation in the politest 
circles”.59 This was, after all, the time of Jane Austen no less than the Prince 
Regent and it is probably no coincidence that the cultivated elites of Iran found 
a better reception in the mannered society of the Regency than in the more 
bullish age of the Victorians. In 1818, the year of the publication of Austen’s 
Persuasion, set in Bath, Mirza Salih and his aristocratic companion Mirza Ja‘far 
made a tour of that city.60 Among the elegant villas, they cut sufficient dash 
that, on leaving, a local newspaper reported that “they will be followed by the 
good wishes of all who witnessed their friendly and ingratiating manners”.61
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Illicit Libations? The Question of Alcohol
Not content with attending society gatherings, Mirza Salih also sought the 
company of England’s intellectual elite and in doing so dined at the grandest 
academic tables in the land. This occurred during his several visits to Oxford and 
Cambridge in 1818 and 1819, where he toured some of the richest colleges of the 
universities at the height of their Regency extravagance, dining at Trinity and 
Queens’ College, Cambridge and New College, Oxford.62 We can be confident 
that Mirza Salih was capable of holding his own at these dinners and his surviving 
letters in English testify to an effortless command of idiom.63 There is also inde-
pendent testimony of his sociability – according to a report in The Times, “he 
has much humour, and is social and easy, particularly with ladies” – and we 
have in any case already seen his informed summary of English table manners.64 
Unlike the latter-day Spanish visitor to Oxford described in the novelist Javier 
Marias’s semi-autobiographical All Souls, one suspects Mirza Salih was far from 
confounded by the gongs and whispers.65 While Mirza Salih left no details of the 
food he ate on these occasions, accounts of the college meals from the period 
allow us to reconstruct something of the gastronomic scene that confronted 
him. One such description appears in the diary of Reverend James Woodforde 
(1740–1803), who transcribed several menus from New College in the years 
before Mirza Salih ate there. During the period in which these dinners were 
held, Woodforde was vice-warden of the college and so in a comparable position 
to the “grandee” (bozorg) of the same college whom Mirza Salih claimed invited 
him.66 Woodforde described one New College dinner as comprising nothing less 
than “two fine Codds boiled with fryed Souls round them and oyster sauce, a 
fine sirloin of Beef roasted, some peas soup and an orange Pudding for the first 
course, for the second, we had a lease of Wild Ducks roasted, a fore Qu of Lamb 
and sallad and mince Pies.”67
Although this grand repast was admittedly a Christmas dinner, Woodforde’s 
account of more everyday dinners for college guests were little less substantial. 
A more quotidian entry in his diary records, “I gave my company for dinner, 
some green Pea Soup, a chine of Mutton, some New College Puddings, a goose, 
some Peas, and a Codlin Tart with Cream. Madeira and Port Wine to drink 
after and at dinner some strong Beer, Cider, Ale and small Beer.”68 While it 
would be tedious to list sample menus for every college at which Mirza Salih 
ate, New College was by no means exceptional in the munificence of its table. 
Even a humbler institution like Queens’ College, Cambridge – where Mirza 
Salih dined on several occasions as the guest of the professor of Arabic, Samuel 
Lee (1783–1852), and the evangelical college dean, William Mandell (c.1785–
1843) – could lay out a similarly lavish spread. Presided over at the time of Mirza 
Salih’s visit by the president and natural scientist, Isaac Milner (1750–1820), 
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who with his awesomely protuberant belly was one of the most renowned gastro-
nomes of Regency Cambridge, it was said at this time that Queens’ “public 
dinners were very merry, but the private ones were quite uproarious”.69 Mirza 
Salih may have been entertained to hear that most of the popular alcoholic 
cups at the university were given ecclesiastical names. Clerical fellows like his 
Oxford host Reverend John Hill might round off their suppers with a cup of 
pope, cardinal or cider bishop, the latter a concoction of cider, brandy and 
“two glasses of calves-feet jelly in a liquid state”.70 Even if such drinks did not 
qualify as the kind of knowledge Mirza Salih thought worthy of recording, there 
remains a pleasing symmetry in the fact that his travels coincided with the 
golden age of the punches that formed England’s most lasting offering to the 
cosmopolitan drinker. As an early nineteenth-century handbook, Oxford Night 
Caps, explained, “the liquor called Punch has become so truly English, it is often 
supposed to be indigenous to this country, though its name at least is oriental. 
The Persian punj, or Sanscrit pancha, i.e. five, is the etymon of its title, and 
denotes the number of ingredients.”71 If “punch” came from the East, then, 
like a latter-day Walter Raleigh, Mirza Salih’s friend Sir John Malcolm had for 
his part tried to introduce the potato to Iran, where for a short while at least it 
carried the correspondingly hybrid name of alu-e malkum (“Malcolm’s plum”).72
Against the bibulous background of the Regency, it is striking that Mirza Salih 
made scarce reference to English alcohol consumption in his travelogue, other 
than noting that English women drank only one or two glasses of wine at table 
and that even men who became openly drunk were considered disgraced.73 While 
we might easily take this as an attempt to politely pass over what he regarded 
as a reprehensible custom, the more likely answer is that wine drinking was 
sufficiently common among Iranian elites to be unworthy of special mention.74 
Looking beyond the travelogue itself, however, firm evidence survives of Mirza 
Salih’s wine consumption in England in the form of a series of letters he wrote to 
His Majesty’s Customs Office. Hoping to avoid paying import duty, Mirza Salih 
expressly testified that the seventy-four bottles of champagne and three dozen 
bottles of brandy and other liqueurs dispatched from Boulogne to his London 
address had been ordered “for my own use”.75 It is possible that on leaving 
Iran for England, Mirza Salih had been granted the same culinary passepartout 
as Ambassador Abu al-Hasan a few years earlier. For as Philoxenus Secundus 
wrote of Abu al-Hasan, “He drank wine at table with the Prince [Regent], 
because his master had given him permission to conform to the customs of the 
English on open great occasions.”76 Diplomacy, then, was a powerful motor for 
this cosmopolitanism of the table. Given the fact that wine consumption was 
quite commonplace in the circles of the Qajar court, why such a special dispen-
sation was deemed necessary is another matter. In the early nineteenth century, 
several European diplomatic travellers to Iran testified to the scale of alcohol 
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
— 118 —
consumption they witnessed there. Writing of the Russian embassy to the court 
of ‘Abbas Mirza in 1817, the German diplomat Moritz von Kotzebue praised 
the Iranians as “valiant topers”, noting how on several occasions he witnessed 
how they “drank off a bottle of rum at once, without appearing to suffer any 
inconvenience from it”.77 Recollecting one banquet hosted by ‘Abbas Mirza, 
Kotzebue remarked that “the wine, at dinner, was very good, and the Persians 
quaffed it off, as well as the liqueurs, in immense quantities”.78 Among the elite 
class with whom Kotzebue mixed at court, wine played a role in promoting 
conviviality that corresponded to that on elite tables in Europe. We can surmise 
the practical role which wine played at such diplomatic dinners in facilitating 
communication across the barriers of language and culture, loosening tongues 
to sally into foreign languages and summoning, however transiently, the sympa-
thies of conviviality. Yet we would be missing the trick if we did not recognise 
the basic fact of alcohol as pleasure that underwrote its broader function as a 
social lubricant. In Persian terms, this intangible élan was summed up in the 
term kayf, a state rather than an ingredient that could potentially be found in 
the intoxicants of any country. As one of the Qajar princes was wont to ask 
whenever offered a new alcoholic beverage in London, “Has it kayf?”79
This is not to say that Iranian consumption of alcohol was without its contra-
dictions.80 But once again, we should not allow the theoretical constraints of 
Muslim religious law to hide the fact that, as individuals with their own moral 
agency, such travellers made their own decisions and compromises. Theology is 
in any case an adaptable tool and, naturally enough, there were Iranians who 
excused their alcohol use by making their own interpretations of Islam rather 
than submitting to clerical rulings. We hear of one such case in the travelogue 
of Reverend Henry Stern (1820–85) who, like other Christian missionaries of 
the period, was keen that Muslims should follow their own laws strictly if they 
would not follow his. When the aptly-named churchman refused to give an 
Iranian a bottle of arak on the grounds that it was forbidden under Islamic law, 
the disappointed Iranian then “swore by Ali, and all the 124,000 Mahomedan 
prophets, that sherab and arrack were only interdicted to those who prayed; but 
as he never prayed, he could not be included in the law”.81 Wine was, then, 
quite available at home, a fact that also brings us to the powerful link between 
food, travel and homesickness. In James Baillie Fraser’s account of his time with 
the Iranian princes in London during the mid-1830s, we thus hear one of the 
princes reminiscing about homemade kebabs and shiraz wine:
And as for wine, – ah! you know the wine of Sheerauz, – and we had the best 
of it, to be sure: for each of us there was never less than two jouingees (glass 
bottles holding at least half a gallon a-piece); and we thought nothing of him 
who should leave a drop of that; ay, and a good bottle of arrack (spirits) to 
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boot, perhaps; and we had champagne and madeira also, from [the Iranian 
port of] Busheer. Ah! those were days of enjoyment!82
Ultimately, though, it was tea rather than wine that formed the most 
important culinary commodity that the Iranians and English held in common. If 
Mirza Salih was reticent on the topic of his champagne purchases, his travelogue 
does reveal him as a keen tea drinker and he described a range of occasions on 
which he enjoyed taking tea with his English hosts. Not least among these was 
Reverend John Hill who, during Mirza Salih’s visit to the university in October 
1818, took him for tea each day at his house on the High Street in Oxford.83 
As with the case of alcohol, the widespread use of tea that Mirza Salih noted as 
taking place in English homes as well as the special tea gardens (baghcha) that 
resembled the shady chai-khanas of Iran lent room for common rituals of socia-
bility. As a commodity being traded in vastly increasing quantity in the early 
nineteenth century, it is tea that points us to the interdependence of culinary, 
commercial and political interactions. Not only did the nineteenth century see 
Britain’s role in the production and trade of tea increasing through its control 
over India and global shipping networks, it also saw a massive expansion of 
tea consumption in Iran in response, leading in both Iran and Britain to a 
replacement of coffee houses by tea shops as spaces of sociability.84 Later in 
the century, the Iranian historian ‘Abd Allah Mustawfi reckoned Iranian tea 
imports as comprising 1,350 tons of white tea from China and 450 tons of black 
tea from India, most of which arrived on English ships.85 Through the mediation 
of commerce and consumption, by the early nineteenth century the sharing 
of tea was becoming an internationalised ritual of conviviality. Like the other 
patterns of shared dining we have examined, it was one that allowed English 
and Iranian elites to find niches of culinary sociability in one another’s worlds 
in a way that was still not possible between people from many other parts of the 
world. Mirza Salih’s repeated references to the tea drinking habits of the English, 
and of the popularity of their tea gardens, hinted to his Iranian readers a culture 
of sociability that they shared with the distant people of Inglistan.
Conclusions
As the nineteenth century wore on, the reach of such common commodities as 
tea widened and spread the mutually intelligible social rituals that accompanied 
them. In part, then, the rise of culinary cosmopolitanism was a by-product of 
the more globalised consumption patterns of the nineteenth century by which 
different societies came to increasingly share the same foodstuffs.86 Such economic 
exchanges led to unexpected forms of culinary interdependence, which would 
ultimately lead to the modern dependence of the sacrificial rituals of the hajj 
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on live sheep exports from Australia and New Zealand.87 Yet in the period with 
which we have been dealing, aside from such luxury products as tea and spices, 
economies of food exchange were generally still regional and for Iranian and 
British travellers in the early nineteenth century, their respective food cultures 
appeared sufficiently different as to render explanation and comment. For in line 
with the larger aims of this volume, what we have seen in this chapter is not the 
existence of some kind of overarching “Islamic” cosmopolitan ideal, but rather 
the emergence from the social interactions of Muslim Iranians and Christian 
Britons in a particular time and space of a specific and certainly limited kind of 
cosmopolitanism that this chapter has dubbed “culinary cosmopolitanism”. As 
an actual rather than a theoretical or idealised cosmopolitanism, this culinary 
cosmopolitanism was part of the much larger pattern of interaction between 
cultures and their commodities that characterised the period and served in 
particular as a mode of sociability between mobile diplomatic or otherwise 
high status elites. Like several of the other Muslim cosmopolitanisms explored 
elsewhere in this volume, it was a socially active practice that emerged as an 
interacting border between two culture zones. While what we have seen was a 
specific case, it was not a unique case, and other early crossers of culture zones 
forged their own versions of culinary cosmopolitanism. A few years before the 
Persian princes were exploring the cooking of Mr Mivart in London, we thus 
find the South Indian traveller Enugula Virasvami (c.1780–1836) describing 
the foodstuffs being introduced by the British into India. As the cosmopolitan 
experience challenged the received language available to him, as in the Persian 
account of Mirza Salih, Enugula Virasvami occasionally had to introduce 
the English terms for these new food commodities into his Telegu account.88 
Whether with South Indian Hindus or Iranian Muslims, culinary, like other 
forms of cosmopolitanism, demanded the adaptation of existing cultural systems 
(whether linguistic or philosophical) in order to make conceptual space for the 
experience of the (in this case edible) other. Emerging in historical context, 
cosmopolitanisms involve the remaking of culture rather than the reliance on a 
pre-existing and unchanging cosmopolitanisms, whether Muslim or otherwise.
Even so, as a result of ecological connections and an older history of commerce, 
on a global level similarities often outweighed differences, and we have seen 
how both the British and Iranian parties were able to understand, adapt to and 
even enjoy the differences they encountered. While it might be argued that the 
consumption of different foods scarcely qualifies as even the weakest of cosmo-
politanisms, what rendered such acts of consumption culturally significant was 
the social context from which they were (for the traveller at least) inseparable. 
Again, as we have seen elsewhere in this volume, this was an active and actual 
rather than a notional and theoretical cosmopolitanism. The figures we have 
examined not only physically ate other people’s food, but ate it in the company 
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of other people and used their distinct etiquettes of dining. In so doing, they 
not only adjusted to other sets of ingredients and manners, but confronted and 
conversed with the manners and members of another and, during this period, 
little-known society. In this way, the simple need for calorific intake set in motion 
a series of further interactions with both cultures of etiquette in the abstract and 
individual people in the concrete. If these culinary transactions did not possess 
the philosophical rigour of the intellectualised cosmopolitanism of the eigh-
teenth century, then in springing from the tougher soil of living encounters with 
another people, this was at least a face-to-face cosmopolitanism.89 Even if they 
were frequently couched in diplomatic flattery, the interactions and immersions 
in food cultures that we have seen were therefore pragmatic rather than moral-
istic. Intended as it was to serve the practical purposes of elite governmental 
exchange, and disseminated through travel books of ethnographic advice, this 
was a no less deliberate cosmopolitanism than the voluntary commitments of 
the Enlightenment philosophes. And as a vehicle for affinity and even affection 
with another people, the sharing of food also released the subtle but potent 
agent that is pleasure. 
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Abdur Rahman Chughtai: 
Cosmopolitan Mughal Aesthetic 
in the Age of Print
Iftikhar Dadi
Chapter 8
The Lahore-based artist, Abdur Rahman Chughtai (1897–1975) is generally 
considered the first significant modern Muslim artist from South Asia. His art 
developed with an awareness of the early modern Islamicate cosmopolitan 
world, especially with Safavid Persia and Mughal India. But this relationship 
was also shaped by nineteenth- and early twentieth-century factors – the 
loss of symbols of political power in South Asia to colonialism beginning in 
the late eighteenth century, reaching its full dismemberment in the wake of 
the 1857 mutiny, and the further loss of the external identificatory symbol of 
the Ottoman Caliphate, which was dissolved in 1924. Chughtai revisits and 
renews the cosmopolitanism of the early modern era, but does so in a manner 
that self-consciously foregrounds the impossibility of inhabiting a continuous 
tradition. Rather than referencing the twentieth-century Muslim world beyond 
South Asia, especially when decolonisation was beginning to bring about the 
rise of fractured and divided nation-states, his art draws selectively upon its 
own cosmopolitan tradition. Referencing this tradition involves a complex 
operation, in which tradition is lived and remembered practice in some cases, 
but also available discursively, not only through the increasing availability of 
classical works in print but also as a result of orientalist art historical scholarship 
of Mughal and Islamic art. Modern South Asian art is also shaped by a complex 
encounter with Western orientalism.
This essay focuses on the critical reception of Chughtai by Urdu literary 
critics and authors from the 1920s and through essays on the artist in English. 
This complex interaction between Urdu literary concerns and the emerging 
understanding of Persian miniature, Mughal painting and other painting tradi-
tions in India shaped the horizon of Chughtai’s career. Apart from his volu-
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
— 128 —
minous painterly output, Chughtai served as a partisan and provocateur in 
locating himself in the rediscovery of a complex inherited painterly tradition. 
The artist articulated his views in a series of important essays on aesthetics 
in Urdu. His work must also be situated in relation to his brother Abdullah 
Chughtai’s scholarly research into Mughal and Persian painting, calligraphy, 
architecture and ornament, as forming a broader revival of Mughal aesthetics 
during the early and mid-twentieth century. Mughal nostalgia serves to decentre 
the artist’s identification with a specific national site, projecting it instead onto 
earlier Islamicate and Persianate cosmopolitanism in order to evoke a broader 
aesthetic ideal, but this evocation is characterised by both optimism and 
 melancholy.
Background and Early Life
Painting in the Punjab since the mid-nineteenth century consisted of a variety 
of practices. The Punjab had been under Mughal rule earlier and was subse-
quently under Sikh rule before the British began exerting direct control over 
much of it in the middle of the nineteenth century. Various practitioners of 
miniature Mughal and Sikh painting continued their work through the nine-
teenth century, but under increasingly difficult circumstances. Emerging from 
the mid-nineteenth century were art schools founded in India under British 
patronage, which provided technical training based on arts and crafts principles. 
The Mayo School of Art, based in Lahore, was founded in 1874 and heavily 
emphasised the renewal of traditional craft skills rather than fine art.1 Chughtai’s 
formation as an artist was shaped by the mediation of ideas of subjectivity and 
imagination that emerged in the wake of the Bengal school rather than by the 
commercial possibilities available to illusionist painters or to the small number 
of miniature “copyists”. Despite his reliance on the Mughal tradition, Chughtai’s 
modernity lies in his insistent foregrounding of his own subjectivity; the devel-
opment of a style associated with, yet distinct from, the Bengal school; and his 
friendship with the literary and intellectual circles in Lahore that sought to 
create a discursive framework in which his paintings might be understood. 
The rise of the Bengal school was associated with the emergence of a lively 
intellectual environment and debate on art and aesthetics during the first third 
of the twentieth century in Calcutta.2 Much of this research and debate was 
carried out in illustrated journals in Bengali and English that were devoted to 
art. By 1915, the self-consciously orientalised Bengal school style had become 
dominant in Bengal, and by the 1920s it had assumed virtual hegemony over 
the notion of “Indian” art across India.3 The Bengal school inaugurated a new 
paradigm of artistic subjectivity, marking an important break from the roles the 
makers of art and crafts had occupied earlier. The higher role accorded to the 
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Figure 8.1 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, Mughal Artist, c. 1950s. Etching. Dimen-
sions 24.7 x 20.9 cm. (Collection of Nighat and Imran Mir. Reproduced with 
kind permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, Lahore.
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Figure 8.2 Cover of Chatterjee’s Picture Albums, a series of bound plates in 
full colour. 29 x 21 cm.
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artist was fully separated from that of the artisan. The artist was now viewed 
as autonomous from base patronage and invested with transcendent ideals. 
The Bengal school and its allied critics placed Buddhist and Hindu aesthetic 
precedents at the heart of national aesthetic practice. Although it could not 
be ignored due to its prominence, the Mughal contribution to Indian art and 
architecture was viewed as Muslim, and was interpreted as being secular, courtly 
and foreign, and thus less sincere than religious and “national” art. Mughal 
architecture and painting had assumed a paradoxically central and marginal 
role in the emergence of the Bengal school and its promoters. The rediscovery 
of Mughal aesthetics by British and Indian scholars and by artists and critics 
associated with the Bengal school is central to understanding the work of Abdur 
Rahman Chughtai.4 
Abdur Rahman Chughtai was born in 1897 in Lahore into a family descended 
from generations of craftsmen, architects and decorators. Beginning in 1912, 
he studied at the Mayo School of Art. Earlier, he apprenticed with his uncle 
Baba Miran Bakhsh, a naqqash who maintained a workshop in a chamber at 
the Mughal-era Wazir Khan Mosque.5 Here Chughtai was introduced to the 
practice of Mughal architectural ornamentation.6 Beginning in 1915, Chughtai 
began teaching in the Mayo School in the photo-litho department. Beginning 
in 1917, Chughtai began sending his work regularly to Calcutta for publication. 
The presence of his work in Calcutta-based journals became pivotal to his early 
success – his paintings published in Modern Review starting in 1917 brought him 
national prominence.7 The 1920 exhibition of the Punjab Fine Arts Society 
showcased artists from the Punjab and also showed work mailed from other 
parts of India, including work by the Bengal school artists based in Calcutta. 
Chughtai’s work in this exhibition attracted considerable attention from the 
press.8 Chughtai’s success at such venues during the 1920s permitted him to 
secure a living through princely and market patronage rather than having to 
depend on government employment. Chughtai continued to promote the idea 
of a Punjab school or Lahore school into the 1930s, but the Punjab school of 
painting failed to cohere as a group, and indeed, apart from Chughtai, the other 
artists are now largely forgotten.9 Thus the Punjab school failed to become a 
strong rival to the Bengal school, and in any case the style of painting asso-
ciated with both was already coming under attack due to the rise of oil-based 
abstraction and modernism from the 1930s onward. Chughtai thus remains a 
singular Muslim artist of his generation in South Asia.
Chughtai’s “Hindu” Pictures
From the beginning of his career, Chughtai created numerous paintings illus-
trating Hindu mythology, which exponentially extended his patronage circuit.10 
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
— 132 —
Chughtai’s “Hindu” works are included in numerous collections in India but are 
little known in Pakistan. Chughtai also painted many other Hindu myths and 
festivals, and these works were reproduced in numerous journals and magazines. 
In painting such themes, Chughtai was no different from his contemporary, 
Allah Bukhsh, the academic “Krishna painter”, suggesting that painting Hindu 
mythology was not completely unusual for a Muslim painter during the first third 
of the twentieth century. In his writings, however, Chughtai remains largely 
silent about his “Hindu” paintings, suggesting that, unlike the “Islamic” works, 
the former were not painterly embodiments of his discursive values. 
Before the partition of India in 1947, Chughtai considered himself nominally 
as a national artist but painted very few “national” themes, unlike artists such 
as Nandalal Bose. A large illustrated volume of Chughtai’s “Hindu” paintings, 
titled Chughtai’s Indian Paintings, was published in India in 1951, after partition. 
The publication date is significant, because even after the hardening of political 
identities and the brutality and carnage of partition in 1947, Chughtai, residing 
in Pakistan, still deemed his Indian work important enough to be issued. The 
duality of Chughtai’s Hindu and Muslim works is thus symptomatic of the diffi-
culties the artist faced during this time of anticolonial movements, which were 
structurally unable to forge a unified struggle toward independence. These Hindu 
works nevertheless remain significant for embodying the memory of Hindu 
motifs in the revival of the miniature form. This syncretism will be later redis-
covered and celebrated in a new miniature revival beginning in 1990s Lahore.
Genesis of the Muraqqaæ-i Chughta’i
Calcutta boasted a number of illustrated journals specialising in fine arts, but 
Lahore lacked such journals and a corresponding discourse on visual arts. 
Instead, the growing city was witness to the development of a body of Urdu 
writing, literary criticism and debate. Lahore-based authors have constituted a 
virtual galaxy of the best-known Urdu writers of the twentieth century. Under 
the guidance of Muhammad Din Tasir, Chughtai was pulled into the orbit of the 
literary world of the 1920s. The publication of the Muraqqaæ-i Chughta’i, possibly 
the most significant published work Chughtai produced during his long career, 
is a direct result of this engagement. 
Published in 1928, the widely celebrated Muraqqaæ-i Chughta’i is an illustrated 
edition of the Urdu poetry (divan) of the poet Mirza Ghalib (1797–1869). In 
undertaking this project, Chughtai was undoubtedly guided by his belief that 
“Muslims have contributed more to art by way of muraqqaæs and books than any 
other nation”.11 Produced with great care, with an English foreword by the poet 
Iqbal, the volume reproduced the complete divan, with more than thirty full-
page illustrations, most of them in colour. Ghalib, whose poetry is considered a 
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Figure 8.3 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, Arjuna, illustration in Chughtai’s Indian 
Paintings, 1951. Watercolour on paper. Dimensions n.a. (Reproduced with kind 
permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, Lahore.)
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masterpiece of the Urdu ghazal (lyric form), lived during the nineteenth century, 
was attached to the court of the last Mughal emperor and composed his Urdu 
and Persian poetry based on strictly traditional poetic forms and tropes, exhib-
iting little thematic concern for the rising sun of the British Empire. Never-
theless, since Ghalib wrote his works during the dissolution of Muslim political 
power, the inwardness, difficulty and philosophical character of his poetry can 
be understood as an internal, formal response to the widespread crisis of Muslim 
life in nineteenth-century India.
The term muraqqaæ is significant, denoting codex albums composed in Timurid 
and Safavid Persia and in Mughal India. These albums, which can be considered 
scrapbooks for elite connoisseurship, were compilations of esteemed and varied 
examples of painting and calligraphy, framed in elaborate decorated borders.12 In 
Indian albums, prized examples of Persian and Indian painting and calligraphy 
were inserted, and the album functioned as an important aesthetic benchmark 
for an age in which mechanically reproduced samples of work were absent.13 
Usually written by officials or calligraphers, the prefaces to Timurid, Safavid 
and Mughal albums provide an important source of historical information about 
individual calligraphers, their techniques and their social status.14 Among the 
Mughals, the emperor Jahangir (reigned 1605–27) in particular assembled a 
number of albums containing some of the finest examples of painting and callig-
raphy.15
Chughtai reinvented the muraqqaæ in the age of mechanical reproduction 
through considerable effort, enacting numerous technical and aesthetic trans-
formations. The publication marks shifts in patronage and the primacy of print 
culture in the making of an artist during the early to mid-twentieth century. 
The idea for illustrating Ghalib’s divan emerged not from fellow painters but 
from Chughtai’s encounters and informal discussions with his literary friends.  
One immediate problem was securing an authoritative text of Ghalib’s divan. 
The group sought the advice of Ghulam Rasul Mihr, a respected Ghalib scholar, 
to ensure that they possessed a reliable text. This is the sort of problem scholars 
often face when preparing critical printed editions of handwritten manuscript 
texts, and its recurrence here exemplifies how vestiges of manuscript traditions 
lingered within the emergent print culture of the twentieth century. Indeed, 
until recently, Urdu has primarily been printed by hand-calligraphed pages 
reproduced via lithography, rather than by typesetting. The break with the 
manuscript form was thus not as sharp, and the stylistic particularities of mostly 
anonymous scribes continued to be reproduced in print until the 1980s.
Chughtai involved his two brothers and other members of his extended 
family in what was clearly shaping up to be a massive undertaking. A callig-
rapher had to be selected to write the text, and this output had to be regularly 
overseen. Suitable paper had to be chosen and imported from Europe via a 
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Figure 8.4 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, illustration and illumination of the first 
couplet of Divan-i Ghalib (Urdu), in Muraqqaæ-i Chughta’i, 1928. 23 x 16 cm. 
(Reproduced with kind permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai 
Museum Trust, Lahore.)
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Figure 8.5 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, The Wasted Vigil, illustration in Muraqqaæ-i 
Chughta’i, 1928. Watercolour on paper. Dimensions n.a. (Reproduced with kind 
permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, Lahore.)
trading firm, and since the Chughtai family did not possess sufficient funds to 
fully pay for the paper stock, arrangements had to be made with a bank to 
work out an instalment-based delivery and payment plan. To print the text, 
the family members decided to set up a press in a room in their own house. To 
run the machine, they also needed a commercial-grade electrical connection in 
their home, which was finally approved by the city utility after three months 
of persistence. Samples of materials for the covers of both the normal and the 
deluxe edition were requested from a Manchester-based firm and, after great 
deliberation, Abdur Rahman placed the order. The binding of the book was 
entrusted to a local firm.
All this careful logistical effort was devoted only to the printing of the 
text and the binding of the book. The images themselves, the most important 
component of the project, could not be printed in India, but in London. 
Securing adequate funds was crucial. The Maharani of Cooch Behar reportedly 
contributed a considerable sum of money toward the publication in exchange 
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for acquiring a number of the original paintings that were to be reproduced in 
the Muraqqaæ. 16 This effort finally resulted in the printing of 210 signed deluxe 
editions priced at 100 rupees each and a larger number of normal editions priced 
at 17 rupees. As an artist formed by print culture for whom circulation of his 
work was vital, Chughtai’s decision to produce two editions, a deluxe edition 
and a more affordable and populist one, was a strategy he followed throughout 
his life.
Chughtai’s pioneering use of print culture sought to bring a classical Mughal 
and Islamic artistic form into modernity. But for the muraqqaæ form, a distinctive 
Muslim contribution to world culture, the heavy reliance on imported techniques 
of production and reproduction demonstrate the difficulty and the considerable 
labour needed to transform a manuscript into a modern, mechanically produced 
book. The technical and aesthetic reliance on Europe for this production of the 
“East” also indicates the impossibility in modernity of disengaging Europe from 
its others. European art and design since the late nineteenth century had itself 
already been heavily influenced by orientalism, in such domains as painting 
(Matisse), book illustration and fashion. Indeed, illustrated editions of FitzGer-
ald’s Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam had formed a veritable industry for several 
decades, peaking during the first two decades of the twentieth century,17 and the 
formal and thematic preoccupations of the Bengal school and Chughtai need to 
be situated accordingly.18 It is precisely at this convergence of the material and 
aesthetic realms of East and West, however, that Chughtai and Iqbal asserted 
their difference most forcefully.
Iqbal’s Foreword to the Muraqqaæ-i Chughta’i
The process that led to Iqbal contributing a foreword to the Muraqqaæ reveals 
the bewilderment the Urdu literary intelligentsia faced when encountering 
visual art. The relationship between Chughtai and Iqbal is multifaceted and 
was sustained by Chughtai well after the death of Iqbal. (It culminated in the 
publication of the monumental work æAmal-i Chughta’i in 1968, which the artist 
claimed fulfilled the wishes of the deceased poet.) Tasir persuaded the reluctant 
Iqbal to write the foreword in English. The choice of writing in English is telling 
in itself, suggesting that Chughtai and Tasir had a wider circulation in mind for 
a work whose main textual element, Ghalib’s verse, was not translated. Despite 
efforts by the literary intelligentsia to compel Iqbal to produce an aesthetic 
and art historical text, the foreword is a disappointing essay and reads as if it 
were written as an afterthought, although it was far from a simple matter for 
the poet to write it. The essay, which is less than three pages long, reveals 
Iqbal’s discomfort with Chughtai’s art, being basically a cursory exposition of the 
poet’s philosophy of creation. Iqbal remained ambivalent regarding the merits 
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of Chughtai’s illustrations of Ghalib. Claiming that he was “not competent 
enough to judge the technical side of painting”, the poet did write that he found 
Chughtai’s paintings “remarkable” in that as “Art [ought to be] subservient to 
life and personality”, Chughtai might be “the ideal artist in whom Love reveals 
itself as a unity of Beauty and Power”. However, it is patently incongruous to 
associate imagery of power with Chughtai, whose paintings are saturated with 
a pervasive atmosphere of eroticism and lassitude, and this incongruity might 
well be the reason for the poet’s reticence in discussing the paintings themselves. 
Moreover, Iqbal is generally unimpressed by Muslim achievements in the arts, 
even from the pre-modern era:
And in so far as the cultural history of Islam is concerned, it is my belief that, 
with the single exception of Architecture, the art of Islam (Music, Painting 
and even Poetry) is yet to be born – the art, that is to say, which aims at 
the human assimilation of Divine attributes … There are, however, indi-
cations to show that the young artist of the Punjab is already on the way 
to feel his responsibility as an artist. He is only twenty-nine yet. What his 
art will become when he reaches the maturer age of forty, the future alone 
will disclose. Meanwhile all those who are interested in his work will keenly 
watch his forward movement.19
This is certainly an evasive endorsement of Chughtai. In his own Urdu 
introduction to the Muraqqaæ-i Chughta’i, Chughtai had praised, among others, 
Bihzad’s use of imagination as a guide for pictorial depiction, rather than direct 
observation of reality itself. Chughtai – by consciously following the path of 
imaginative depiction that he ascribed to the legendary Bihzad – inserts himself 
in a history of painting that traverses the Timurid, Safavid and Mughal eras. 
Iqbal’s ambivalent remarks on Islamic painting in his foreword do carry critical 
overtones on modern painting, which are reiterated in his last collection of Urdu 
poetry, Zarb-i kalim, published in 1937. Zarb-i kalim contains a number of poems 
in which Iqbal complains of the lack of life-affirming art in South Asia.20 For 
example, the following couplet from the poem “Musavvir” (“Painter”) contains 
a reference to contemporary painting:
I am extremely sad that the Bihzads of today,
Have lost touch with the intoxication/freshness of the timeless past/beginning 
of creation [surur-i azali].21
This tension between Iqbal’s philosophy of dynamism and the evocative 
stasis of the past represented by Chughtai emerges again in æAmal-i Chughta’i, 
and Iqbal’s uncertain position on the merits of the works of “today’s Bihzads”, 
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and thus by implication, on Chughtai’s art. Nevertheless, Chughtai’s Muraqqaæ 
is significant for orienting the artist’s career toward the Urdu literary past and 
in relation to the emergent Urdu literary criticism. During the first third of the 
twentieth century, the Bengal school had pioneered the appropriation of the 
Mughal visual past artistically, and scholars of Mughal art and architecture were 
systematically exploring Mughal painting and architecture. In the aftermath of 
the publication of Muraqqaæ, Chughtai and his brother Abdullah became more 
deeply engaged with the history of the Mughal visual tradition, the latter in his 
prolific writings on Indo-Persian art and architecture. In his critical essays, the 
artist himself had become increasingly concerned with how a modern Muslim 
art might engage this legacy. 
Emergent Art History
With the publication of the Muraqqaæ, Chughtai, now a highly successful artist, 
was fully drawn into the literary universe of Lahore. He designed innumerable 
book covers for leading writers and contributed to numerous emerging Urdu 
journals.22 The years from the early part of the twentieth century to the death 
of Chughtai in 1975 coincided with Lahore’s ascendancy in the field of Urdu 
literature. The artist was continually concerned with the promotion of literary 
journals, frequently contributing cover designs gratis and paying for subscrip-
tions as a show of support.
Instead of independent evaluation of visual art, a literary framework began 
to provide a substitute for evaluating Chughtai’s work. With little connection 
with the Mayo School and unease toward the emerging abstractionists and post-
cubist modernists, the artist increasingly drew his references from the Persian 
and Mughal painting tradition, from Ghalib and Iqbal, and from the world of 
literary journals and its intelligentsia. Characteristically, the Majlis-i Taraqqi-yi 
Adab, a society that promoted Urdu literature, published the only volume of 
critical essays on Chughtai, and most of the essays (with the exception of a few 
translations from European art historians) were contributed by eminent Urdu 
writers and literary critics. 
However, the launching of the journals Nairang-i khayal in 1924 and Karavan 
in 1933 by Tasir in collaboration with Chughtai were important efforts by the 
pair to include visual art as an integral dimension of the emergent intellectual 
culture of the early to mid-twentieth century.23 Tasir accorded great importance 
to the role of visual art in Karavan. He had stressed in an earlier essay that “Urdu 
is utterly bereft of any theory [nazariya] of [visual] aesthetics [jamaliyat]”.24 Since 
there were few galleries (tasvir khana) in India, it was all the more imperative to 
publish masterpieces of art, in order to familiarise “untrained minds”. But few 
editors of other journals were able to judge the merits of visual art and, moreover, 
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deemed efforts to understand visual art as an unworthy task. Tasir proceeded to 
stress that viewing exemplary images was necessary to train viewers to under-
stand the objectives (maæruzat) of painting. Otherwise, their observations on art 
would remain based on literalist readings of visual images and would be 
 … exactly analogous to that Europe-afflicted [europe zada] young man who, 
by drawing a [literal] cartoon [of imagery of the ghazal’s beloved] with an 
arrow for an eyelash, a dagger for an eyebrow, and a narcissus for an eye, 
thought that he had “permanently demolished the poetry of Iran and India.” 
But our journals, far from offering correct criticism [tanqid], are unable even 
to recognize the names of artists, and in their ignorance publish the master-
pieces of Bihzad and Botticelli next to the obscenities of Frith and [Ravi] 
Varma.25
Here, Tasir excoriates sentimental and illusionist paintings exemplified by 
Frith and Varma, recognising painting’s visual codes in sympathy with the 
ghazal’s symbolic universe, thus privileging metaphoric and allegorical readings 
of visual art over realism. 
Tasir’s intellectual scope and his vision of catalysing art criticism in Urdu was, 
however, short-lived. Karavan ceased publication after its second issue, ending a 
remarkable publishing experiment that Abdullah Chughtai claimed would never 
be repeated. The demise of the journal meant that there was no longer any Urdu 
journal seriously focused on the visual arts, a situation that continues today, 
although literary journals have included occasional essays on art. In general, 
art criticism has been either written in English and published in illustrated 
magazines and newspapers or, when written in Urdu, has continued to privilege 
artists and work that forge a relationship to literature, rather than attending 
to artistic form as an independent value in its own right. Thus the collected 
essays on Chughtai, for example, are written either originally in English by 
Western scholars or by eminent Urdu writers and critics. This failure to institute 
a durable tradition of art criticism has meant that the modernists who rebelled 
against Chughtai were also compelled to work out a visual aesthetic without a 
prepared discursive ground. 
Aesthetic Values of Chughtai’s Orient
Chughtai and his critics have also perceived painterly values in his work that 
distance him from the Bengal school, and they have sought to place him in conti-
nuity with Islamic art. Critics saw Chughtai blazing a new way of connecting 
tradition with the present and expressed their amazement at the very possibility 
of interpreting poetry in visual images. The broader reference to tradition was 
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Figure 8.6 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, Eve of the Future, illustration in æAmal-i 
Chughta’i, 1968. Watercolour on paper. Dimensions n.a. (Reproduced with kind 
permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, Lahore.)
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Figure 8.7 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, Mourning for Baghdad, illustration in 
‘Amal-i Chughta’i, 1968. Watercolour on paper. Dimensions n.a. (Reproduced 
with kind permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, 
Lahore.)
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itself seen as complex, referring to the Persian and Mughal achievements in 
art and architecture, the symbolic imagery of Urdu poetry, and the Hindu and 
Buddhist visual heritage and Rajput painting of India.26 But Chughtai and his 
critics have foregrounded the Islamic element.
According to art historian Tamara Talbot Rice, the artist made numerous 
and substantial contributions to Islamic art. He had not sought simply to return 
to the past, but by his emphasis on individuation of the figure he had surpassed 
even Bihzad.27 Yaqub Zaki also considered the task before Chughtai to be more 
difficult than that of the legendary Bihzad, arguing that 
Chughtai’s art evokes a complete civilization, in the same manner in which 
painters such as [Antoine] Watteau, [François] Boucher, and [Jean-Honoré] 
Fragonard had evoked the Ancien Régime in France … Chughtai has reached 
much further back from Ghalib’s era, to create links with [the Mughal] era in 
which Muslim civilization in India was at its zenith.
Vahid Quraishi noted influences beyond South Asia, suggesting that 
Chughtai’s art was deeply shaped by the æAbbasid-era stories, A Thousand and 
One Nights, and was saturated in an atmosphere of a world of enchanted magic 
(tilsimi rang).28 But this past was not recreated without melancholy. In Chughtai’s 
thematic and affective recreation of the past, Zaki discerned a major shift: 
Although [Mughal] civilization possessed a manly, active dimension, we find 
no trace of this in Chughtai’s art … He has no interest in depicting battle 
scenes and sieges of forts, or in painting portraits of rulers in a manner in 
which they were virtually deified.
This is an observation also made by Tamara Talbot Rice.29 
Instead, Chughtai portrays the melancholy beauties of courtly life, who 
are saturated with a pervasive atmosphere of self-absorption … Emotion is 
frequently expressed in Chughtai by the unruly line of the dress, whereas the 
face is stony, impassive.30
Vazir Agha and Agha Abdul Hamid underscored the sense of stasis that 
pervades not only Chughtai’s paintings but also his fictional writings.31 And 
Salim Akhtar claimed that Chughtai’s woman was not a familiar figure from 
everyday life but a picturisation of the classical ghazal’s metaphors of the 
beloved.32 
Critics have thus identified how Islamicate and Persianate aesthetics, Mughal 
nostalgia and Urdu poetic symbolism in Chughtai’s world create an internal, 
Cosmopolitanisms in Muslim Contexts
— 144 —
idealised dreamworld of beauty. Chughtai himself considered his work to have 
given direction again to “our painting”, which had “lost its way for some three 
centuries”.33 Figurative work, especially in the case of the female figure, was seen 
not from the viewpoint of realism but from woman identified as the symbol of 
the ghazal’s beloved who is not a realist or bodily figure but an “other”, a sum of 
symbols and metaphors, totally self absorbed and indifferent, even sadistic, in 
inducing madness and ecstasy in the poet.34
The modernisers of Urdu who emerged in the wake of the 1857 mutiny had 
disparaged the tropes of the Urdu ghazal, comparing them unfavourably with 
the naturalism of William Wordsworth and other English poets. Altaf Husain 
Hali, himself an erstwhile student of Ghalib, had mounted a forceful critique 
of the ghazal’s beloved.35 According to the prominent leftist poet Faiz Ahmad 
Faiz, however, Chughtai’s contribution lies precisely in his recovery of tradition 
based on Persian, Central Asian and Mughal motifs. Rather than simply copying 
or reproducing this heritage, Chughtai gathered the “motifs, symbols, and meta-
phors” of various Islamic decorative arts in his work, creating a new synthesis. 
Faiz counters Hali’s critique by saying that Chughtai rendered the beloved in 
line and colour in a more ravishing actualisation (alam-i vujud) than that of 
the ghazal’s imagined beloved (alam-i tasavvur).36 For Faiz, this nostalgia had an 
efficacy in “opening the door to the lost mirages of our civilization, of which we 
had only a tenuous relationship, but whose forms were disappearing as if they 
were abandoned buildings”.37 Within this dreamworld, especially in Chughtai’s 
later work, the picture plane is fully illuminated, without any rendered shadows. 
Abdullah Chughtai saw this as characteristic of oriental painting, which had 
no reflections either, but which was defined by lines, thus making the picture 
evenly and fully legible.38 This formal quality of illumination of the whole 
picture evoked a sensibility of optimism (raja’iyat) that Abdullah Chughtai and 
others discerned in Chughtai’s work and which Chughtai himself asserted as an 
important marker of his difference from the Bengal school.39 According to the 
artist, a major failure of the Bengal school was that its works were suffused with 
“monasticism, pessimism, and despair” and “denial of the self” and, moreover, 
there was no artist in the Bengal school who could redirect its emphasis toward 
the style and form (tarz-i nigarish) of Mughal painting.4
The decorative and illuminated emphasis of Chughtai’s idealism was predi-
cated upon an essential difference between Western art and oriental art, not 
least by Chughtai himself. Self-orientalism was already formative in the rise of 
the Bengal school. Iqbal also deployed a kind of self-orientalism in his poetry, 
to the degree that he was known by the appellation “Poet of the East” (shaæir-i 
mashriq). However, Iqbal’s references to the East – including his citation of the 
Qur’an itself – are strategic and fragmentary and ultimately do not cohere into 
a unified worldview. By a close reading of Iqbal’s English and Persian writings, 
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Figure 8.8 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, The Desert in Love, illustration in ‘Amal-i 
Chughta’i, 1968. Watercolour on paper. Dimensions n.a. (Reproduced with kind 
permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, Lahore.)
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Javed Majeed has stressed Iqbal’s weaving of fragments from Islamic intellectual 
history with wide-ranging references to Western thinkers.41 Iqbal’s later poetry 
persistently addresses contemporary world politics, in which figures such as Lenin 
conduct a dialogue with God on imperialism and exploitation, for example.42 
Iqbal’s ideas changed during the course of his life, and the values he articulated 
in his later poetry denounce the evils of imperialism, capitalism and materi-
alism, and call on Muslims to become agents of dynamism and selfhood (khudi). 
He espouses transcending racism by celebrating an Islamic universalism, yet by 
his use of the terms “Arab” and “Ajam”, he continues to rely upon an ethni-
cised history of Islam. Iqbal also glorifies historical Muslim martial conquests, 
which cannot be easily translated into practical politics in multi-religious South 
Asia.43 Nevertheless, his poetry introduced new tropes and subjects into clas-
sical forms and paved the way for more radical poetic experiments to follow. 
We have already seen how critics considered Chughtai to be similar to the 
painters of the Ancien Régime, evoking a complete pre-revolutionary past. 
The tension between Iqbal’s dynamism and Chughtai’s idealism is evident in 
the majority of the artist’s work, and especially in the illustrations of æAmal-i 
Chughta’i, the decorative stasis of which is at variance from the restless strivings 
of Iqbal’s poetry.44 Chughtai fashioned his artistic project by negotiating the 
mental and cultural impasse colonialism produces upon the colonised, but also 
the degree to which resistance to colonialism for Chughtai was also only possible 
by accepting its terms, indeed by further asserting difference. Self-orientalism 
also meant that Chughtai was unable to countenance the idea of change and 
the transformations of modernity, because he associated these with the West. 
Consequently, Chughtai was appreciative of Western Renaissance masters but 
was disparaging of cubism and other forms of twentieth-century experimental 
art.45 
Some of Chughtai’s critics and supporters took a similar stand on the essential 
division between Eastern and Western painting, the irrelevance of post-cubist 
painting, and the baleful effects Western modernism and the avant-garde had 
had on “our” painters.46 To an extent, this represents a genuine impasse at which 
intellectuals contemporary to Chughtai found themselves. However, this anti-
modernism was not shared by all, especially not by the younger generation of 
writers and critics, who were supportive of the emergent post-cubist modernism 
following decolonisation and independence. Moreover, the seemingly complete 
and exhaustive scope of Chughtai’s individual achievement stood in stark 
contrast to the barrenness of modern Indo-Muslim painting between 1917 and 
1947. Chughtai’s secrecy and isolation elicited widespread acknowledgment that 
his school of painting had died with him.47 Chughtai’s career also marks both 
the opening of possibilities for Urdu art criticism and their attenuation during 
subsequent decades and certainly demonstrates that, despite heroic scholarly 
Abdur Rahman Chughtai
— 147 —
efforts by the artist, Abdullah Chughtai and other isolated researchers, so far no 
sustained and collective effort to study South Asian Muslim visual heritage has 
emerged from within Muslim South Asia.
Chughtai’s repudiation of realism and his recourse to imaginative form were 
also significant. Western painters had to draw from live models, but oriental 
painting was free of such constraints. Although the West was tied to the worship 
of materialism and could not transcend realism, the East distinguished itself by 
use of the imagination and “transcended the limitations of a [live] model by 
grounding its ‘model’ purely on the basis of aesthetic principles.”48 The female 
figure, which had become a central motif in Chughtai’s work, provided another 
point of departure between Iqbal and Chughtai. As the artist recounts, Iqbal, 
being a proponent of “art for life’s sake”, used to complain that in fine arts 
there appeared to be “no subject other than the female figure. [But] Tasir and 
myself would look at each other and softly remark that woman is indeed life’s 
subject [zindagi æibarat].”49 Iqbal situated nostalgia in a strategically fragmentary 
and activist framework and “generally considered Mughal civilizational achieve-
ments to be a sign of a culture in decline”,50 but Chughtai found the very raison 
d’être of his art in Persian and Mughal painting and architecture and in the 
symbolic figure of the ghazal’s erotic beloved. 
Nevertheless, by the continued centrality of the female figure in his work 
and by his very refusal to paint triumphalist battle scenes or portraits of male 
authority, Chughtai resists Iqbal’s masculinist vitalism. In this sense, the 
“difference” of Chughtai’s illustrations in æAmal-i Chughta’i in picturising Iqbal’s 
poetry is significant.51 Chughtai’s orientalism, “in contrast to Iqbal’s orientalism, 
possesses greater degrees of beauty and refinement [latafat o jamal kay æanasir]. 
Rather than having masculine traits [mardana ausaf], it has a much greater sense 
of femininity [nisa’iyat]”, observes Vahid Quraishi.52 And although Chughtai is 
said to have “unabashedly objectified the bodies of women”53 and is clearly not 
a feminist artist, his overall work nevertheless marks a crisis of masculinity that 
requires a reading sufficiently attentive to this dimension of his aesthetic.
Despite living through a turbulent period of South Asian history, Chughtai’s 
paintings show virtually no overt thematic engagement with contemporary 
events. A late interview by Tasir published in 1952 provides further evidence 
of Chughtai’s formalist aesthetic orientation. Tasir suggested that the primary 
purpose of art was to provide harmony and balance for emotions. Claiming 
that architecture, music and painting possessed little space for “politics of the 
uniform” and that although literature might be inherently more suited to address 
the political than the other arts, literature itself was bigger than politics, encom-
passing the wider world, while political life was narrow and petty. Thus, even 
when Chughtai ostensibly addressed themes that were potentially political, such 
as his Kashmir pictures and his painting The Slave Girl, Tasir nevertheless saw 
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Figure 8.9 Abdur Rahman Chughtai, The Story Teller, illustration in ‘Amal-i 
Chughta’i, 1968. Watercolour on paper. Dimensions n.a. (Reproduced with kind 
permission of Arif Rahman Chughtai © Chughtai Museum Trust, Lahore.)
Abdur Rahman Chughtai
— 149 —
him maintaining “emotional balance” (jazbati tavazun) in these works. Tasir 
was more open to modernism, suggesting that the world of art was transna-
tional; a world in which a painter like Matisse could draw upon Persian carpets, 
for example. At this historical moment, for Tasir, Chughtai represented one 
possible approach to art, one that inherited the force of tradition to become a 
catalyst for new possibilities.54 Chughtai refused to view himself in relation to 
Picasso, Gauguin, Braque or Van Gogh but sought to locate himself as a classical 
artist working in the tradition of the great Indo-Persian masters.55 
An Anti-modernist Modernity?
Chughtai’s project was predicated upon the exploration and renewal of his own 
heritage, rather than upon any borrowing from Western modernism. If Chughtai 
is indeed a painter of the Ancien Régime – as much of the criticism and his 
own self-perception seeks to situate him – what then is the possible relationship 
of Chughtai to modernism and modernity? This relationship is itself complex 
in its acknowledgments and silences. The immediate context is, of course, that 
Chughtai attempted to recreate Persian and Mughal classicism in an age of 
nationalism, capitalism and decolonisation, an age when addressee and patronage 
were in transition. The very effort to recreate classicism is thus rendered as a 
nostalgic project, but this nostalgia was not without its positive effect, as Faiz 
recognised. Rather, Chughtai was far from passive, indeed he was a pioneer in 
his efforts to situate and shape patronage and audience along new lines. He was 
intent on not simply publishing expensive, beautiful and painstakingly made 
books but was very keen on issuing less expensive and more affordable editions 
because he implicitly recognised the role of print culture as essential to his 
artistic formation.56 I have already discussed his efforts to produce illustrations 
and covers for books and journals, frequently in a voluntary capacity, without 
remuneration. Chughtai was also an artist of the “Age of Exhibitions”57 and 
found patronage and audiences by winning awards with the resulting exposure 
in newspapers and magazine reviews.
Chughtai’s subjectivity in his artwork is paradoxical – simultaneously central 
and absent. In his writings, Chughtai frequently stressed the individuality 
of the artist.58 He was proud of creating what he considered to be a unique 
style, labelled “Chughtai Art” by him and by his critics.59 The recreation of a 
complete and static aesthetic universe led him inevitably to disavow stylistic 
change within his art. Agha Abdul Hamid has divided Chughtai’s development 
into three periods, while Marcella Nesom, in her substantial and informative 
study, has identified five periods.60 Nesom has also studied the signatures and 
dates on Chughtai’s paintings and notes that around 1929 Chughtai ceased 
dating his work and, moreover, reworked themes from time to time to create 
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similar paintings and also “occasionally reverted to previous styles”. Even when 
he signed and dated his earlier work, the text is so tiny that it is “difficult to 
read in reproduction”. Chughtai also released work for printing to journals and 
publications that he had done or developed much earlier. A striking example 
is the painting titled Fame, based in recognisably “Hindu” iconography and 
included in æAmal-i Chughta’i, a version of which had been published no less 
than fifty years earlier, in 1918.61 Through such strategies, Chughtai successfully 
confounded a clear chronological account of his development, inhabiting the 
nostalgic plenitude of a Muslim visual past-into-present.62 The presence of the 
“Hinduised” Fame in æAmal-i Chughta’i, a major late volume illustrating Iqbal’s 
verses, also indicates that this Indo-Muslim past also ambivalently and uncer-
tainly included aspects of South Asia’s syncretistic culture, which was familiar 
to Chughtai but which became less so for subsequent generations of artists who 
came of age in Pakistan after 1947.
Chughtai’s avoidance of modernism in his paintings might also have been 
motivated by his awareness of his singular status. Unlike the literary modernists 
who worked in association with various literary circles, during the first three 
decades of his career (1917–47) Chughtai remained a towering, solitary figure 
upholding and modernising aspects of visual “tradition”. His work above all 
was suffused with a self-conscious optimism (raja’iyat) addressing South Asian 
Muslim subjectivity, which was traversing a difficult decolonising process while 
simultaneously being rendered a minority. Chughtai’s cosmopolitan modernity 
lies in his providing the South Asian Muslim intelligentsia with the practice 
of visual art as a serious endeavour, to which Chughtai devoted himself with 
a single-minded focus over a career spanning six decades. By his interpellation 
of himself as an artist rather than as an artisan, he firmly established artistic 
subjectivity and imagination in Muslim South Asia as a central motif in artistic 
development. By the very singularity and massive scope of his achievements and 
by his exhaustion of the possibilities of “Chughtai Art”, he enabled the younger 
modernists to repudiate his nostalgic and enchanted world and initiate a new 
openness toward transnational modernism. Chughtai’s association with the 
cosmopolitan Indo-Muslim literary universe also attempted to secure painting 
on a discursive and textual basis. 
The search for an adequate ground for artistic practice has persisted until 
today, stimulating artists to continued praxis and offering them a considerable 
degree of freedom to inhabit new formalist, modernist and conceptual develop-
ments. The contemporary miniature painting created by the graduates of the 
miniature programme of the Department of Fine Arts, National College of Art 
(NCA) from the late 1990s onwards is often claimed to be an unbroken conti-
nuity with tradition, but also a new way of celebrating hybridity and cosmo-
politanism. These are seen as formations that venture beyond the ideological 
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dictates of the Pakistani nation-state. However, South Asian Muslim identity 
in modern history has been too complex and over-determined to be easily 
confined in a national register. The return of the miniature today is neither 
an unbroken continuity with “tradition”, nor fully new in its acknowledgment 
of hybridity, although its playful and ironic potential is certainly a new devel-
opment. But in many ways, it parallels the revival of the miniature by Chughtai, 
who also negotiated cosmopolitan frameworks, even while articulating an idea 
of a Lahore-based Muslim art. The Chughtaian and the contemporary minia-
tures draw upon the legacies of Mughal painting, (post)modernism and Indian 
vernacular painting traditions to create a kind of post-national cosmopolitan 
Muslim aesthetic. The miniature either arises too early, before the founding of 
Pakistan, or too late, when the great national drive for modernisation from the 
1950s to the 1970s has been exhausted, to be unproblematically considered as 
national art. The contemporary miniature also unwittingly recreates Chughtai’s 
object of longing, the Lahore school of painting, but whose geographic locale 
is ironically globally dispersed and cosmopolitan, in a fashion that recalls pre-
modern Muslim intellectual history and strives to participate as an equal in the 
globalised world of contemporary art. 
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Cosmopolitanism and Authenticity:
The Doctrine of Tashabbuh Bi’l-Kuffar 
(“Imitating the Infidel”) 
in Modern South Asian Fatwas
Muhammad Khalid Masud
Chapter 9
This paper1 examines the frequently held assumption that the quest for cultural 
authenticity and religious identity in present-day Muslim societies discourages 
cosmopolitanism. This assumption problematises the notion of cosmopoli-
tanism as an issue of cultural authenticity. In order to understand the concept 
of cosmopolitanism as well as cultural authenticity in Islamic thought and 
practice, I have chosen to study the doctrine of tashabbuh bi’l- kuffar that forbids 
imitating non-Muslims and is, therefore, frequently cited as a decisive factor for 
cultural authenticity. G. E. Von Grunebaum2 observed that this specific doctrine 
formed the basis of a sense of religious superiority that inhibited interaction 
with others. Focusing on the notions of similarity and dissimilarity, the doctrine 
defines authenticity within the theological framework of religious identity. The 
paper explores the origin and development of this doctrine in Islamic thought 
and analyses its discourse in present day fatwa literature. As the focus on the 
doctrine of similarity limits the meaning of cosmopolitanism, I would like first 
to explore the conception of cosmopolitanism that has been suggested in recent 
studies of Muslim societies on the subject.
Problematising “Cosmopolitanism”
Cosmopolitanism in its semantic field includes political, moral, geographical 
and ethnic plurality. As an idea it contests the various exclusivist ideologies, 
most importantly nationalist and ethnic identities. A cosmopolitan perspective 
on Muslim societies explores how Muslim societies relate to others, and how 
they negotiate the concept of “other” within the frameworks of both nation-
alism and universalism. Roel Meijer’s3 study defines the semantic field of the 
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concept of cosmopolitanism to include the notions of coexistence, openness 
and contact with other cultures, along with freedom to choose eclectically from 
them. Cosmopolitanism, to Meijer, suggests the openness of a society to interact 
with other communities and a refusal to go along with exclusivist cultural trends 
that oblige a person to conform to specific cultural values. Cosmopolitanism 
celebrates both diversity and unity. The idea of unity in cosmopolitanism refers 
to the ideals of humanism, which unite all human beings into one community 
despite the diversity of languages, cultures and religions. The notion of unity in 
diversity in cosmopolitanism came to be contested in the nineteenth century by 
the concepts of unity based on nationalism, nation state and national identity, 
which laid emphasis on homogeneity and similarity and excluded extra-national 
identities, for example religious identity. The term cosmopolitanism forms a 
significant part of the semantic trajectory of globalism, which is currently used to 
express the notion of an open and liberal society. While globalism and nationalism 
tend to share an emphasis on homogeneity, cosmopolitanism honours diversity. 
Cosmopolitanism and globalism both contest the exclusivist claims generated 
by nationalism. A number of Muslim thinkers today, however, contest globalism 
as they understand it as a hegemonic relationship between Western and Muslim 
societies. Muslim contestations in this regard have revived academic interest in 
comparative studies of Middle Eastern and South and Southeast Asian societies, 
often claiming that these societies are structurally opposed to globalism and 
cosmopolitanism. Roel Meijer observes that liberal attempts to reform indig-
enous cultures and to adapt them to the demands of the modern world have 
given way to trends that focus on defining one’s own identity in opposition to 
Europe. In the process of creating an identity, cultural and political demarcation 
lines came to be drawn more narrowly, which eventually led to the disappearance 
of cosmopolitanism in the Middle East. Nationalist and Islamist movements in 
the 1930s and 1940s both termed Western concepts as alien and “imported”.4 
In order to fully appreciate the changing attitudes about cosmopolitanism in 
Muslim societies, the following five points must be taken into consideration. 
First, uncritical assumptions about the inherent opposition between Muslim and 
European cultures overlook the cultural shifts that occurred over time. Compared 
with Africa and Asia, where culturally diverse societies existed, cosmopolitanism 
was historically a rare phenomenon in medieval Europe because European 
cultures still valued integration and homogeneity. On the other hand, people of 
different religions and cultures lived side by side in Alexandria, Beirut, Istanbul, 
Delhi and various cities in Southeast Asia. Trading empires in Africa and Asia 
welcomed different religious and cultural communities. The Ottoman caliphate 
was open to cultural exchange, not only with other Asian communities but also 
with contemporary Europe. Percival Spear notes that during the eighteenth 
century the English were visibly fascinated by the local Muslim culture in India5 
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and cultural interaction between Muslims and Europeans was quite liberal and 
visible. Europeans adopted the local lifestyle and mastered the Urdu language 
well enough to compose poetry.6 Europeans and local intellectuals and scholars 
had close relations with each other.7
Second, one must also note that the cultural shift from the nineteenth century 
onwards began with the colonial biases of cultural superiority that defined the 
projects of development in terms of Western domination, not only in economic 
and political, but also in cultural terms. Meijer considers the increasing influence 
of European powers that threatened the openness in the region, along with 
Europe’s arrogance, imperialism and racism as the major factors responsible for 
the disappearance of cosmopolitanism in the Middle East. 
Third, the nationalist movements defined the political organisation of soci-
eties in terms of language, ethnicity and territory, and consequently damaged the 
cultural and religious diversity of the Middle East. Cosmopolitan Muslim intel-
lectuals such as Muhammad Iqbal found nationalism harmful to the humanist 
elements in art and culture. In his words,
On the other hand, the growth of territorial nationalism, with its emphasis 
on what is called national characteristics, has tended rather to kill the broad 
human element in the art and literature of Europe. It was quite otherwise 
with Islam. Here the idea was neither a concept of philosophy nor a dream of 
poetry. As a social movement the aim of Islam was to make the idea a living 
factor in the Muslim’s daily life, and thus silently and imperceptibly to carry 
it towards fuller fruition.8
Fourth, the Western perspective of nationalism was essentially rooted in the 
political ideology of power and superiority. It generated a sense of exclusivism 
and security that considered Muslim cosmopolitanism a threat to the West. 
Von Grunebaum, one of the most influential American sociologists, regarded 
modernising trends in Muslim societies as a threat. He warned the West against 
such cosmopolitan Muslim attitudes in the following words:
We in the West need to cultivate awareness that tendencies which appear 
to be assimilative and which actually do reflect a profound interest in the 
Occidental achievement and its absorption are, in the last analysis, moti-
vated by the wish to overcome the West by taking over its hidden sources of 
creativeness.9
Fifth, uncritical references to the doctrine of tashabbuh bi’l- kuffar ignored 
its historical development. For instance, G. E. Von Grunebaum10 argues in the 
following extract that by forbidding imitation of the non-Muslim, this doctrine 
developed a sense of religious superiority among Muslims.
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The attitude which is indicated toward the protected religious communities 
is one of polite aloofness with emphasis on superior status of Muslims; any 
imitation of the customs of the non-Muslims is to be avoided not because 
those customs would necessarily be intrinsically objectionable but because 
al-tashabbuh bi’l-kuffar, assimilation to the unbelievers, must be guarded 
against; cf. the poignant passage in Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), Tafsir Surat 
al-Ikhlas (Cairo, 1905), 132–311; al-Ghazali, Ihya (Bulaq, 1872) 2:189, 
records this (alleged) saying of the Prophet: When you see me do not rise 
as the foreigners, al-aÆajim do (p. 188). We find another alleged direction 
of the Prophet: “Do not shake hands with the protected non-Muslims, ahl 
al-dhimma, and do not greet them first”, etc.12
Meijer points out three major factors responsible for the disappearance of 
cosmopolitanism in the Middle East: first, the increasing influence of European 
powers allowed their arrogance, imperialism and racism to threaten the openness 
in the region; second, the ruling nationalist elite that symbolised cosmopoli-
tanism was discredited due to its failure in establishing social justice, rule of law 
and good governance; third, the search for authenticity led to a more exclusive 
and introverted worldview.
However, associating nationalism with cosmopolitanism has prevented 
Meijer from fully exploring the contested nature of the notions of national and 
religious identity in the Middle East. It leads him, rather, to conclude that in this 
increasingly “myopic political and intellectual climate”, “[O]nly Islam seemed 
to provide the right guideline”.13 
Meijer and Von Grunebaum assume that the doctrine of tashabbuh does 
not distinguish between religious and cultural elements. The doctrine refuses 
to imitate non-Muslim customs not because “those customs would necessarily 
be intrinsically objectionable”, but because similarity means “assimilation to 
the unbelievers” in Von Grunebaum’s words cited above. This paper offers an 
analysis of the modern discourses on the doctrine of tashabbuh in South Asian 
fatwas. It particularly revisits constructions of this doctrine by al-Ghazali and 
Ibn Taymiyya to which Grunebaum refers in the above-mentioned article. It 
is important to note that, as I explain later, both al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyya 
were worried by the encounters with alien cultures and the assimilative attitude 
of their contemporary Muslim societies.
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The Doctrine of Ashabbuh bi’l-kuffar
Sources of the doctrine
In Islamic tradition, the Qur’an and hadith, (the sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad), are considered primary sources. However, almost every discussion 
on the doctrine of tashabbuh cites the following saying of the Prophet reported 
in the Sunan by Abu Da’ud Sulayman (b. AshÆath al-Sijistani (d. 888-9)): 
“Whoever imitates (tashabbaha) a people he belongs to them”.14 Abu Da’ud’s 
version is quite problematic as it differs with reports in other hadith collec-
tions. It is not reported by earlier collectors such as Bukhari (d. 870), Muslim 
(d. 875) and Malik (d. 795). This version differs with other versions reported in 
Ibn Hanbal’s (d. 855) Musnad, Abu’l Qasim al-Tabarani’s (d. 881) Mu’jam, and 
Abu ‘Isa Muhammad’s (b. ÆIsa al-Tirmidhi (d. 892)) Jami’. Abu Da’ud’s report 
appears to be part of the following report by Ibn Hanbal, which is apparently 
the earliest on the subject:
I have been sent close to the Day of Judgment with the sword in order that 
God alone is worshipped without any associate. My sustenance is placed 
under the shade of my lance and humiliation and subjugation is ordained for 
those who oppose me. Whoever imitates a people belongs to them.15
Comparing the two, Abu Da’ud’s version appears to be a part of Ibn Hanbal’s 
longer version. What is more significant, Ibn Hanbal’s report restricts the prohi-
bition to the ways of belief and worship while Abu Da’ud broadens the context 
and shifts the subject of the hadith from the strictly religious to cultural subjects 
by placing it in the chapter about dress and in a section entitled labas al-shuhra, 
meaning “dress as a symbol of social status and religious identity”. Other reports 
in the chapter forbid certain types of dress that are meant to gain reputation or 
to identify the wearer with other people. It is significant to remember that dress 
served in these societies as a marker of identity, denoting sex, social status and 
religion. 
The following version in Tirmidhi, on the other hand, also stresses the reli-
gious context of the hadith, referring to the different ways of greeting among 
other religious communities. 
One who imitates others does not belong to us. Do not imitate the Jews and 
the Christians in the ways they greet; the Jews greet raising (ishara) fingers 
and the Christians by raising palm of the hand.16 
Reports by Abu Da’ud and Tirmidhi have both been subjected to technical 
criticism pointing to the weak links among the narrators, but that is not our 
present concern.17 
Cosmopolitanism and Authenticity
— 161 —
One must not overlook that these and other hadiths point to a chequered 
relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims during the days of Prophet 
Muhammad in Medina. When the Prophet arrived in Medina, he was particu-
larly inclined toward Jews as people of the book. He even chose to adopt some 
of their religious practices such as fasting on a particular day.18 Later, however, as 
the Jews continued to insist on their religious superiority, the Prophet began to 
distance himself from them. The hadith literature reveals how tense the relations 
were between Muslims and Jews at that time. Several hadith reports mention 
that the Jews in Medina used to curse Prophet Muhammad while greeting him.19 
The Prophet advised his followers not to return their evil greetings with evil. The 
Muslims could at the most reply to these curses by simply saying “same to you”.20 
The Qur’an also refers to such greetings by the Prophet’s enemies; it says, 
“And when they come to thee, they salute thee, not as Allah salutes thee”21. 
The Qur’an prescribes as a general rule that “When a (courteous) greeting is 
offered you meet it with a greeting still more courteous, or (at least) of equal 
courtesy. Allah takes careful account of all things”.22 Another explanation refers 
to preferring greetings by words rather than by gestures, as that would symbolise 
acts of worship like bowing and prostrating. The Prophet allowed greeting 
by making signs using the hands only when the persons are greeting from a 
distance. Although no evidence exists, it is possible that the greeting gestures 
by Christian and Jews had specific religious meanings. Islam did not allow the 
worshiping of a human even by making gestures of worship such as bowing and 
prostrating; even the Prophet could not be venerated in this manner. 
From this brief comparison, it becomes clear that it is necessary to study the 
context of these hadiths. The manner of reporting a hadith also influences the 
understanding of the doctrine of imitation; a fuller version of a hadith limits the 
area of prohibition to strictly religious matters.  
Development of the doctrine
Instead of a full history of the doctrine, this short paper provides a brief summary 
of the views of prominent Muslim thinkers such as Al-Ghazali (d. 1111), Ibn 
Taymiyya (d. 1328), Shams al-Haq al-Azimabadi (d. 1867), Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan (d. 1898), and Qari Tayyib (d. 1983), representing the discourses in the 
twelfth, fourteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Twelfth century
Muslim encounters with Greek, Magi and Indian scholarly traditions posed 
an epistemological crisis. One of the foremost issues in Muslim theology (‘ilm 
al-kalam) was to define an epistemological framework in order to assimilate or 
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reject alien ideas and sciences. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali (d. 1111) was opposed to 
the assimilative attitude of his contemporary Muslim philosophers and theolo-
gians and developed a theory of knowledge distinguishing religious from non-
religious sciences. Developing the criteria of religious utility he approved of 
logic and arithmetic as useful sciences. He was the first to introduce logic into 
shari‘a sciences. 
In his very influential book Ihya æUlum al-din (“Revival of Religious 
Sciences”), al-Ghazali elaborated his theory of knowledge and its application. 
It is significant that he discussed the question of tashabbuh in this book not as 
a theological or legal subject matter but as an issue of social psychology. He 
dealt with Muslim religious encounters with non-Muslims in terms of love and 
hate relations between humans for the sake of God. He enumerated disbelief 
and heresy as two grounds for hate. However, he defined hate not in terms of 
violence but as tolerance. A non-Muslim must not be harmed if s/he is not 
at war. However, relationships with non-Muslims had to be approached with 
caution. A Muslim should not be the first to greet a non-Muslim. If a non-
Muslim comes across a Muslim in a street, the non-Muslim must walk on the 
opposite side of the street.23 
Obviously, al-Ghazali was defining this encounter in a historical context in 
which Muslims dominated. One must not, however, overlook the fact that he 
was discussing the assimilation of the Greek sciences, which did not belong 
to a dominant culture; rather they were borrowed from the conquered people. 
It is also important that even in this context al-Ghazali was defining bound-
aries between the religious and cultural aspects of this relationship. Among 
the cultural aspects, he is careful to point out matters which are conceived as 
religious by non-Muslims and which may confuse religious identity with cultural 
identity. 
Al-Ghazali cited four hadiths on the authority of Muslim, Bukhari, Tirmidhi 
and Abu Da’ud, all of them forbidding greetings, venerating and meeting non-
Muslims. Three of these hadiths were mentioned above. Tirmidhi’s hadith 
forbids imitating the Christian and Jewish gestures of greeting.24 Another 
hadith forbids Muslims from standing up for the Prophet like the non-Arabs 
who venerate their elders by standing up on their arrival.25 
Al-Ghazali’s views reflect the ambivalence in the Muslim attitude toward 
non-Muslims that necessitated peaceful coexistence with non-Muslims but 
discouraged close relationships with them. This ambivalence was the result 
of continuing wars between the two religious communities. Compared to the 
non-Muslim attitude toward Muslims, the doctrine of tashabbuh in fact allowed 
peaceful coexistence by separating the religious from the cultural aspect of simi-
larity.
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Fourteenth century
By the fourteenth century, Muslims had lost the dominant position that they 
enjoyed during al-Ghazali’s days. From 1258, when they destroyed Baghdad, the 
Mongols remained a threat to Muslim society for at least two centuries. Never-
theless, non-Muslims continued to be a part of Muslim societies. Ibn Taymiyya 
(d. 1328) complained about the increasingly permissive Muslim attitude toward 
non-Muslims. Referring to the hadith foretelling the schism among Muslims 
and their deviation in the footsteps of the Jews, he maintained that the opening 
chapter in the Qur’an divides human beings into three groups: those who follow 
the straight path, those who incurred the wrath of God and those who deviated 
from the right path. Ibn Taymiyya identified these respectively as Muslims, Jews 
and Christians. In addition to other monographs, Ibn Taymiyya’s Iqtida al-sirat 
al-mustaqim mukhalafat ashab al-jahim (“The Straight Path Demands Divergence 
from the People of Hell”)26 is especially dedicated to this theme. 
In this work, Ibn Taymiyya reconstructed the doctrine of tashabbuh, adding 
references to the Qur’anic verses and to Islamic history in addition to the 
hadiths already mentioned above. Ibn Taymiyya elaborated that the prohibition 
of tashabbuh had its roots in the Sunnah of the Prophet and in the covenants 
with non-Muslims in early Islam. In these covenants, the Jews and Christians 
in conquered areas agreed to show respect to Muslims by not wearing the same 
dress, headgear, hairstyle and shoes and not using the same mounts (horses) that 
Muslims used.27 
Ibn Taymiyya also refers to the Prophet’s practices. For instance, Prophet 
Muhammad changed the prayer direction from Jerusalem to Mecca stressing a 
divergence from the Jewish practice. Sometimes, the Prophet simply reversed 
what the Jews practiced; for example, he fixed the times of prayer to be contrary 
to Jewish and Christian practices. The Prophet allowed Muslims the dying of hair 
against the Jewish practice of maintaining grey hair in old age. The Prophet also 
asked Muslims to oppose pagan and Jewish practices of peculiar hairstyles. For 
instance, the Meccan pagans parted their hair and the Prophet while in Mecca 
let his hair fall on his shoulders. Later, when he came to Medina, he found the 
Jews parting their hair in the middle of the head. Initially, he approved of this 
practice but later, however, he asked Muslims to distinguish themselves by not 
parting their hair. Similarly, he forbade Muslims from keeping forelocks hanging 
on the sides as the Jews did, or shaving part of the head as the Christians did.28
Ibn Taymiyya also argued that various Qur’anic verses forbade imitation of 
non-Muslims, especially Jews and Christians. According to him the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah do not simply prohibit imitating what non-Muslims do; they also 
imply that things should be done in ways contrary to those of non-Muslims, and 
that non-Muslim practices should be held in contempt. 
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Ibn Taymiyya’s reasoning on the question of imitation appears very complex 
and often hard to follow. Apparently, the main reason for this complexity is that 
the context of prohibition in the early history of Islam, which constitutes his 
main source of reasoning, was both religious and political; the cultural context 
in that period was not as distinct as it became in later centuries. It is also compli-
cated because Ibn Taymiyya introduced the question of intention in imitating 
the infidels. He elaborated that “imitation” is not only doing something that 
others do; it also means following the same objectives as those of the non-
Muslims.29 Close relations lessen contempt for sinful non-Muslim practices and 
in most cases eventually lead Muslims to kufr (loss of faith).30 For evidence, Ibn 
Taymiyya observed that Jews and Christians residing in Muslim societies often 
lost faith in their religions; they became less inimical to Muslims compared to 
those living outside.31 Obviously, according to Ibn Taymiyya, the relationship 
between culture and religion is quite complex and interactive; the boundaries 
between culture and religion keep shifting. Nevertheless he tried to define 
these boundaries by also introducing the doctrine of bidÆa in the discussion of 
tashabbuh. BidÆa limited the meaning of religion to those symbols and prac-
tices that served as markers of religious identity in a religion. He argued, for 
example, that non-Muslim dress and food are not forbidden per se; they are 
prohibited only if they are specific to the religious rites of others.32 Celebrating 
“non-Muslim” festivals is prohibited because they are distinctly religious prac-
tices and celebrating them introduces alien religious practices and innovations 
(bidÆa) into the religion of Islam.33 
Ibn Taymiyya’s contemporary Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi (d. 1388), a Maliki 
jurist in Andalus, offered a detailed analysis of the concept of bidÆa in his book 
al-I’tisam, because he was accused of bidÆa by his contemporary scholars. He 
limited the meaning of bidÆa, mainly to the area of ‘ibadat, the matters between 
God and humankind, distinguishing it from other, broader areas of muÆamalat, 
which pertains to relations among human beings. 
Nineteenth century
During the nineteenth century, movements for revival and reform focused on 
purifying Islam from a number of corruptions that Muslim societies had adopted 
under local cultural influences. Thus the question of cultural and religious 
imitation received focal attention again in the debates on bidÆa. It is significant 
that in these debates Ibn Taymiyya’s writings became a point of reference. For 
instance, Shams al-Haq al-Azimabadi (d. 1867)34 argued that Ibn Taymiyya 
spoke about a total and comprehensive sense of imitation, which is undoubtedly 
kufr (un-Islamic) and must be forbidden because imitation signifies a sense of 
belonging. If one imitates sinners and non-Muslims then one would belong to 
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them. ÆAzimabadi dismisses Ibn Taymiyya’s stress on the role of intention in 
imitation. He cites ÆAbd Allah b ‘Amr, who stated that a Muslim who settles in 
the land of the idolaters, celebrates their festivals in imitation, and dies in that 
condition will be counted among them on the Day of Judgment. Although the 
example in this statement clearly related to the doctrine of hijra (the obligation 
to migrate from countries at war to Muslim territories) and referred to a different 
historical period, ÆAzimabadi concluded that one is prohibited from imitating 
non-Muslims even if one does not intend to belong to them. He cited several 
hadiths to support his claim.35
ÆAzimabadi shifted the emphasis from religious and cultural to political 
aspects of the doctrine of tashabbuh. He argued that the Qur’an discouraged, and 
sometimes forbade, alliances (wila’) with Jews and Christians (see, for example, 
Qur’an, 4:139, 5: 51, 9:23). The term wila’ that ÆAzimabadi introduced was later 
rendered as tark mawalat (non-cooperation) and became very popular during the 
independence movement in India. 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), on the contrary, was in favour of loyalty to 
the British. He founded Aligarh College, a modern institution of learning for 
Muslims, and called upon them to adapt to new ways. He was among the few 
Muslims who took employment with the British. He was very critical of the 
doctrines of tashabbuh and muwalat, which prevented Muslims from moderni-
sation. The ulema of Deoband, a religious institution of learning that later also 
became a school of thought, opposed Khan’s alliance with the British and his 
efforts toward modernisation. In 1867 controversy arose about Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan when he took meals with some British officers. Some ulema declared 
him “Kristan”, Christian because he imitated their ways. Khan wrote an article 
arguing that Islam allowed Muslims the consumption of food prepared by the 
“people of the book”. In his discussion on the issue, he offered a detailed critique 
of the doctrine of tashabbuh, particularly the hadith on which this doctrine is 
founded. He reproduced the opinions of early scholars who found the chain of 
narrators in this hadith unreliable. He also argued that the term qawm (nation) 
in the text was ambiguous; it could not only mean a religious community. He 
also observed that the Prophet Muhammad wore a Syrian robe that was used 
by Christians.36 
The doctrine of tashabbuh was criticised in Tunisia as the main hindrance to 
modernisation; it opposed imitation of even such practices as were in conformity 
with the teachings of Islam. In his book Aqwam al-Masalik, published in 1867, 
Khayruddin Pasha (1889), the prime minister of Tunisia, argued that Islam 
supported constitutional forms of government. However this was rejected by 
Muslim ulema on the grounds of similarity with non-Muslims. Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan published extracts from this book in 1875 stressing the need for a critical 
study of the doctrine.37 
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It is clear that political and cultural resistance to the West came to be defined 
in religious terms in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Doctrines of bidÆa, 
notions of taboos, purity and pollution, and alliance and friendship with non-
Muslims became part of the political discourse of this period.38 
Twentieth century
Qari Tayyib’s al-tashabbuh fi’l Islam (Imitation in Islam)39, written circa 1929 to 
refute Khan’s critique, illustrates the political context of the debate about this 
doctrine. Qari Tayyib (d. 1983) was a grandson of Mawlana Qasim Nanawtawi, 
the founder of the Dar al-Ulum Deoband in India, a reformist school that called 
for reforming bidÆa, resisting British imperialism and cooperating with the Indian 
National Congress in its composite nationalism. The Deoband School opposed 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan for wearing English dress and adopting a Western way of 
life. Qari Tayyib was one of the important ideologues of this school. 
Qari Tayyib’s’s book on tashabbuh was meant to respond to the challenges of 
cosmopolitanism arising with colonial rule and to clarify the implication of the 
doctrine of tashabbuh in this context. It took an overtly comprehensive view of 
the doctrine, relying on the views of earlier scholars such as Shah Waliullah (d. 
1762), Ibn Taymiyya and Mawlana Qasim Nanawtawi (d. 1879).
Without mentioning the name of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Qari Tayyib warned 
about a “new Islam under construction”, that would “destroy the true image of 
Islam by promoting imitation of other peoples, particularly the Christians”.40 
Qari Tayyib repeated Ibn Taymiyya’s explanations about the authenticity of the 
hadith of tashabbuh, responding to Khan’s technical criticism of the hadith. Qari 
Tayyib regarded the prohibition of imitation in the hadith as unconditional; 
tashabbuh applies to every non-Muslim practice. He supported his view citing 
the Caliph ‘Umar b. Al-Khattab who forbade using water in the bath because 
the Arabs only took sunbaths. Qari Tayyib concluded that the hadith on 
tashabbuh called for a total prohibition, including friendship with non-Muslims 
and seeking help from non-Muslims.41
In his analysis of the concepts of imitation and identity, Qari Tayyib argues 
that the laws and teachings of earlier prophets have been abolished, and imitation 
of Jews and Christians amounts to their revival. The doctrine of tashabbuh is a 
safeguard against this revival. He is, however, careful to add that these ancient 
laws were not entirely abolished; the sharia of Islam did not abolish those laws 
which are still good and beneficial. He discusses tashabbuh as causing ambiguity 
to one’s identity. Defining the nation (qawm) as a group of humans who abide by 
a particular path that distinguishes this group from others, he identifies “path” 
as meaning religion. He explains that Christians, Jews, idolaters and Muslims 
are distinct from each other on account of their particular beliefs and practices. 
Cosmopolitanism and Authenticity
— 167 —
Tashabbuh bi’l- ghayr (imitation of others) destroys that distinction.42 Distinc-
tions among various nations (qawm) and communities (ummat) are informed by 
their special characteristics, particular morals, habits and cultures. These special 
traits distinguish nations from one another. That is how European nations are 
distinct from the non-European.43 
Qari Tayyib distinguished between different types of human practices: tabÆi, 
normal or natural habits like eating and drinking, taÆabbudi, purely religious 
matters like specific forms of worship, ‘ibadat and particular symbols like the 
wearing of the cross, taÆawwudi, non-religious customs and practices, and ‘adat, 
customary law. The prohibition of tashabbuh applies only to the second type, 
namely taÆabbudi. The imitation of taÆawwudi, that is, customs and social prac-
tices, is prohibited only if a clear and explicit text forbids it. Imitation is also 
forbidden if the text identifies a custom clearly belonging to non-Muslims as 
their marker of identity (shiÆar). A non-Muslim custom is not preferable to 
a Muslim practice. Finally, intention to imitate non-Muslims also makes an 
otherwise lawful custom forbidden.
Tayyib concluded the discussion saying that the real objective of the doctrine 
is to save the Muslim umma from confusion and destruction and to make them 
distinct from non-Muslims. However, this prohibition does not aim at hardship 
of the disregard of natural desires.44 In order to maintain these distinctions, 
Islam forbids women to imitate men, and artists to imitate God.45 Although 
Qari Tayyib’s construction of the doctrine is more comprehensive and more 
restrictive than others, he still continues the Muslim thinkers’ tradition of 
separating the religious from other aspects of imitation. It is significant that 
the Deoband school of thought came to support Hindu–Muslim unity and the 
Indian National Congress in Indian politics.
In the twentieth century, this doctrine became a source of reference in the 
face of the threat of Westernisation. In the following section I analyse some 
selected fatwas to illustrate how the muftis had to appeal to the political situ-
ation when it was difficult to declare a practice prohibited which was not origi-
nally religious. 
Fatwa Literature
The term fatwa refers to an expert religious opinion given in response to either a 
question or a statement by an expert (mufti) on a particular issue. The practice 
of fatwa has existed throughout Islamic history but its role was enhanced during 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when Muslims suddenly faced the new 
cultural, religious and political challenges of modernity, colonialism and nation-
alism. As the British gradually restricted the formal application of sharia, the 
institution of fatwa filled the gap in matters relating to marriage, divorce and so 
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on, which were not covered by Anglo-Muhammadan law. However, due to rapid 
social changes in Muslim societies, the fatwas were no longer limited to religious 
matters. Consequently, since fatwa was understood as God’s law, the meaning 
and scope of religion also expanded. The following analysis of some selected 
fatwas reveals the ambivalence and diversity of attitude toward cultural matters. 
Shah ÆAbd al-Aziz (d. 1823)
Shah ÆAbd al-Aziz, a son of Shah Waliullah had close relations with the British 
in Delhi.46 In his comments and fatwas, he always distinguished between the 
cultural and religious dimensions of these relations.47 He clarified that imitating 
any custom which specifically belonged to non-Muslims, for example, dress or 
food, was tashabbuh and forbidden. If it was common among non-Muslims but 
not peculiar to them, there was no harm in adopting it. If Muslims adopted alien 
practices because they were useful and convenient and not with the intention of 
specifically imitating non-Muslims, this imitation was not forbidden.48 What was 
forbidden was the intention of imitating those customs for a religious purpose. 
Mawlana ÆAbd al-Hayy Lakhnawi (d. 1887)
Born in Banda, Uttar Pradesh, to the family of Farangi Mahall, Mawlana ÆAbd 
al-Hayy studied in Lucknow with Shafi’i and Hanbali teachers.49 Like Shah 
ÆAbd al-Aziz, the muftis of Farangi Mahall also had a cosmopolitan perspective 
on the doctrine of tashabbuh. Mawlana ÆAbd al-Hayy was well versed in philo -
sophy and other related sciences known as maÆqulat (rational sciences). As 
Francis Robinson notes, the ulema of this family were mostly cosmopolitan; not 
only had they studied and travelled within India and abroad, but they referred 
frequently to the principle of ibaha (things are originally lawful unless forbidden) 
in their fatwas. They were also critical of the earlier fatwas on social practices. 
Mawlana ÆAbd al-Hayy disagreed with the Hanafi authority Mulla ÆAli Qari (d. 
1014) who forbade teaching women how to write.50
Mawlana ÆAbd al-Hayy Lakhnawi’s fatwas51 are very important for issues 
related to cosmopolitanism. Mawlana wrote several fatwas about mutual rela-
tions between the various Muslim sects, between Hindus and Muslims and 
between Muslims and Christians. Indian Muslims were divided in sects and 
mutual relations were discouraged. Mawlana criticised the Shi’a and Sunni 
muftis who declared each other kafir. Mawlana ÆAbd al-Hayy’s reconstruction 
further refined the doctrine of tashabbuh; he added a fine distinction between 
implicit and explicit imitation. An imitation is forbidden only if one explicitly 
intends to imitate a non-Muslim.52  
On the question of colonial rule, he clarified that India under the British was 
Cosmopolitanism and Authenticity
— 169 —
Dar al-Islam (Islamic territory), not Dar al-Harb (an enemy territory), because 
the rulers did not interfere in Muslim religious matters.53 Similarly, learning 
English did not constitute an imitation of non-Muslims. Tashabbuh referred only 
to special customs and habits, which are peculiar with non-Muslims. Food, drink 
and dress may entail tashabbuh, but not language.54 Using modern technology, 
like installing an electric fan in a mosque, did not mean one was imitating non-
Muslims. There is certainly tashabbuh with the Christians, but it is blameworthy 
only if the intention is religious, that is, if the Christians observe it as a religious 
symbol.55 
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905)
Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, who wrote fatwas for the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband, was 
frequently asked questions about social practices; whether they were bidÆa or 
entailed tashabbuh. In his fatwas56 he developed comparatively clear definitions 
of these concepts for the Indian context in which cultural relations with Hindus 
and Christians were generating these debates. For instance, wearing wooden 
sandals was not allowed by Mawlana ÆAbd al-Hayy because it was an imitation 
of Hindu yogis. When Gangohi was asked about this practice he clarified that 
it is neither bidÆa nor imitation. Wearing wooden sandals was no longer specific 
to Hindu yogis; it had become a common practice among Muslims and Hindus, 
and was therefore allowed.57 
Most Muslims regarded wearing English clothes as an imitation of the non-
Muslim. Gangohi distinguished between English clothes and the cross. He clar-
ified that the cross is a symbol of Christianity, but a hat, coat and pantaloons 
are not. Muslims in Western countries also wore the same clothes as Christians 
did. In India the situation was different, however. There only Christians and 
Hindus wore these clothes. Adopting this practice in India is seen as tashabbuh 
by non-Muslims and therefore is forbidden.58 
Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi (d. 1943)
Mawlana Ashraf Ali Thanawi was also critical of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the 
Aligarh movement for modernisation. He had declared Khan to be a heretic. He 
wrote fatwas for Deoband before the establishment of the special department of 
fatwa in the school. Regarding the doctrine of tashabbuh, therefore, he differed with 
Khan. He endorsed Gangohi’s view arguing that English dress by itself was not 
prohibited; in Europe, Muslims also wore this dress and thus it was not forbidden. 
But in India, it was a mark of identity for non-Muslims and therefore not allowed.59 
Those who adopted this dress clearly intended to resemble the British. 
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Mufti Kifayatullah (d. 1952)
Mufti Kifayatullah was a renowned mufti of the Deoband School and belonged 
to JamÆiyyat ÆUlama-i Hind, an ulema organisation that supported the Indian 
National Congress. Unlike most other muftis, he allowed close cultural rela-
tions between Hindus and Muslims. He was often questioned on this point by 
the Muslim masses who were cautious about Hindu customs and avoided eating 
and drinking with them. Movements for nationalism had brought to the fore 
questions of religious and cultural identity.
When asked about the Hindu practices of qashqa and chandan (ritual marks 
on the forehead), he explained that they were special Hindu cultural and reli-
gious ritual marks. Muslims must avoid those marks; however imitation of 
Hindus in this matter did not make them non-Muslim.60 He rejected the idea 
that non-Muslims were “polluted”. He clarified that a human body, Muslim 
or non-Muslim, was clean unless physically polluted. Food eaten and touched 
by non-Muslims was not polluted. However, since Hindus regarded the things 
prepared and touched by Muslims polluted, Muslims must respond with pride.61 
The close alliance of the ulema of the Deoband with the Hindu leaders 
raised questions. One of the inquirers asked if a Muslim was allowed to pray for 
the well being of a non-Muslim as it was common to pray for the long life of 
Mahatma Gandhi who was on a hunger strike. Mufti Kifayatullah replied that 
such prayers were allowed but with the intention that he may live to accept 
guidance from God.62 To this cautious reply, the mufti added that Jews and 
Christians are “people of the book” but unnecessary relations with them may 
harm religion.63 It was an allusion to some political parties that allied with the 
British. He clarified that the Qur’an characterises Christians as idol worshipers 
and Trinitarian, yet declares their food lawful and marriages with them permis-
sible.64 He elaborated that the Qur’anic prohibition against friendship with 
non-Muslims did not forbid all kinds of relations. Exchange of gifts was permis-
sible. In a country like India it was impossible to not have relationships with 
non-Muslims.65 Cooperation with Hindus for the purpose of freeing India from 
the British was inevitable.66 
In 1936, in a public meeting in Karachi, Mawlawi Muhammad ÆUthman said 
that Muslims had no hesitation sharing food with the untouchables. Malik Hajji 
ÆAbd al-Aziz, the proprietor of the Punjab Hotel stood up and publicly drank the 
leftover water from the drinking glass of Mr Chandra, a Hindu leader partici-
pating in the meeting. A certain Muhammad Yusuf Dihlawi publicly protested 
against this “insult”, as Islam could not allow drinking the leftovers of a person 
who consumed dead meat and prohibited food. The mufti explained that the 
leftovers of a non-Muslim were not unlawful unless they contained prohibited 
food. The same question was also sent to other muftis in India. 
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Mufti Muhammad ShafiÆ (d. 1976)
Mufti Muhammad ShafiÆ, another mufti of the Deoband School, was also 
consulted about the above-mentioned incident of tashabbuh. In contrast to 
Mufti Kifayatullah, he was more cautious about Hindu–Muslim relations. Mufti 
ShafiÆ wrote that the food prepared by a Hindu with clean hands and clean 
utensils was permissible for Muslims to consume. Eating and drinking the left-
overs of a human being was never forbidden. However he added the following 
note to his fatwa: 
Since Hindus hate us, our honour demands that we also hate them. We should 
not buy commodities from their shops, except when inevitable. Hindus are 
by nature more unclean than other non-Muslims. It is therefore better to 
avoid their food. The food cannot however be declared legally unclean and 
unlawful.67
On a similar question about sharing food with Christians, the mufti explained 
that not all contemporary Christians can be considered “people of the book”; 
most of them are atheists.68 He added that, in principle, there was no objection 
against eating and drinking with them, but the practice must be discouraged 
because social contact with non-Muslims breeds religious sympathy for and prox-
imity with other religions, which weakens one’s faith in one’s own religion.69 
Conclusion
Muslim communities differ from each other in their historical and cultural devel-
opment, yet they have been culturally cosmopolitan. Most cities in medieval 
Muslim societies hosted scholars, artists, traders and travellers belonging to 
different cultures and religions. Cultural developments in Muslim societies in 
language and literature, arts, architecture, medicine and other sciences owe a 
great deal to this cosmopolitan attitude among Muslims.
During the early nineteenth century, Indian cities like Lucknow, Murshidabad, 
Lahore and Delhi, for instance, exemplified Indian-Muslim cosmopolitanism. 
During their early encounters with the local societies, the British were not only 
impressed by the local cultures but, as has been noted above, some of them even 
adopted local manners and practices. 
The situation changed in the late nineteenth century, especially after 1857 
when the British Empire opted for modernisation in the British style. On account 
of Muslim resistance in the form of jihad movements from 1857 to 1867, the 
British developed a bias against the Muslim ulema. Muslims in general were 
already divided on cooperation with the British who posed not only a political 
but also a religious and cultural threat to Muslims. 
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Although in Islamic tradition Christians are “people of the book” and thus 
respected, under the influence of local notions of pollution and purity Hindus 
and Muslims both considered the British to be polluted and untouchable. These 
perceptions also influenced the doctrines of tashabbuh and bidÆa, as we have seen 
above. Revivalist movements in eighteenth-century India had rejected the local 
notions of pollution and called for the reform of other Hindu influences, but 
these notions had continued among the masses. They were revived with the 
emphasis on religious and political resistance to the British during the nine-
teenth century.
The political perspective during the twentieth century eroded the concept of 
cosmopolitanism further, as the question of identity shifted the emphasis from 
religion to nationalism, which brought Hindus and Muslims together against 
the British. Muslims, however, became divided on the question of Hindu–
Muslim unity. The majority of Deoband scholars, such as Qari Tayyib and Mufti 
Kifayatullah, supported the Indian National Congress and called for Hindu–
Muslim unity. Others, including Mawlana Thanawi and Mufti Muhammad ShafiÆ, 
supported the Muslim nationalism of the Muslim League. The various notions of 
religious, cultural and political similarity complicated the doctrine of tashabbuh. 
One can note differences in the notions of “pollution” and “untouchability” 
not only between the muftis and Muslim masses, but also among the muftis 
on political lines. The muftis who supported the Muslim League admitted that 
Hindus were not untouchable and that sharing food with them was lawful, but 
added the political caveat that since Hindus considered Muslims untouchable, 
Muslims should avoid friendly relations. The muftis who supported the Indian 
National Congress accused the opponents of cordial relations with the British 
who were Christians and who were regarded as untouchables in the past by the 
muftis on the other side.
As the above discussion reveals, Muslim theologians developed doctrines 
like tashabbuh and bidÆa to distinguish between religious and cultural practices. 
These distinctions suggested either expanding or limiting the scope of religion. 
However, continued shifting between the two played an important role in the 
development of Muslim cultures. Further, political context also played a signif-
icant role in pushing the frontiers of religion and culture in these theological 
discourses. The above analysis of the doctrine of tashabbuh bi’l- kuffar reveals the 
complex semantic, cultural, religious and political context of its development. 
In its early phase, the doctrine concentrated on refining the notions of similarity 
and dissimilarity and their religious implications, later a clear emphasis on the 
distinction of the religious from other aspects emerged. Next, the notion of simi-
larity is extended to alliance, borrowing the Qur’anic term wila, and the doctrine 
becomes more political than ever in the coming years. During this development, 
the question of intention was introduced to distinguish between the religious, 
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cultural and political aspects of imitation, similarity and alliances; similarity 
was forbidden only if the intention, and later only the explicit intention, was 
to aspire for the “similar” objectives. One can see in the history of the doctrine 
of tashabbuh a continuous accommodation of the changing notions of cosmo-
politanism. 
The idea and practice of cosmopolitanism have also been influenced by 
varying cultural and political contexts. Privileging one specific cultural and 
political context does not suffice to understand the concept of cosmopolitanism 
or the doctrine of tashabbuh. The above discussion suggests that cross-cultural 
studies of such concepts and practices cannot ignore the political context of the 
queries. In the twenty-first-century debates on globalism, pluralism, integration, 
multiculturalism, Islamophobia and inter-faith dialogues have revealed further 
issues about cosmopolitanism and tashabbuh in both Muslim and non-Muslim 
societies. 
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